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1.1 Brief overview of the thesis
Nowadays regulatory bodies and competition policy makers borrow heavily from
the findings of theoretical and empirical economic models.1 However, the Euro-
pean Commission (the EC) warns that this has to be done cautiously because by
’their very nature, economic models and arguments are based on simplifications of real-
ity’.2 Some of the simplifications, e.g. rationality of economic agents, the shape
of demand and supply functions, may be crucial for the outcomes of the models.
Consequently, the predictions drawn from the findings in economics models may
differ significantly from the observations in reality.
A typical assumption in economic models is that all the consumers are fully in-
formed about all firms’ offers and can pick the one providing them with the highest
utility. However, in many real markets information about available offers is costly
to obtain. In this type of markets the optimal consideration set and the ultimate
choice of a consumer may differ significantly from the one in a standard model.
Since consumer decisions shape the price strategies of sellers, the results of eco-
nomic models with fully and partially informed consumers may be quite different.
This thesis contributes to this line of reasoning by introducing consumer search costs3
in standard models of collusion and mergers. Our analysis reveals that the outcome
of a merger (Chapters 2 and 3) and the incentives to collude (Chapter 4) depend
1 Röller (2006) observes that now the question is ’what kind of economics and especially how the economic
analysis is used’ instead of how much economics is needed.
2 DGCompetition (2010)
3 See section 1.2 for the definition of consumer search costs.
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heavily on the magnitude of search costs. The relevance of these results rests on
whether search costs are actually large or not. This thesis also contributes to the
measurement of search costs by developing an empirical consumer search model
for differentiated products (Chapter 5).
The incentives to merge and the welfare implications of mergers continue to be
important topics of study in Industrial Organization (see Shapiro, 1989; Whinston,
2007; Porter, 1991, Ivaldi, Jullien, Rey, Seabright, and Tirole, 2003a). The seminal
works of Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) and Deneckere and Davidson (1985)
show, respectively, that firms do not have incentives to merge in Cournot markets
for homogeneous products, while they do have in Bertrand markets for horizon-
tally differentiated products, with corresponding negative welfare consequences.
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, using a model of consumer search for differentiated
products and Bertrand competition, we demonstrate that a merger paradox can
also arise if consumer search costs are sufficiently high. The basic insight goes as
follows. The standard internalization of pricing externalities makes the price of a
merger to differ from the price of non-merged firms. This difference in prices, along
with the fact that consumers face positive search cost, imply a particular optimal
search order, namely, consumers start searching from non-merged sellers and visit
the shops of a merger only after all the non-merged firms are visited. This search
order has a strong negative effect on the quantity of the merger. Hence, the merger
earns less than in a pre-merger market, despite the higher post-merger price level.
The studies of Farrel and Shapiro (1990), Williamson (1968), Perry and Porter
(1985), Lommerud and Sørgard (1997) and Whinston (2007) reveal that a merger
is welfare improving if it brings sufficient cost efficiencies or increases product va-
riety. In Chapter 3 of this thesis we show that mergers have the potential to be
welfare improving without any supply side efficiencies when consumer search is
sufficiently costly. The mechanism is as follows. Suppose the firms that merge start
selling all the varieties of the parent firms so that they effectively reduce the con-
sumer costs of searching various alternatives. We show that when search costs are
sufficiently high mergers that result in multi-product shops lead to consumer sur-
plus increase even if the post merger prices are above the pre-merger equilibrium
price.
Collusion has also been a theme that has received a lot of attention in indus-
trial organization (see Jacquemin and Slade, 1989; Ivaldi et al., 2003b). Part of that
attention has been on how market transparency affects the stability of collusion.
Borrowing on that body of work, market transparency is assumed to be beneficial
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for colluding sellers by competition authorities.4 The studies of Green and Porter
(1984) suggest that collusion stability increases if the monitoring of cartel members
is easier. Chapter 4 of this thesis adds to this line of work by addressing the relation
between cartel stability and market transparency from a different angle. Rather
than focusing on how firms can monitor one another, we study the incentives to
collude when consumers face search costs. Our analysis reveals that market trans-
parency from the consumer point of view counters with market transparency from
the seller point of view. In other words, a cartel becomes more stable if the search
costs go up.
The previously mentioned chapters add to the theoretical body of work point-
ing to the fact that search costs have an important influence in economic activity
(see Stigler, 1961; Burdett and Judd, 1983; Stahl, 1989; Wolinsky, 1986; Anderson
and Renault, 1999). This body of work has recently led to a new area in empir-
ical economics dedicated to the estimation of search costs (see Hong and Shum,
2006; Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2004; Kim, Albuquerque, and Bronnenberg, 2010;
Moraga-González and Wildenbeest, 2008). This thesis also contributes to this body
of knowledge by developing in Chapter 5 an empirical model of sequential search
for differentiated products. The model uses the well-known multinomial logit
(MNL) demand model. The MNL model has attracted the attention of economists
and competition policy practitioners because, ’despite [a] potentially large number of
dimensions of consumer "types"[...], the resulting demand functions are entirely analytic,
making analysis and estimation relatively straightforward.’5 As a result, there are many
modifications and estimation techniques of this model in the economics literature.
We modify the market-share-based MNL demand model by introducing sequen-
tial consumer search. We show that the estimated parameter values are strongly
affected by the assumption how the consideration set of a consumer is formed.
Costly search also effects the estimation routine.
Chapter 6 of this thesis is dedicated to summarize the main findings of this work
as well as to describe some ideas for future research.
1.2 Literature on consumer search costs
There is lots of advice for consumers by competition authorities and other con-
sumer rights protecting institutions. For instance, the Federal Trade Commission
4 E.g. Federal Trade Commission (2010), section 7.2 ’Evidence a Market is Vulnerable to Coordinated
Conduct’
5 Davis and Garcés (2010) Chapter 9 "Demand System Estimation"
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(the FTC) suggests that a wise consumer should shop around, as the sale price is not
always the “best” price.6 Moreover, the shopper should read the adds carefully and
notice such details as “quantities limited”, or “not available in all stores”. The EC even
advices shoppers to check price differences among the EU member-states, as well
as differences in the terms of any additional commercial guarantees like refund,
repair, etc.7
The existence of this amount of consumer advice indicates that buyers often
make their purchase decisions without collecting and analysing all necessary infor-
mation. Such behaviour may look irrational at first sight. However, it needs not
to be. Information gathering and its analysis require that buyers spend time and
effort.8 Hence, consumers must trade-off the wish to buy the good and(or) service
that gives them the highest possible surplus against the costs of being informed.
Consequently, some consumers deliberately choose to be uninformed or to be par-
tially informed when they make their purchase decisions.
The fact that some consumers are not fully informed about available offers in
a market has an impact on firms’ pricing decisions. This issue has been broadly
discussed in the academic literature. We start the review of the economic models
on costly consumer search by considering the theoretical work. Afterwards we
continue with the summary of the empirical economic models, which are used to
estimate consumer search costs.
1.2.1 Theoretical models
The theoretical models that analyse the effect of consumer search costs on equi-
librium prices and social welfare can be classified in two groups. The first group
consists of the models that deal with homogenous product markets. The second
group of models focuses on differentiated product markets. In all papers firms
maximize their profits by choosing prices. Whether the equilibrium is in mixed or
pure strategies depends on whether products are homogeneous or differentiated.
Stigler (1961) has already pointed out that firms selling homogeneous products
will charge different prices if consumers search for prices at positive costs. When
search is costly, consumers rarely compare all the market offers and so the observed
minimum price may be higher than the minimum market price. Since the con-
6 Some advice can be found on the website of FTC: http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/consumer.shtm.
7 The European Consumer Centres Network http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/index_en.htm.
8 For instance, FTC warns that a smart consumer must ’take time and travel cost into consideration’ while
she is looking for the best price and quality match (FTC “Shopping Tips: Is That Deal for Real?” available
at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt081.shtm.).
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sumer will pay the minimum observed price, firms dare to take a risk and charge
high prices with positive probabilities. Diamond (1971) addresses costly consumer
search in a homogeneous product market where a consumer can observe the price
of only one store per period at a positive search cost. The consumer chooses be-
tween taking the observed current offer or searching one more seller in the next
period. Firms make their pricing decisions every period. Diamond (1971) shows
that firms set their prices slightly below the sum of the price that a consumer would
agree to pay in the subsequent period and the search cost. As a result, sellers charge
the monopoly price and consumers do not search beyond the first visited shop in
equilibrium. Varian (1980) has shown that the Diamond paradox fails to hold if
there are some consumers who are perfectly informed about all prices. In his model
a firm needs to find a balance between charging the monopoly price and serving
only non-informed consumers and having the lowest price and selling many more
units. Varian (1980) demonstrates that in that case there is a unique equilibrium
price distribution.
There are two main types of search protocols in the theoretical consumer search
models: sequential and non-sequential (simultaneous) consumer search. If a consumer
firstly decides on the number of offers she wants to search and makes the purchas-
ing decision only after all chosen alternatives are observed then the consumer is
said to search non-sequentially. A consumer searches sequentially if she makes the
decision whether to sample one more store or stop searching and accept the best
observed offer after every visit to a shop.
No matter the search protocol employed by consumers, the price equilibrium in
homogeneous product markets is in mixed strategies. Burdett and Judd (1983) have
assumed that consumers search non-sequentially and have shown that there may
be one and more dispersed price equilibria in their model. Janssen and Moraga-
González (2004) introduced a fraction of zero search cost consumers in the model of
Burdett and Judd (1983) and assumed a finite number of firms. There is no equilib-
rium in pure strategies in their model too, and the expected price does not decrease
with the number of firms. Stahl (1989) studies a model where some consumers
have zero search costs and others have positive search costs, but with sequential
search rather than non-sequential. He also characterizes an equilibrium in mixed
strategies that bridges between the monopoly price equilibrium and the competi-
tive price equilibrium as the fraction of zero search cost consumers goes form zero
to one. Janssen, Moraga-González, and Wildenbeest (2005) examined equilibrium
properties in a slightly modified version of Stahl (1989). More particularly, they as-
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sume that the searching consumers do not get the first price quote for free. In their
model the equilibrium is also in mixed strategies. Additionally, they show that
when the search cost is hight, the searching consumers may decide to stay outside
the market with strictly positive probability.
By contrast, horizontally differentiated product markets with costly consumer
search typically exhibit equilibria in pure strategies. The equilibrium price(s) is(are)
above marginal production costs because firms have some market power. Knauff
(2006) analyses the equilibrium in a Hotelling model where a fraction of consumers
are not informed about the prices. She has shown that ’an increase in market trans-
parency9 causes the equilibrium prices of both goods to decrease’. Wolinsky (1986) demon-
strates that the symmetric equilibrium price is above marginal production costs if
consumer search is costly, even if the number of firms tends to infinity. Moreover,
the analysis of Anderson and Renault (1999) reveals that the equilibrium price in a
differentiated product market increases with search costs.
In all this work, a key result is that prices become higher as consumer search
costs increase. Governmental institutions that protect consumer welfare take good
account of this result. For instance according to a survey of the Irish National Con-
sumer Agency (INCA), in 2008 British retailers charged Irish consumers 60% more
than British customers.10 The surveyed retailers argued they faced higher operat-
ing costs in Ireland than in Great Britain. However, Irish consumers would have
benefited by buying via Internet from the stores in Great Britain even after taking
into account currency exchange and delivery costs. The INCA survey in 2010 found
that just over 7 in 10 consumers stated that they shopped for better prices.11 As a
result, the agency advises consumers to ’watch price labels’, ’shop around’, ’remember
discount stores’, etc.12
When gathering price information is costly for consumers, there is also a role
for firm advertising. Robert and Stahl II (1993) have analysed price advertising in a
homogeneous product market with sequentially searching consumers. Robert and
Stahl II (1993) have shown that firms ’advertise “sale” prices more than high prices’, but
they advertise less if the search costs approach zero. Haan and Moraga-González
(2011) have examined advertising incentives in a horizontally differentiated prod-
uct market with sequential consumer search. In their model advertising attracts
consumers’ attention but does not reveal the details about firms’ offers. Their anal-
9 The fraction of informed consumers.
10 INCA (2008)“Watch out for sterling price differences” available at http://www.consumerconnect.ie.
11 ICNA (2011) “Consumer attitudes to shopping and pricing” available at http://www.consumerconnect.ie.
12 See footnote 10.
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ysis reveals that firms advertise more if the search cost goes up and the distribution
function of match values is convex. However, the equilibrium price goes up if the
search cost increases.
Recently, the search cost literature has also paid attention to the origin of search
costs and has recognized that to some extent search costs are created by the firms
themselves. In this regard, a relevant question is whether firms are interested in
increasing or decreasing search costs. On the one hand, a seller that charges a high
price can sell more if a customer has difficulties to compare its offer with the offers
of other firms. As a result, firms may want to make their products, the descriptions
of their price components, etc. less understandable for consumers. The practice of
doing this is called obfuscation. On the other hand, higher search costs may reduce
overall demand. Ellison and Wolitzky (2009) have modified the model of Stahl
(1989) by introducing the possibility for firms to engage in obfuscation. They find
that firms obfuscate in equilibrium. Moreover, if a firm charges a higher price then
it obfuscates more. Wilson (2010) also looks at the market equilibrium in a sequen-
tial consumer search model with homogeneous products. In contrast to Ellison and
Wolitzky (2009), he assumes that consumers can observe the obfuscation level of
a firm before the visit. Wilson (2010) shows that there is no market equilibrium
where firms choose not to obfuscate.13
Models of consumer search costs have also been prominent in the study of firm
location, firm agglomeration and product differentiation. A firm that provides a
consumer with the highest expected surplus has the highest chance to get into the
consideration set of the consumer. A consumer gets higher expected surplus at a
firm if it charges a lower price, offers more varieties or (and) is searched at a lower
search cost than other sellers. Hence, firms may decide to settle near each other
(join a cluster). If the firms enter a cluster then the search costs per clustered firm
are less than the search costs per stand-alone seller. Then competition between
clustered firms is stronger than between stand-alone shops. Prices and profits of
sellers go down if competition becomes more intense. This has a negative effect on
the incentives to cluster. Nevertheless, the results of economic analysis show that
sellers prefer to join the clusters of shops in a costly search market. For instance,
Non (2010) analyses a homogeneous product market with one shop cluster and
13 The Office of Fair Trading (the OFT) issued a detailed report of the study on consumer attitude to-
wards advertising in 2010. The results of the study show ’just under half the consumers would like to see
"standardised information" or suppliers using the same terms in advertisements’. (Office of Fair Trading (2010))
(Annexe H). Moreover, ’two-thirds of people ended up buying the product that was advertised’, given that firms
charged their customers unadvertised fees on the top of the advertised prices. (Office of Fair Trading
(2010))
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many isolated shops. She finds that in equilibrium clustered shops earn more than
stand-alone sellers if the search costs are sufficiently high. Wolinsky (1983) has
looked at the location choice of firms which are distributed around a circle in a
sequential consumer search market. He has proved that an equilibrium where all
firms settle in one place may arise. There is no particular geographical distribution
of shops in the sequential search model of Fischer and Harrington Jr (1996). The
search costs per cluster vary across consumers, and all consumers experience the
same fixed search cost per stand-alone seller. Fischer and Harrington Jr (1996) find
that when the degree of product heterogeneity is sufficiently large, clustered firms
earn more than their competitors, and stand-alone sellers prefer to join the cluster.
Stahl (1982) has analysed the incentives for firms to cluster in a costly search market
where firms are evenly spread on a line. He shows that ’the only sufficient condition
for a spatial concentration of firms never to take place is that...all commodities are considered
perfect substitutes by all consumers’.
1.2.2 Empirical models
There have not been many attempts to estimate consumer search cost models in
the applied economics literature. This is an important omission because costly
consumer search implies that the consideration sets vary among consumers. As
a result, estimating demand parameters using prices that are constrained by con-
sumer search may lead to significant biases. Therefore, incorporating information
about consumer’s consideration set is a crucial step in the estimation of structural
market models (see Draganska and Klapper, 2010; De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and
Wildenbeest, 2011). In some applications, however, it is quite difficult to observe
the consideration set of consumers and there the use of theory of optimal consumer
search lends itself as a solution to map from observables to consumer’s considera-
tion sets (see Hong and Shum, 2006; Moraga-González, Sándor, and Wildenbeest,
2011).
We classify the empirical models on consumer search according to two dimen-
sions: (1) whether products are homogeneous or differentiated and (2) whether
consumers search sequentially or non-sequentially. The degree of product hetero-
geneity affects the data that is necessary to identify consumer search costs. Mean-
while, the search protocol has an impact on model specification.
We start with markets for homogeneous products. A consumer looks for the
cheapest product in a homogeneous product market. Firms chose their prices from
an equilibrium price distribution. Then a firm sells to a consumer only if the buyer
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does not sample other firms with lower prices. There is a negative relationship be-
tween the search costs and the size of the consideration set of a non-sequentially
searching consumer. Hence, a consumer with high search costs buys from a high
price charging firm more often than a consumer with low search costs. This is be-
cause, the probability that a high search cost consumer finds a cheaper offer is less
than the probability that a low search cost consumer finds a lower price. As a result,
Hong and Shum (2006) have shown that the cut-off values of the search cost distri-
bution can be identified using just price data. However, Moraga-González, Sándor,
and Wildenbeest (2010) warn that the set of the calculated search cost distribution
cut-off values does not converge to a continuous search cost distribution if the num-
ber of sellers goes to infinity, provided that the price distribution of only one market
is observed. This happens because the incremental benefit of a consumer decreases
with every additional observation in her consideration set.
When products are differentiated then there are factors other than the price that
affect the probability that a firm gets into a consumer’s consideration set. This im-
plies that having data on prices only is not enough to identify the search costs of
consumers. If a firm charges a high price then the majority of its customers are
not necessarily the customers with relatively high search costs. This is because
other product characteristics may overcome the negative price effect on the utility.
Hence, it is impossible to claim that a specific subset of firms has not been sampled
if a consumer buys from a particular seller. The number of possible consumer’s con-
sideration sets increases rapidly with the number of alternatives and this compli-
cates the estimation of the model. Honka (2010) has estimated the USA auto insur-
ance demand function using additional information. She has overcome the many-
consideration-sets problem by observing the consideration sets and choices of the
customers. Meanwhile, Moraga-González et al. (2011) have proposed a method to
estimate the search costs by using market share data. They have solved the issue
of many consideration sets by employing importance sampling, which makes the
numerical optimization feasible.
A sequentially searching consumer starts searching from the alternatives that
have the highest expected utility and searches further as long as the additional gain
from search is higher than the additional search costs. The expression that equates
the gains from an additional search and the search costs, defines the utility cut-off
values (reservation utilities). The ranking of the reservation utilities is equivalent
to the ranking of the expected utilities. Hence, the reservation utilities are impor-
tant in defining the search order of a consumer and the identification of the search
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costs. If products are homogeneous and the prices of firms are drawn from the same
equilibrium price distribution then consumers sample firms randomly. Thus, the
estimation of the search cost distribution with sequentially searching consumers is
similar (but not the same) to the estimation of the search cost distribution in a non-
sequential search market. The study of Hong and Shum (2006) suggests that the
data on prices is sufficient to identify the parameters of the search cost distribution
in a homogeneous product market because the probability for a consumer to find
the cheapest offer decreases with the search costs.
Product heterogeneity again makes the inference about the search order more
difficult. If products only differ in quality, then consumers start searching from
the highest quality products and end up with the lowest quality items. This as-
sumption has been used by Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004), who have estimated the
search cost distribution for S&P 500 index funds.
If products are horizontally differentiated then there is no single alternative
characteristic that can be used to determine the search order. Hence, some addi-
tional data are needed to decrease the myriad of search orders. Koulayev (2010) had
information on searching and clicking activity of consumers, when he estimated
online demand for hotels. Similarly, De los Santos et al. (2011) had information on
browsing history and transactions when they studied the search behaviour of con-
sumers. Brynjolfsson, Dick, and Smith (2010) estimated demand for books by ob-
serving the sequence in which the offers were presented to a consumer. Meanwhile,
Kim et al. (2010) used a specific Amazon ranking index to infer the search order in
the estimation of online demand model for camcorders. Dubois and Perrone (2010)
used the distance measure and other vertical characteristics of the supermarkets to
infer the order in which a household visited the shops.
1.3 Contribution of this thesis
1.3.1 Mergers, cartels and search costs
Competition between sellers is beneficial for a consumer because competition leads
to relatively ’low prices, high quality products, a wide selection of goods and services,
and innovation’.14 A horizontal merger often decreases the intensity of competition.
Hence, mergers are considered to be detrimental for consumer welfare and, corre-
spondingly, are carefully examined by competition authorities.
14 European Commission (2010b)
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The total effect of a merger on consumer surplus and the profits of firms de-
pends on the assumptions of the model. For instance, if the costs of the merged
firms decrease, the sellers introduce new varieties or new firms enter the post
merger market easily, then consumers may be better off after the merger. Further-
more, the profitability of a merger and incentives to merge depend on the degree
of product heterogeneity. In two subsequent chapters of this thesis we analyze the
effect of costly consumer search on the incentives to merge in a horizontally differ-
entiated product market. The analysis shows that the search order changes after a
merger, and it affects the profits of firms and the total welfare.
Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) and Zhou (2011) have proved that the
search order has a strong effect on equilibrium prices of firms in a differentiated
product market. Their analysis shows that if consumers follow a specific pre-
determined search order then firms charge different prices even if they have the
same production costs and their varieties are identical ex ante. The demand elas-
ticity of a seller decreases with its position on the search list. Then the firms that
are closer to the end of the search list charge higher prices in equilibrium than their
competitors that are closer to the top of the list. Consequently, later visited sellers
sell less and often earn less profit than earlier visited firms.
We analyze how merging affects the order in which firms are visited and the
incentives to merge in Chapter 2. Merging involves only joint price setting among
merged firms, and neither the number of shops nor the number of varieties per
shop changes after a merger. Due to the internalization of pricing externalities the
merger and the non-merged firms are expected to charge different prices. If the ex-
pectations of consumers about prices are different before and after the merger then
the search orders also differ. Then both the internalization of pricing externalities
and the search order affect equilibrium prices. We show that there is an equilibrium
in the post-merger market where the merged firms charge higher prices than their
competitors, and consumers visit the merging shops only after all the non-merged
sellers are visited.
The post-merger equilibrium quantities are affected by the search order and the
price level. Firstly, the price of the merger is higher than the price of its competi-
tors. Therefore, there is a negative price effect on the quantity of every merging
firm. Furthermore, positive search costs imply that less consumers reach the merg-
ing shops in general if the sellers are at the end of the search order. Thus, the
quantity of the merging shops drops down sharply in the post-merger market. If
the search costs are sufficiently high then the quantity of the merger drops down a
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lot and a merger paradox arises: the merging firms earn less than before the merger.
Contrarily, the non-merged firms sell more than in the pre-merger market. Thus,
the profits of the non-merged firms are higher than the profits of the merging firms
and exceed the pre-merger profits.
The post-merger equilibrium in our model is similar to the post-merger equilib-
rium in the model of Deneckere and Davidson (1985). The post-merger equilibrium
prices are higher than the pre-merger equilibrium price and non-merged firms take
a free ride in both models. However, the results of our model suggest that a merger
may be not profitable if consumer search is costly. It goes without saying that the
outcome of our model converges to the outcome of Deneckere and Davidson (1985)
if the search cost approaches zero.
Merging firms prefer to overcome the negative effect of the search order on their
profits. However, the internalization of pricing externalities makes it almost impos-
sible for a merger to set its price below the price of its non-merged competitors.15
Then the merger may use other means to raise the attractiveness of its shops and
get on the top of the consumers’ search list. This issue is analysed in Chapter 3 of
the thesis. We assume that a merger starts selling all the varieties of the parent firms
in all its shops (or what is equivalent in our model, closes all its shops but one and
puts all its varieties in one place). In this way, a consumer can observe many vari-
eties in the shop of the merger for the same search cost that she incurs if she visits
a typical non-merged firm. We show that this alters fundamentally the nature of
equilibrium since it turns out that in equilibrium consumers start searching at the
merging firms if the search cost is sufficiently high.
In the second model the order effect works in favour of the merger, and its
profit per variety is higher than in a pre-merger market. However, the profit of a
non-merged firm is less than in a pre-merger market if the search cost is sufficiently
high. The profit of the merger increases enough to compensate the decrease in
the profits of its non-merged counterparts. Thus, the total industry profit goes up
after the horizontal integration for any value of the search cost. If the search cost
is sufficiently high then a merger raises consumer surplus. This happens because
a consumer observes several varieties in the shop of the merger and saves on her
total search costs. The savings on search costs outweigh the negative effect of the
higher post-merger prices and consumer surplus increases.
Real market examples show that firms may pool their products together or keep
15 We show in Chapter 2 that there may be an equilibrium when the merger is visited before the non-
merged firms because the later charge a higher price than the merger. However, this equilibrium exists
just for some parameter values and can be destabilized by introducing some zero search cost consumers.
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them separately after a merger. For instance, the EC cleared the merger between
Adidas-Salomon AG and Reebok International Ltd at the beginning of 2006. However,
both brands keep their online stores separately and it is not possible to buy Adidas
sport shoes on the web-site of Reebok. On the other hand, a consumer may buy a
ticket for the flight that is operated by AirFrance on the web-site of KLM, or a ticket
to the flight that is operated by Swiss European Air Lines For Swiss on the web page
Lufthansa. The choices of merged firms to pool their differentiated products to-
gether or keep selling separately indicate whether the search order effect is strong.
The clients of the sport-clothing companies are relatively loyal to their favourite
brand names. Therefore, an increase in prices probably did not deter consumers
from starting their search from the shops of Reebok and Adidas. Moreover, sep-
arate selling places make more distinction between brands and firms can charge
higher prices. Meanwhile, it may be that a customer cares about available flight
times and accessible airports more than the brand names of the airlines. Therefore,
all flights of the merged airlines can be found on the same web page.
The incentives to collude and cartel stability in a sequential consumer search
market with differentiated products are analysed in Chapter 4. It has been shown
by Schultz (2005) that market transparency from the consumer point of view makes
cartels less stable. He has analysed a Hotelling model where a fraction of con-
sumers are not informed about prices in the market, whereas the rest of the buyers
are perfectly informed. He has shown that the critical discount factor above which
a cartel becomes sustainable increases if the fraction of uninformed consumers de-
creases.
An increase in the costs of search works in the same way as an increase in the
fraction of uninformed consumers. This happens because a consumer searches less
on average if the search cost goes up. Hence the results of our analysis are in line
with the findings of Schultz (2005): a cartel becomes more stable if the search cost
goes up. The result is driven by the fact that the deviation price is observed by
less consumers if the search cost increases. Then a deviant does not attract as many
customers as in a fully transparent market, and the deviation is less attractive.
1.3.2 An empirical model of sequential search for differentiated
products
In Chapter 5 of this thesis we develop an empirical model of sequential search for
differentiated products. The model borrows heavily from the theory used in earlier
chapters. To make the model more appealing in empirical applications, we general-
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ize the standard setup of Wolinsky (1986). In particular we develop an application
of such a model for a retail banking industry. A bank is a universal financial insti-
tution that is involved in many financial activities. It accepts deposits, issues loans,
mortgages, acts as an intermediary in the transactions among individuals, compa-
nies and governments, participates in financial markets as an investor, etc. Further-
more, the banking market is quite concentrated, which implies that the unilateral
actions of a single bank have a big impact on the market equilibrium. Additionally,
the markets for different banking services are closely related to each other, e.g. a
bank may accept the deposits of its customers in very unprofitable terms if it makes
the funding access to other credit institutions more costly, and allows the credit in-
stitution to gain a dominant position in a credit market. Hence, it is a big challenge
to derive a full structural banking service market model.
We employ the MNL framework to derive a demand function for saving de-
posits. We assume that bank customers observe only several saving contract char-
acteristics at zero search costs and the rest of the characteristics have to be learnt
at positive search costs. The customers search banks sequentially with perfect re-
call. It is assumed that bank customers treat the service of banks as a differentiated
product. Hence, the estimation requires data on interest rates, the market shares of
saving contracts and the characteristics of the banks.16
The idea to use discrete choice models for the estimation of the demand of bank-
ing services is not a unique idea. Ishii (2005) has used this method to estimate how
the demand of saving deposits and bank’s incentives to invest in their ATM net-
works are affected by the compatibility of ATM networks. This method has been
applied by Dick (2008) for the deposit demand estimation in the banking indus-
try in the USA. Molnár, Nagy, and Horváth (2007), Nakane, Alencar, and Kanczuk
(2006) and Zhou (2008) used the random coefficient MNL demand model to esti-
mate the structural banking market models in Hungary, Brazil and China respec-
tively. Our novelty is that we introduce the aspect of consumer search in this type
of models. If the search is costly then a bank customer often accepts alternatives
other than the one that gives maximum utility. Therefore, the estimated parame-
ters are biased if positive consumer search costs are ignored in the derivation of
the demand function. If the estimated parameter next to the interest rate is less
than the true value then the elasticity of the saving deposit demand function is
underestimated and the results of a counterfactual merger simulation can be quite
16 The quantities of accepted saving deposits, their interest rates and other data are reported by credit
institutions to the central bank of a particular country. Therefore, this data is actually available, although
strict data confidentiality has restrict us so far the access to the necessary information.
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misleading.
The search order that consumers follow when they search for banking services
has to be known for the correct specification of the demand function. This problem
is very severe in horizontally differentiated product markets, because it is impossi-
ble to infer the search order from the observable product characteristics. We over-
come this problem by assuming that the search cost parameter varies across con-
sumers and banks independently. Thus, any search order may be followed with a
positive probability. The number of possible search orders increases with the num-
ber of banks.17 Hence, in applications to markets with many firms the estimation
of the model becomes very hard. In those cases, some additional information about
consumer search behaviour is needed. In very concentrated markets such as the
retail banking, the model is tractable.
At the stage of closing this thesis, we lacked data from a real world bank services
market. Because of this, the demand model is estimated using simulated market
data. The simulation of the market shares involves the integration over the search
cost distribution and solving a large number of non-linear search rule equations.
Thus, the simulation of the data and the estimation of the model are very time con-
suming. In order to perform a sufficient number of estimations we impose a couple
of restrictions on consumer search. We assume that some bank customers have zero
search costs and the rest of the customers search at most one credit institution if they
search at all. The second assumption decreases the number of non-linear equations
that have to be solved during the simulation of the data and the estimation of the
model. Thus, the simulation and the estimation time significantly decreases.
17 If there are n banks then a consumer may follow n! search orders.

Chapter 2
Consumer Search Costs and the
Incentives to Merge with
Bertrand Competition∗
2.1 Introduction
One of the most important insights in merger analysis is that merging is not very
attractive in the environments where firms compete in quantities and offer simi-
lar products (Salant et al. (1983)). This result, known as the merger paradox, arises
because the output reduction of the merging firms, which favors the coalition part-
ners, is accompanied by an output expansion of the non-merging ones, which hurts
them and has a dominating influence. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) show that
price-setting firms selling horizontally differentiated products, other things equal,
always have an incentive to merge. This result arises because the price increase of
the merging firms, which favors the coalition partners, is accompanied by the price
increase of the non-merging firms, which also favors them.
While no one would deny that searching for a price and product fit is costly in
real-world markets – think for example about the time we spend test-driving new
cars, acquiring new furniture, trying on new clothes, etc. – there has been little
work in the industrial organization literature on the influence of search costs on the
incentives to merge and on the aggregate implications of mergers. In this chapter
∗This chapter is based on Moraga-González and Petrikaite˙ (2011a)
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we argue that when search costs are important mergers may become unprofitable,
even if they involve firms competing in prices and selling horizontally differenti-
ated products.
Our model has a finite number of firms selling differentiated products. The
exact utility a buyer derives from consuming a product can only be ascertained
upon visiting the seller. Consumers search for satisfactory deals sequentially. Firms
compete in prices. In a pre-merger market, all firms look alike and when consumers
pick a first shop to visit, they do so in a random way. Those consumers who fail
to find a satisfactory product continue searching and once again they pick the next
shop to visit randomly; and so on. This model was introduced by Wolinsky (1986)
and was further studied by Anderson and Renault (1999). When search cost is
equal to zero, the model is similar to Perloff and Salop (1985) and merger analysis
gives the same results as in Deneckere and Davidson (1985).
When search cost is positive, higher prices charged by the merging stores result
in consumers searching first at the non-merging firms’ and then, in the event they
fail to find a satisfactory product in those firms, continue searching at the merging
stores. In equilibrium, as search costs increase, the share of consumers who walk
away from the non-merging stores and show up at the merged shops falls, which
makes merging less profitable. We show that any two-firm merger is unprofitable
if search costs are sufficiently high. Moreover, we show that any arbitrary k-firm
merger becomes unprofitable if search costs and the number of non-merging firms
are sufficiently high. These results establish a new merger paradox. What is inter-
esting about this paradox is that it arises even if firms sell horizontally differenti-
ated products and compete in prices.
Janssen and Moraga-González (2007) also study mergers in a consumer search
market. In contrast with the present model, they focus on markets where firms
sell homogeneous products and there is price dispersion. Their main result is that
mergers have redistributive effects with consumers searching little getting better off
at the expense of consumers who search a lot. Our model is also related to a recent
literature on ordered search. Arbatskaya (2007) studies a market for homogeneous
products where the order in which firms are visited is exogenously given. In equi-
librium prices must fall as the consumer walks away from the firms visited first.
Zhou (2011) considers the case of differentiated products and finds the opposite
result. Armstrong et al. (2009) study the implications of “prominence” in search
markets. In their model, there is a firm that is always visited first and this firm
charges lower prices and derives greater profits than the rest of the firms, which
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are visited randomly after consumers have visited the prominent firm. Zhou (2009)
extends the ideas in Armstrong et al. (2009) to the case in which a set of firms,
rather than just one, is prominent. In our model, the merging stores, by raising
their prices to internalize the pricing externalities they exert on one another, confer
the non-merging firms a “prominent” position in the marketplace. In Haan and
Moraga-González (2011), firms gain prominence by advertising. Also related is
the paper of Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004), who present a model where sampling
probability variation across firms is used to explain price dispersion in the mutual
funds industry.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
consumer search model. Section 2.3 presents the equilibrium analysis, for both
cases, the pre-merger market and the post-merger market. Some model modifica-
tions and the discussion about other equilibria are in section 2.4. Section 2.5 offers
some concluding remarks. Various proofs are placed in an appendix to ease the
reading of the chapter.
2.2 The model and the pre-merger symmetric equilib-
rium
We use Wolinsky (1986) model of search for differentiated products. On the supply
side of the market there are n ≥ 3 firms selling horizontally differentiated products.
All firms employ the same constant returns to scale technology of production and
we normalize unit production costs to zero. On the demand side of the market,
there is a unit mass of consumers. A consumer m has tastes described by an indirect
utility function
umi(pi) = εmi − pi,
if she buys product i at price pi. The parameter εmi can be thought of as a match
value between consumer m and product i. Match values are independently dis-
tributed across consumers and products. We assume that the value εmi is the real-
ization of a random variable uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. No firm can observe
εmi so practising price discrimination is not feasible. In what follows we will define
z` ≡ max{ε1, ε2, ..., ε`}. For later reference, it will also be useful to calculate the
optimal price of a multi-product monopolist selling ` varieties, which we refer to
as pm` . This price maximizes p(Pr[z` ≥ p]), and this gives pm` = (1 + `)−
1
` . Setting
` = 1, we have the single-product monopolist, whose price will simply be labeled
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pm.
Consumers search sequentially with costless recall. We assume that a search
cost s is relatively small so that the first search is always worth, that is:
0 ≤ s ≤ s ≡ Pr[ε ≥ pm]E[ε− pm | ε ≥ pm],
which yields s ≡ (1− pm)2/2. When the search cost is equal to zero, the model is
similar to Perloff and Salop (1985).
We focus on symmetric equilibrium.1 Following Wolinsky (1986), let p∗ denote
the price charged by firms other than firm i and consider the (expected) payoff
to a firm i which deviates from the symmetric equilibrium by charging a price pi.
Assume pi ≥ p∗ without loss of generality.
We start by computing the probability that a consumer accepts the offer of firm
i, conditional on visiting firm i first. Suppose that the purchase option at firm i gives
the buyer utility εi − pi. If εi − pi < 0, the consumer will search again given our
assumption s < s. Suppose εi − pi ≥ 0. In equilibrium, a buyer who contemplates
searching again expects to see a price of p∗ at the next shop to visit. Therefore,
searching one more time, say at firm j, yields gains only if ε j > εi − pi + p∗ ≡ x,
i.e., if the consumer prefers the new option over option i. The expected benefit from
searching once more is then
ˆ 1
x
(ε− x)dε = 1
2
(1− x)2 (2.1)
Searching one more time is worthwhile if and only if these incremental benefits
exceed the cost of search s. The buyer is exactly indifferent between searching once
more and stopping and accepting the offer at hand if x = x, with x given by the
solution to 12 (1− x)2 = s, i.e., x = 1−
√
2s. Since s ∈ [0, (1− pm)2/2], we have
that x ∈ [pm, 1].
In any equilibrium x ≥ p∗. Therefore, the probability that a buyer stops search-
1 We note that asymmetric equilibria can be sustained in this model. The idea is that if consumers
believe that firms’ prices are, say, ordered as follows p1 < p2 < ... < pn, then it is optimal for consumers
to visit firms in that order and for firms to price in a way to make consumer beliefs coherent. The
unattractive feature of these equilibria is that they are not determined by the underlying characteristics
of the market, but by an indeterminacy of beliefs. We will ignore this types of equilibria in our model.
A completely different situation is that studied in Zhou (2011) where it is assumed that the shops of
the firms are arranged in a particular way so consumers have no alternative than to visit them in a
pre-specified exogenous order.
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ing at firm i, given that firm i is visited first, is equal to
Pr[x > x] = 1− x− pi + p∗,
provided the deviating price is not too high, i.e., pi < 1− x+ p∗ for otherwise every
single consumer would walk away from firm i.2
The consumer may visit firm i after having visited other firm(s). The probability
that a consumer goes to firm i in her second search and decides to acquire the
offering of firm i right away is x(1− x − pi + p∗).3 Similarly, the probability that
a consumer goes to firm i in her `-th search and decides to acquire the offering of
firm i right away is x`−1(1− x− pi + p∗).
To complete firm i’s payoff calculation, we need to compute the joint probability
that a consumer walks away from every single firm in the market and happens to
return to firm i to conduct a transaction, that is
Pr[max{0, zn−1 − p∗} < εi − pi < x− p∗]
This probability is independent of the order in which firms are visited. We will
label it as ra to indicate that these are consumers who return to a firm i after having




(εi − pi + p∗)n−1dεi =
ˆ x−p∗
0
(εi + p∗)n−1dεi =
1
n
(xn − p∗n) (2.2)








We look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in prices. After the requirement that
consumer expectations are fulfilled, i.e., pi = p∗, the first-order condition (FOC) is:
1− p∗n − p∗ 1− x
n
1− x = 0 (2.4)
It is easy to check that (2.4) has a unique solution that satisfies x ≥ p∗ ≥ 1− x.4
2 In what follows we derive the payoff of a firm under the assumption that pi < 1− x + p∗. When this
does not hold, the payoff is slightly different. We deal with this case later (see footnote 4).
3 Letting j denote the firm visited earlier, this probability is given by Pr[εi − pi > x− p∗ > ε j − p∗].
4 The equilibrium price p∗ is indeed an equilibrium if no firm has an incentive to deviate from it. So
far we have checked that "small" deviations are not profitable. Suppose now that the deviant firm
charges a price so high that consumers always walk away from it and, therefore, this firm only sells
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In addition, one can show that the equilibrium price increases in the search cost s
(Wolinsky, 1986; Anderson and Renault, 1999).




2.3 Equilibrium when k firms merge
In this section we study the price implications of mergers and the incentives to
merge. As in Deneckere and Davidson (1985), we abstract from efficiency gains and
focus on the effects of joint (price) decision-making. Consider that k firms merge,
with 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. In what follows, a typical merging firm will be labeled i, while
a typical non-merging store will be labeled j.
As before we focus on symmetric equilibria in the sense that all non-merging
firms will be assumed to charge p˜∗, and all merging firms will be supposed to
charge pˆ∗. As it is expected, suppose also that the merging firms charge higher
prices than the non-merging firms, i.e., p˜∗ < pˆ∗. This is reasonable because in-
ternalizing the pricing externalities the merging firms confer on one another lead
these firms to charge higher prices than the non-merging ones.5
Given this, optimal consumer search (see e.g. Kohn and Shavell, 1974) implies
consumers should start searching for a satisfactory product at the non-merging
to those consumers who come back to it after having visited all other firms. In that case the deviant
profits become Πi(pi ; p∗) = pi
´ 1
pi
(εi − pi + p∗)n−1dεi . Because of log-concavity of the uniform density
function, this profits expression is quasi-concave in own price (Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)). Taking the
derivative of the deviating profits with respect to pi , and setting pi = p∗, we get dΠi/dpi |pi=p∗ =
(1− p∗n − np∗)/n < 0, where the inequality follows from the fact that p∗ solves (2.4). Since deviating
profits are quasi-concave and they decrease at pi = p∗, we conclude they are even lower at prices pi
such that x + pi − p∗ > 1.
5 A comment on the existence of other equilibria is in order now. As in the pre-merger market, it may be
possible to sustain asymmetric equilibria in the sense that distinct non-merging and/or distinct merging
firms charge different prices. Again, these asymmetries are not based on any underlying characteristic
of the market and can only be sustained because of the indeterminacy of consumer beliefs discussed in
the previous section. We will abstract from these types of asymmetric equilibria. What may also happen
is that a symmetric equilibrium where the merging firms charge a price lower than the non-merging firms,
i.e. p˜∗ > pˆ∗, exists. This equilibrium is counterintuitive because we know that joint-profit maximization
leads the merging firms to internalize the pricing externalities they impose on one another, which calls
for higher rather than lower prices than the non-merging firms. Therefore, if this type of symmetric
equilibrium exists, it must be because the force of consumer beliefs more than offsets the effect of joint
profit-maximization. Later in Section 2.4.2 we prove that an equilibrium with p˜∗ > pˆ∗ fails to exist
when for example the search cost is low or when the search cost is high. In those cases, the strength of
the order effect driven by consumer beliefs is relatively weak. The implication of this result is that if one
takes seriously such an equilibrium where the merging firms charge lower prices than the non-merging
ones, consumer beliefs should be discontinuous in search costs, which is difficult to justify. In Section
2.4.2, we also show that this type of equilibrium can easily be destabilized when for example there exist
consumers in the market who have zero search costs.
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firms and then, if no alternative is found to be good enough in those firms, con-
tinue searching at the merging ones. To calculate the equilibrium, we proceed by
computing the payoff the two types of stores (merging and non-merging) would
obtain when deviating from the equilibrium prices. Then we derive the FOCs, re-
quire consumer expectations to be correct, and solve for equilibrium prices.
Payoff to a deviant non-merging store.
We now compute the payoff of a non-merging store j that deviates from p˜∗ by
charging p˜ 6= p˜∗. As all non-merging firms are supposed to charge the same price
p˜∗, consumers are assumed to visit them randomly. Therefore the deviant firm
may be visited in first place, second place and so on till the (n− k)-th place. As any
other non-merging store, the deviant has a probability 1/(n − k) of being visited
in each of these positions. When the consumer visits the deviant in the 1st, 2nd,
..., (n − k − 1)-th place, the decision whether to continue searching or not takes
into account that the next visited shop is also a non-merging store. By contrast,
when the deviant firm is the last non-merging store visited by the consumer, i.e.
the (n − k)-th, the decision of the consumer is slightly different because the next
shop to be visited is a merging store and such a store charges a price different from
the price of a non-merging store. Since the consumer stopping rule is different at
any of the first n− k− 1 non-merging stores than that at the last non-merging store,
it is convenient to distinguish among those two cases.
• Consider the deviant non-merging firm j that is visited by a consumer in h-th
place, with h = 1, 2, ..., n− k− 1. Suppose the deal a consumer observes upon
entering the deviant’s shop is ε j − p˜. There are three circumstances in which
the deviant sells to this consumer.
– First, the consumer may stop searching at this shop and buy there right
away. This occurs when ε j ≥ x− p˜∗ + p˜, where x was defined in Section
2.2. Therefore, the joint probability a consumer visits the deviant in h-th
place and buys there directly is
Pr[zh−1 − p˜∗ < x− p˜∗ < ε j − p˜] = xh−1 (1− x + p˜∗ − p˜)
– Second, the consumer may walk away from the firm visited in h-th place
and come back to it after visiting all non-merging stores. To see this, note
that optimal search implies that the consumer would walk away from
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the last non-merging store to visit one of the merging firms if zn−k ≤
x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗. Moreover, if the consumer did arrive to the (n− k)-th non-
merging store it is because zn−k−1 ≤ x¯. Since pˆ∗ > p˜∗, it is clear that
the condition to leave the last non-merging store and continue searching
among the merging stores is more stringent than to continue searching
among the non-merging stores. For this reason, the consumer may re-
turn to the deviant firm after having visited all non-merging firms and
buy there. This occurs when
Pr[max{zn−k−1 − p˜∗, x− pˆ∗} < ε˜ j − p˜ < x− p˜∗]
and this gives the following "coming back" or "returning" demand:
r˜nm ≡
ˆ x− p˜∗+ p˜
x− pˆ∗+ p˜
(
ε j − p˜ + p˜∗
)n−k−1 dε j = 1n− k (xn−k − (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k)
where the subindex "nm" refers to the fact that consumers return to the
deviant firm after having visited all the non-merging stores.
– Finally, the consumer may walk away from the deviant non-merging
firm and come back to it after having visited all the firms in the market.
This occurs when
Pr[max{zn−k−1 − p˜∗, zk − pˆ∗, 0} < ε˜ j − p˜ < x− pˆ∗]





ε j + p˜∗
)n−k−1 (
ε j + pˆ∗
)k dε j (2.6)
where the subindex "a" again refers to the fact that consumers return
after having visited all the stores.
• We now consider the case in which the deviant firm is visited in (n − k)-th
place. This type of firm sells to the consumers in two cases:
– First, the consumer stops searching at this shop and buys there right
away. This occurs with probability
Pr[ε j − p˜ ≥ max{zn−k−1 − p˜∗, x− pˆ∗} and zn−k−1 < x]
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and this gives a demand
xn−k−1 (1− x + p˜∗ − p˜) + 1
n− k
[
xn−k − (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k
]
– Second, the consumer walks away from this firm and comes back to it
after visiting all the firms in the market. In this second case we have
exactly the same expression for returning consumers as in (2.6).
As a result, taking into account the different positions in which the deviant firm






1− x (1− x + p˜
∗ − p˜) + r˜nm + r˜a
]
(2.7)
Payoff to a deviant merging store.
We now compute the joint payoff of the merging stores. Recall that since consumers
expect the price set at the merging firms pˆ∗ to be greater than p˜∗, they postpone
visiting them until they have visited all the non-merging firms. Suppose that the
merging firms deviate by charging pˆ 6= pˆ∗.
Consider a consumer who walks away form the last non-merging store and
observes a deal εi − pˆ at the first merging store she visits. We note first that such
a consumer will never return to any of the non-merged firms without first visiting
all other merging stores. This is because the utilities from all non-merged firms are
lower than x¯ − pˆ∗, which is exactly the reservation utility at any of the merging
shops. We now ask whether the consumer will continue searching after she visits
the first merging shop. Clearly, she will continue searching when her best deal so
far does not give her sufficiently high utility. She will do the same when the highest
utility so far is obtained at one of the non-merging stores, that is, zn−k − p˜∗ >
εi − pˆ > 0. In case the best deal is the one at the merging store, the consumer will
continue searching when εi − pˆ < x¯ − pˆ∗.6 As a result, the probability that the
6 We assume that a buyer who observes a deviation price pˆ at one of the merging stores does not change
the expectation that the other merged firms charge pˆ∗. This assumption is adopted for technical reasons
though it can easily be justified because consumers usually need not know both whether the pricing
of firms is joint or independent, or the ownership structure of the firms. If consumers did know the
merging firm deviates jointly in all its stores, then they would update their expectations correspondingly
and this would lead to a kink in the demand function of the merging firms. In this situation, downward
deviations lead to exactly the same payoff as here. However, upward deviations lead to a different
payoff function, which suggests the existence of multiple equilibria.
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consumer arrives at the first merging store and buys there right away is
Pr [εi − pˆ ≥ x− pˆ∗ ≥ max{zn−k − p˜∗] = (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k (1− x + pˆ∗ − pˆ)
Suppose now the consumer walks into the h-th merged store, h = 2, ..., k. The
probability this consumer buys at that shop right away is
Pr[max{zh−1 − pˆ, zn−k − p˜∗} < x− pˆ∗ < εi − pˆ]
This gives a demand (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k (x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)h−1 (1− x + pˆ∗ − pˆ) . Taking into
account that k firms belong to a merger, the probability that a consumer terminates
her search in one of k merged firms equals




(x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)h−1 (1− x¯ + pˆ∗ − pˆ)
= (x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k
[
1− (x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)k
]
Some consumers visit all shops in the market and decide to return to one of the
merging stores to conduct a purchase. Then, the joint returning demand obtained




Pr [εi ≥ max {zk−1, zn−k + pˆ− p˜∗, pˆ} and εi < x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ]




(εi + p˜∗)n−k (εi + pˆ)k−1 dεi (2.8)
The payoff to a deviating merged entity is then:
pˆi = pˆ
[
(x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k
(





2.3.1 An example with three firms
In order to develop some intuition for the main results, we briefly discuss in this
subsection an example with three firms in which two of them merge. Prices and
profits in the pre-merger market follow straightforwardly from setting n = 3 in
(2.4) and (2.5).
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Firms payoffs in the post-merger market are
p˜i = p˜
[






(x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)
(
1− (x− pˆ∗ + pˆ)2
)
+ 2
ˆ x− pˆ∗+ pˆ
pˆ
ε(ε− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)dε
]
with corresponding FOCs after applying symmetry
















It can be seen that this system of equations has always a solution and that such
solution is unique and constitutes a Nash equilibrium.7 For a fixed search cost, it is
straightforward to solve the FOCs numerically for equilibrium prices. The results
are given in Figure 2.1a, where we plot post-merger equilibrium prices, pˆ∗ and p˜∗,
against search costs. For comparison purposes, we also plot the pre-merger price,
p∗. As expected, all prices are increasing in search costs. As searching for price and
product fit becomes more costly, firms have more market power over the consumers
who pay them a visit and this results in higher prices for all the firms.
(a) Prices (b) Profits
Figure 2.1. Pre- and post-merger prices, and merger profitability.
As the graph reveals, post-merger prices, whether from merging or non-merging
firms, happen to be higher than the pre-merger price. This deserves a comment. In
our model, the non-merging firm is expected to charge a price lower than that of
the merging stores and therefore it is visited first by the consumers; after that, if
7 Further, we can show that no other symmetric equilibrium exists (see Proposition 2.5(c)).
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consumers do not find a satisfactory product there, they proceed by checking the
goods on sale at the merging stores. In the terminology of Armstrong et al. (2009),
what happens in our model is that by merging, the joining firms end up conferring
market prominence to the non-merging store.
Armstrong et al. (2009) study the effects of market prominence. They show, on
the one hand, that a prominent firm charges a lower price than the rest of the firms,
as it is here the case. In their model this price ranking originates from the order in
which firms are visited by consumers. The firm that is visited first has a more elastic
demand than the other firms just because the latter receive consumers who were
dissatisfied at the first firm so in effect it is as if they had fewer acceptable options.
In addition, Armstrong et al. (2009). show that the prominent firm charges a lower
price than in the case in which no prominent firm exists. This result does not arise
here. The reason is that in our model there is a second force counteracting with the
search-order effect: merging firms internalize pricing externalities between them
and raise prices over and above the prices they would charge if they were operating
independent stores. This weakens competition further and then all prices increase
over and above the status quo (pre-merger) situation.
Figure 2.1b shows how the profits of a merging firm and a non-merging firm,
pˆi∗/k and p˜i∗, vary with search costs. In addition, the figure gives the pre-merger
profits, pi∗, so we can readily assess whether merging is worthwhile for the merg-
ing parties. The most important point to make here is that the profits of a merg-
ing firm decline as the search cost goes up. The reason is that, as the search cost
increases, fewer consumers walk away from the non-merging firm and visit the
merging firms. This has a major implication on merger profitability: for sufficiently
large search costs, merging is not individually rational for the merging entities.
This result resembles the well-known merger paradox, but its novelty is that it arises
under price competition with differentiated product sellers. The graph reveals that
the non-merging firm gets a free ride and this ride is freer the higher the search
cost. These insights can be proven more generally and this will be the purpose of
the next section and the appendix.
2.3.2 Main results
We first study the existence of equilibrium. For this, we first define a critical search
cost value below which all firms, including the merging firms, receive positive de-
mand. Let
s˜k ≡ Pr[ε ≥ pmk ]E[ε− pmk | ε ≥ pmk ].
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s˜k is the search cost that makes a consumer who has currently found no acceptable
option indifferent between staying at home and visiting a monopoly firm that con-
trols k stores. Since pmk = (1+ k)
− 1k , s˜k = (1− (1+ k)−
1
k )2/2. In what follows, if a
merger of k firms occurs, we will pay only attention to search costs in the set [0, s˜k]
(or x¯ ∈ [pmk , 1]). This ensures that each of the k merging stores has positive demand.
Taking the first order derivatives of the payoffs in (2.7) and (2.9) with respect
to deviation prices pˆ and p˜ respectively and applying the equilibrium requirement
that consumer beliefs are correct, i.e., pˆ∗ = pˆ and p˜∗ = p˜, yields the following
FOCs:
(x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k
(













(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε = 0 (2.13)
Proposition 2.1. Assume that k firms merge. For any s ∈ [0, s˜k] , there exists a Nash
equilibrium in the post-merger market where consumers start searching at the non-merging
stores and then they proceed by searching at the merged ones. Merging firms charge a price
pˆ∗ and the non-merging stores charge a price p˜∗; these prices are given by the unique solu-
tion to the system of FOCs (2.12)-(2.13) and the price ranking is consistent with consumer
search behavior, that is, pˆ∗ > p˜∗.
The proof of this proposition, which is presented in the appendix, has the fol-
lowing steps. We first show that there is a unique pair of prices { pˆ∗, p˜∗} that satis-
fies the FOCs. We then show that these prices satisfy the inequality pˆ∗ > p˜∗, which
immediately implies that the hypothesized consumer search behavior is optimal.
We explore next the relationship between the post-merger equilibrium prices
and the pre-merger equilibrium price.
Proposition 2.2. The ranking of pre- and post-merger equilibrium prices is p∗ < p˜∗ < pˆ∗
whenever one of the following conditions holds: (a) the search cost is sufficiently low, (b)
the search cost is sufficiently high, (c) the number of firms n = 3.
Whether the post-merger equilibrium prices are higher or lower than the pre-
merger equilibrium price is a priori ambiguous. Consider the price charged by the
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non-merging firms. The fact that the potentially merging stores by actually merg-
ing confer a "prominent" position in the marketplace to the non-merging stores
causes a direct downward pressure on the price of the non-merging firms. When
a firm becomes prominent its pool of consumers becomes more elastic. In addition
there are two indirect effects. The first is that, since the merging firms are relegated
to the last positions of the queue consumers follow when they search, they tend to
raise their prices. This effect arises because for the non-prominent firms it holds
the opposite, namely, that their demand becomes less elastic. By strategic comple-
mentarity, this weakens competition in the marketplace and the non-merging firms
tend to raise their prices as well. The last effect follows from the fact that the merg-
ing firms internalize the pricing externalities they confer on one another. This also
tends to raise their price, and indirectly, by strategic complementarity again, the
prices of the non-merging firms. Similar considerations apply to the price of the
merging firms. Our proposition shows that when the search-order effects are not
very strong then we are sure that the prices increase after a merger. We note how-
ever that solving numerically the model we have found no example in which this
does not happen. Basically, what we always observe is similar to what happens in
Figure 2.1a when n = 3.
We study next the relationship between the post-merger equilibrium prices and
search costs. The following result extends those in Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson
and Renault (1999) about how search costs influence the symmetric equilibrium
price to the merger situation studied here.
Proposition 2.3. The post-merger equilibrium prices pˆ∗ and p˜∗ increase in search costs.
Our final result explores merger profitability.
Proposition 2.4. Assume that the search cost s ∈ [0, s˜k]. Then:
(A) Any 2-firm merger is not profitable if search cost is sufficiently high.
(B) Any arbitrary k-firm merger is not profitable if search cost and the number of competi-
tors are sufficiently high.
(C) If search costs are sufficiently small, any arbitrary k-firm merger is profitable.
As expected, the case in which the search cost is small reproduces naturally the
situation in Deneckere and Davidson (1985). However, as search costs increase,
fewer consumers walk away from the non-merging stores and visit the merged
ones. This lowers the profits of the merging firms. Eventually, when the search
cost becomes relatively high, unless there are many firms in the industry and the
merger comprises almost all of them, merging becomes unprofitable. The interest
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of the last proposition is that it puts forward a new merger paradox, which arises
under price competition with differentiated products. The underlying reason is
based on search costs, something quite different from the merger paradox of Salant
et al. (1983), which concerns competition with decision variables that are strategic
substitutes.
2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 Alternative distributions of consumer tastes
So far we have assumed that consumer tastes are uniformly distributed on the unit
interval. In this section we study the sensitiveness of our results to this assumption.
For this purpose, we assume that the distribution of match values is F(ε) = ελ with
ε ∈ [0, 1] and λ ≥ 1. The parameter λ is a shifter of the distribution of consumer
preferences towards the right end of the interval of possible match values. When
λ goes up, products become more homogeneous and, therefore, competition be-
tween firms becomes fiercer. Note also that the average willingness to pay, which
is λ/(1+ λ), also increases in the parameter λ.
With this distribution of match values, the price of a monopolist selling ` va-
rieties becomes pm` = (1+ λ`)
−1/λ`. The threshold match value x˜ above which
consumers stop searching becomes the solution to
´ 1
x˜ (ε− x˜) dελ = s. This gives a
critical search cost s˜` = λ1+λ − pm` + 11+λ (pm` )λ+1 beyond which no consumer would
ever visit the shops of a monopoly firm in control of ` shops. One can easily check
that when λ = 1 we get the same expressions for the monopoly price and maxi-
mum search cost we had in section 2.2.
For simplicity, let us assume that n = 3, as in section 2.3. It is easy to rewrite the
payoffs of the firms using the new distribution of match values. These are
p˜i( p˜, pˆ∗) = p˜
[
1− (x˜ + p˜− pˆ∗)λ +
ˆ x˜− pˆ∗+ p˜
p˜
λελ−1 (ε− p˜ + pˆ∗)2λ dε
]
pˆi ( p˜∗, pˆ) = pˆ
[(
1− (x˜− pˆ∗ + pˆ)2λ
)
(x˜ + p˜∗ − pˆ∗)λ
+2
ˆ x− pˆ∗+ pˆ
pˆ
λε2λ−1(ε− pˆ + p˜∗)λdε
]
As above, equilibrium prices can be found by taking the FOCs, setting pˆ = pˆ∗ and
p˜ = p˜∗ and solving for pˆ∗ and p˜∗. Even in this simple environment with three firms,
calculations get complicated when λ can vary freely.
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Figure 2.2a shows the pre-merger and post-merger equilibrium prices of Propo-
sition 2.1. Initially there are three firms and then two of them merge. The search
cost is fixed at s = 0.01 and λ varies from 1 to 10. The graph shows that no mat-
ter the value of λ, the price of the non-merging firms is lower than the price of
the merging firms. Moreover, we see that as λ goes up, prices increase and then
decrease. To understand this, recall that as λ goes up the intensity of competition
increases and this tends to lower prices. At the same time, as λ goes up, the av-
erage willingness-to-pay also increases and this pushes prices up. The first effect
dominates for high levels of λ, while it happens otherwise for low levels of λ.
(a) Prices (b) Merger profitability
Figure 2.2. Pre- and post-merger prices and merger profitability.
In Figure 2.2b we show the region of search costs s and taste parameters λ for
which merging is individually rational. The critical search cost level below which
merging is profitable, denoted scr, first increases and then decreases in λ. This result
is intimately linked to the price result discussed above. When λ is small, an increase
in λ increases the price of the merging stores and this raises merger profitability.
Eventually when λ is relatively large, further increases in λ make products too
similar and this fosters competition. In this case, as λ increases a smaller search
cost is needed to make merging unprofitable.
2.4.2 Other symmetric equilibria
All the discussion so far has been on a symmetric equilibrium with the merging
firms charging a higher price than the non-merging firms and, correspondingly,
consumers starting their search for satisfactory products at the non-merging stores.
This equilibrium is the natural extension of the equilibrium that arises under per-
fect information (Deneckere and Davidson (1985)) and exists for all (reasonable)
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levels of the search cost. For this reason, it has been the focal point of the analysis
so far.
However, as we mentioned above when we discussed the potential problems
associated with the indeterminacy of consumer beliefs about which type of firms
charge the lowest prices (cf. footnote 5), another symmetric equilibrium can be
proposed. In such alternative symmetric equilibrium, consumers hold the belief
that the merging stores charge prices lower than those of the non-merging firms
and, correspondingly, they start their search for satisfactory products at the merg-
ing firms; firms respond by setting prices in such a way that consumer beliefs are
fulfilled.
In this section we focus attention on such an alternative equilibrium. Our first
observation is that this alternative symmetric equilibrium is somewhat counterin-
tuitive. The reason is that, due to the internalization-of-pricing externalities effect,
we expect the merging firms to charge higher, rather than lower, prices than the
non-merging firms. Therefore, if such an equilibrium exists, it must be because the
power of consumer beliefs at dictating firm pricing is sufficiently strong so as to
more than offset the internalization-of-pricing externalities effect. Can this occur
for all parameters? We do not expect it. From the received theory we know that
when the search cost is exactly equal to zero (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985), such
price ranking is impossible. By "continuity" we expect this alternative equilibrium
to fail to exist when the search cost is positive but small. This is indeed what our
next result shows. In addition, we can show that the same is true when the search
cost is very high or for example when the number of firms is 3.
Proposition 2.5. Assume that k firms merge. Then a symmetric Nash equilibrium where
pˆ∗ < p˜∗ so that consumers start searching at the merged stores and then proceed by search-
ing at the non-merging stores does not exist if (a) the search cost is sufficiently low, (b) the
search cost is sufficiently high and (c) n = 3. In these cases, the equilibrium in Proposition
2.1 is unique.
The proof of this result is in the appendix. There we first derive the payoff
functions of the merging and non-merging firms assuming that pˆ∗ < p˜∗. Then we
show that when the search cost is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low, profit
maximizing firms charge prices such that pˆ∗ > p˜∗, which leads to a contradiction.
This result implies that the alternative equilibrium where merging firms are visited
first can only exist for intermediate levels of the search cost, which casts doubts
about the appeal of the equilibrium. In fact, taking such an alternative equilibrium
seriously requires consumer beliefs to be discontinuous in search costs, which is
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difficult to justify.
The intuition behind Proposition 2.5 is as follows. The price ranking of the
firms is the outcome of the tension between the search-order effect, which pushes
merging firms that are visited first to lower prices relative to the non-merging firms,
and the internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect, which works in the opposite
direction. The magnitude of the search cost affects the outcome of this tension. In
fact, note that the search-order effect is practically non-existent when the search cost
is arbitrarily close to zero, while the internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect is
the strongest. In this case, the second effect has a dominating influence and this
explains the result. When the search cost increases, the search-order effect gains
importance, while the internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect loses strength.
For intermediate levels of the search cost the equilibrium may exist (though not
necessarily as demonstrated for the case n = 3). Finally, when search costs are very
high, prices, whether form merging or not merging firms, are close to monopoly
prices and the search-order effect loses again against the internalization-of-pricing-
externalities effect.
We have explored alternative ways to affect the trade-off between the search-
order effect and the internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect and rule out the
alternative equilibrium where the merging firms charge lower prices and are visited
first. What is important is to weaken the power consumer beliefs have at dictating
equilibrium prices. For example, one can show that this equilibrium fails to exist
when there is a sufficiently large number of consumers who have perfect informa-
tion. The equilibrium in Proposition 2.1 by contrast survives this modification as
well as our main result in Proposition 2.4.
To illustrate this last point, we provide next the outcome of the numerical anal-
ysis of a slightly modified model where we partition the set of consumers into two
fractions: a fraction of the consumers µ have zero search costs while the rest of the
consumers have positive search costs. The rest of the model remains exactly the
same. In Figure 2.3 we set n = 7 and plot the (blue) region of parameters for which
an equilibrium where a two-firm merger charges a price lower than the price of the
non-merging firms exists. The graph clearly shows the observation in Proposition
2.5 that, when all consumers have positive search costs, this equilibrium only exists
for intermediate levels of the search cost. As we increase the fraction of consumers
who have zero search cost, the equilibrium fails to exist. The equilibrium in Propo-
sition 2.1 by contrast exists for all parameters and it can be seen that no matter the
level of µ, a merger is unprofitable provided that the search cost is sufficiently large.
Search Costs and the Incentives to Merge with Bertrand Competition 35
Figure 2.3. Model with µ percent of zero-search-cost consumers
2.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter has studied the role of search costs for merger profitability. We have
used a model where firms compete in prices to sell differentiated products and
consumers search sequentially to find price and product fit information. When the
search cost is set equal to zero, the model gives the results in Deneckere and David-
son (1985). But when search costs are sizable, the price divergence between merg-
ing and non-merging firms has implications for the path consumers follow when
they search for satisfactory products. Since optimal consumer search prescribes the
consumers to visit first the cheaper stores, the merging firms lose a lot of customers
when search costs are relatively high. Our main result is that merging becomes un-
profitable when the search cost is sufficiently large. The analysis thus shows that
a merger paradox can also arise when firms compete in prices to sell differentiated
products. The paradox arises because a merger pushes the merging stores all the
way back in the search order of consumers.
In the analysis of this chapter we have followed the tradition and studied the
implications of joint-decision making. By doing this, the model has focussed on
the short-run effects of mergers and has therefore abstracted from a number of is-
sues that are relevant to mergers in the long-run. These issues include all types of
business organizational changes aimed at delivering cost reductions. Arguably, in
situations where search costs are important, these organizational changes may even
include the shutting down of shops and the crowding of products together, which
have the potential to generate beneficial search economies for the consumers. These
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long-run considerations are studied in a subsequent chapter. There we show that
search cost economies may render a merger beneficial for consumers.
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2.A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1. The proof of the proposition is organized in three claims.
The first claim shows that there is a pair of prices { pˆ∗, p˜∗} that satisfies the system
of first order conditions (2.12) and (2.13). The second claim shows that such a pair
of prices is unique. Finally, the third claim demonstrates that p˜∗ < pˆ∗.
Claim 2.A.1. There is at least one pair of prices { pˆ∗, p˜∗} that satisfies (2.12) and (2.13).
Proof. We first rewrite the FOC (2.12) as G ( pˆ, p˜) = 0, where
G ( pˆ, p˜) ≡ 1− x
k
kxk−1
− pˆ + g ( pˆ, p˜) (2.A.1)
and
g ( pˆ, p˜) ≡
´ x− pˆ
0 (ε+ pˆ)
k−2 (ε+ p˜)n−k (ε+ kpˆ) dε
(x− pˆ + p˜)n−k xk−1
The FOC G ( pˆ, p˜) = 0 defines an implicit relationship between pˆ and p˜. Let the
function η1( p˜) define this relationship. This function is represented in Figure 2.A.1





= − ∂g/∂ p˜
∂g/∂ pˆ− 1 , (2.A.2)





xk−1 (x− pˆ + p˜)n−k+1
ˆ x− pˆ
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ) (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 (x− pˆ− ε) dε > 0
The denominator of (2.A.2) is however negative. To see this, we note first that









(ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ p˜)n−k (ε+ kpˆ) dε
+ (x¯− pˆ + p˜) (k− 1)
ˆ x− pˆ
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−3 (ε+ p˜)n−k (2ε+ kpˆ) dε
− (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k+1 x¯k−2 [2x¯ + (k− 1) pˆ] . (2.A.3)
Assuming k > 2, let us take the derivative of the RHS of (2.A.3) with respect to
x¯. We obtain
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(ε+ pˆ)k−3 (ε+ p˜)n−k (2ε+ kpˆ) dε
+ (k− 1) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k+1 x¯k−3 [2x¯ + (k− 2) pˆ]− 2 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k+1 x¯k−2
− (n− k + 1) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k x¯k−2 [2x¯ + (k− 1) pˆ]
− (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k+1 (k− 2) x¯k−3 [2x¯ + (k− 1) pˆ]
which can be simplified to




(ε+ pˆ)k−3 (ε+ p˜)n−k (2ε+ kpˆ) dε (2.A.4)
If we now take the derivative of (2.A.4) with respect to x¯ we obtain
−
[
(k− 2) x¯k−3 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k + (n− k) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k−1 x¯k−2
]
· [x¯ (n− k + 2) + (k− 1) pˆ]− (n− k + 2) x¯k−2 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k
+ (k− 1) x¯k−3 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k [2x¯ + (k− 2) pˆ]
Putting terms together and simplifying, this equals to
− (n− k) x¯k−2 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k−1 [x¯ (n + 1) + p˜ (k− 1)] < 0.
This implies that the derivative of the RHS of (2.A.3) with respect to x¯, given in
equation (2.A.4), is decreasing in x¯. Setting x¯ equal to its lowest value, pˆ, in (2.A.4)
gives
− pˆk−2 p˜n−k [ pˆ (n− k−+2) + (k− 1) p˜] < 0.
As a result, the RHS of (2.A.3) is also decreasing in x¯. If we set now x¯ = pˆ in the
RHS of (2.A.3), we obtain − p˜n−k+1 pˆk−1 (k + 1) < 0. From this we conclude that
(2.A.3) is negative. As a result, since the numerator of ∂η1 ( p˜) /∂ p˜ is positive and
the denominator is negative, we infer that the function η1 ( p˜) increases in p˜.8
Now consider the other equilibrium condition. Let us denote the LHS of (2.13)
8 When k = 2, equation (2.A.3) changes slightly. Therefore, we treat this case separately. If k = 2 then
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as H ( pˆ, p˜). The condition H ( pˆ, p˜) = 0 also defines an implicit relationship be-
tween pˆ and p˜. Let the function η2( p˜) define this relationship. This function is






We note that H increases in pˆ. In fact,
∂H
∂ pˆ




+ (n− k) k
ˆ x¯− pˆ
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ)k−1 dε > 0





1− x¯ − (n− k) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)
n−k−1
g ( pˆ, p˜) ≡
´ x− pˆ
0 (ε+ p˜)
n−2 (ε+ 2pˆ) dε
(x− pˆ + p˜)n−2 x
Then equation (2.A.3) is









(ε+ p˜)n−2 (ε+ 2pˆ) dε
+
2
n− 1 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)
n − 2
n− 1 p˜
n−1 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)− (2x¯ + pˆ) (x− pˆ + p˜)n−1 (2.A.5)
The derivative of the RHS of (2.A.5) with respect to x¯ is negative
(n− 2) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−2 (x¯ + pˆ) + 2n




−2 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−1 − (n− 1) (2x¯ + pˆ) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−2
= (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−2
[











=− (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−2
[
x¯
n2 − n− 2









<− (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−2
[
x¯
n2 − n− 2









− (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−2
[
x¯
n2 − n− 4







Since the expression is negative, the same arguments can be used to conclude that ∂G/∂ p˜ is positive also
when k = 2, which implies that η1 ( p˜) increases in p˜.
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+ (n− k) (n− k− 1)
ˆ x¯− pˆ
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−2 (ε+ pˆ)k dε
< −1− x¯
n−k
1− x¯ − (n− k) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)
n−k−1






1− x¯ − (n− k) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)
n−k−1 + (n− k) x¯k (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k−1
− (n− k) x¯k p˜n−k−1
− 1− x¯
n−k
1− x¯ − (n− k) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)
n−k−1 (1− x¯k)− (n− k) x¯k p˜n−k−1 < 0
while for k = n − 1 we get ∂H/∂ p˜ = −2 < 0. As a result, we conclude that the
function η2 is increasing in p˜.
Therefore, both η1 and η2 increase in p˜. To show that at least one pair of prices
{ pˆ∗, p˜∗} exists that satisfies the system of FOCs (2.12) and (2.13), we need to show





shown in Figure 2.A.1 we observe that η1 (0) > 0. For this, note that
G ( pˆ, 0) =
1− x¯k
kx¯k−1




(ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ) εn−kdε.
We have shown above that G decreases in pˆ. Therefore, since









we conclude that η1 (0) > 0.
On the contrary, we now observe that η2 (0) < 0 (see Figure 2.A.1 ). This is
because
H ( pˆ, 0) = 1− (x¯− pˆ)n−k + (n− k)
ˆ x¯− pˆ
0
εn−k−1 (ε+ pˆ)k dε
and H (0, 0) = 1− x¯n−k + (n− k) ´ x¯0 εn−1dε > 0.
Secondly, as depicted in Figure 2.A.1, we show that η1 (1/2) < pmk < η2 (1/2),
which ensures that the functions η1 and η2 cross at least once in the area [0; 1/2]×[
0, pmk
]









































with respect to x¯ we get
−1− (n− k) x¯
n−k−1 + (n− k− 1) x¯n−k









where the inequality follows from noting that the expression 1− (n− k) x¯n−k−1 +
(n− k− 1) x¯n−k decreases in x¯ and therefore it is higher than we set x¯ = 1, that







is decreasing in x¯.


















This expression is decreasing in n. In fact, its derivative with respect to n can be
written as
2n−k−1(pmk )





















) [pmk ln pmk + (1− pmk ) ln 2] < 0






ln 2 < 0. This can
be shown in three steps. We check the sign of the expression with the lowest and
highest values of k:
pmk ln p
m
















k + (1− pmk ) ln 2) = 0






ln 2 with respect to k. We ob-
tain the following (∂pmk /∂k)
(
ln pmk + 1− ln 2
)
. The sign of this expression depends
on the sign of 1− ln 2 + ln pmk = 1− ln 2 + 1k ln(1 + k). This expression is mono-
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ln 2 first decreases and then increases. Together with the two facts above,








is decreasing in n, if we set n equal to its lowest possible









































negative. And because H is increasing in pˆ, we obtain the result that η2 (1/2) > pmk .














k−2 (ε+ 12)n−k (ε+ kpˆ) dε(

































k−2 (ε+ kpmk ) ln
(
ε+ 1/2













































x¯− pmk + 12
)T (x¯)




















(ε+ kpmk ) dε
Note that 1
kx¯k−1(x¯−pmk + 12 )







is negative if T (x¯) < 0.
T (x¯) decreases in x¯ because
∂T (x¯)
∂x¯














(x¯ + (k− 1) pmk )
= 1− x¯k − kx¯k−1 pmk








= 1− (pmk )k − k (pmk )k−1 pmk = 0




= 0. As a result,





Claim 2.A.2. The pair of prices { pˆ∗, p˜∗} that satisfies (2.12) and (2.13) is unique.
Proof. To show this uniqueness result, it is enough to show that η1 increases in
p˜ at a rate less than 1, while η2 does so at a rate greater than 1. From (2.A.2), since
∂G/∂ pˆ < 0, we know that η1 increases in p˜ if and only if ∂G/∂ pˆ + ∂G/∂ p˜ < 0. For
the case k > 2, we can then write
xk−1 (x− pˆ + p˜)n−k−1
[
∂G ( pˆ, p˜)
∂ p˜
+










(ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ p˜)n−k (ε+ kpˆ) dε
+ (x¯− pˆ + p˜) (k− 1)
ˆ x− pˆ
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−3 (ε+ p˜)n−k (2ε+ kpˆ) dε
− (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k x¯k−2 [2x¯ + (k− 1) pˆ]
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which can be simplified to
xk−1 (x− pˆ + p˜)n−k−2
[
∂G ( pˆ, p˜)
∂ p˜
+










(ε+ pˆ)k−3 (ε+ p˜)n−k (2ε+ kpˆ) dε
− (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k x¯k−2 [2x¯ + (k− 1) pˆ] (2.A.8)
We now notice that the RHS of (2.A.8) decreases in x¯. In fact, its derivative is
(n− k) x¯k−2 [x¯ + (k− 1) pˆ] (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k−1
+ (k− 1) x¯k−3 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k [2x¯ + (k− 2) pˆ]
−
[
(n− k) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k−1 x¯k−2 + (k− 2) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k x¯k−3
]
· [2x¯ + (k− 1) pˆ]− 2 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k x¯k−2
which, after rearranging, is equal to
−(n− k)x¯k−1 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k−1 < 0
Therefore if (2.A.8) is negative when setting x¯ = pmk , then it is always negative, that
is9
xk−1 (x− pˆ + p˜)n−k
[
∂G ( pˆ, p˜)
∂ p˜
+
∂G ( pˆ, p˜)
∂ pˆ
]
< − p˜n−k pˆk−1 (k + 1) < 0.
9 The same holds for the case when k = 2. We have
x (x− pˆ + p˜)n−2
[
∂G ( pˆ, p˜)
∂ p˜
+






(ε+ p˜)n−3 (ε+ 2pˆ) dε
+
2
n− 1 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)
n−1 − 2
n− 1 p˜
n−1 − (2x¯ + pˆ) (x− pˆ + p˜)n−2 (2.A.9)
The derivative of (2.A.9) with respect to x¯ is negative because
(n− 2) (x¯ + pˆ) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−3 + 2 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−2
−2 (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−2 − (n− 2) (2x¯ + pˆ) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−3
=− x¯ (n− 2) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−3 < 0
Then
x (x− pˆ + p˜)n−2
(
∂G ( pˆ, p˜)
∂ p˜
+
∂G ( pˆ, p˜)
∂ pˆ
)
< −3pˆ p˜n−2 < 0
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Similarly, using (2.A.6), since ∂H/∂ pˆ > 0, we know that ∂η2/∂ p˜ > 1 if and only








1− x¯ − (n− k) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)
n−k−1
+ (n− k) (n− k− 1)
ˆ x¯− pˆ
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−2 (ε+ pˆ)k dε (2.A.10)




+ (n− k) k
ˆ x¯− pˆ
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ)k−1 dε
=
1− x¯n−k
1− x¯ − (n− k) (x¯− pˆ + p˜)
n−k−1 x¯k
+ (n− k) (n− k− 1)
ˆ x¯− pˆ
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−2 (ε+ pˆ)k dε
+ (n− k) k
ˆ x¯− pˆ
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ)k−1 dε (2.A.11)
This expression decreases in x¯ because its partial derivative with respect to x¯,
after rearranging, is equal to
−1− (n− k) x¯
n−k−1 + (n− k− 1) x¯n−k
(1− x¯)2 < 0.
and we have already shown above that the numerator of this expression is positive.








1− pˆ − (n− k) p˜
n−k−1 pˆk < 0.
The result follows. QED.
Claim 2.A.3. The price charged by the merging stores is higher than the price of the non-
merging ones, that is, pˆ∗ > p˜∗.
Proof. Let p˜1 be the price at which the function η1 crosses the 45 degrees line, i.e.,
η1 ( p˜1) = p˜1; likewise, let p˜2 be such that η2 ( p˜2) = p˜2 (p˜1 and p˜2 are represented in













(ε+ pˆ)n−2 dε = −1− pˆn−1 < 0
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Figure 2.A.1. Existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium
Figure 2.A.1). Given the properties of η1 and η2, if we show that p˜1 > p˜2 then we
can conclude that pˆ∗ > p˜∗.







n−2 (ε+ kp˜1) dε
xn−1
(2.A.12)
Similarly, when p˜ = p˜2 the FOC H (η2 ( p˜) , p˜) = 0 gives





For a contradiction, suppose p˜2 > p˜1. Then the difference between the RHS of
(2.A.12) and the RHS of (2.A.13) must be negative. Let us denote this difference V
and note that


















n−2 (ε+ kp˜1) dε
xn−1
+
1+ (k− 1) x¯k − kx¯k−1
kx¯k−1
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− 1− x¯











1+ (k− 1) xk − kx¯k−1
kxk−1
− 1− x¯





where the inequality follows from replacing ε+ kp˜1 by ε+ p˜1 in the first integral.
Since the second integral in (2.A.14) is equal to
[
x¯n − ( p˜1)n
]
, the whole expres-
sion in (2.A.14) increases in p˜2. Therefore, (2.A.14) must be higher than when we





































1+ (k− 1) xk − kx¯k−1
kxk−1
(2.A.15)
We now show that this last expression is positive, which establishes a contradiction.
For this, we first note that the term in square brackets is positive. To see this, we
take the derivative with respect to x¯ which gives
n− k + (k + 1) x¯−k− (n− 1) x¯−n
and note that this expression is decreasing in n (its derivative is−x¯−n [1− x¯n − (n− 1) ln x¯] <
0). Then we can et n = k + 1 and write that n − k + (k + 1) x¯−k − (n− 1) x¯−n ≤
1+ (k + 1) x¯−k− (n− 1) x¯−(k+1). This last expression increases in x¯ (its derivative
is kx¯−(k+2) [1+ x¯ + k (1+ x¯)] > 0) and therefore we can write 1 + (k + 1) x¯−k −
kx¯−(k+1) <≤ 0. Therefore, the square bracket decreases in x¯ so we can use the
value x¯ = 1 and show that




Finally, we observe that the last term of (2.A.15) is also positive. This follows from
the fact that the numerator 1 + (k + 1) x¯k − kx¯k+1 decreases in x¯ and then we can
use the value x¯ = 1 to write 1+ (k + 1) x¯k − kx¯k+1 > 0.
Therefore, we have proven that V > 0, which is impossible if p˜2 > p˜1. As a
result, pˆ∗ > p˜∗. QED .
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Since we have already proven that pˆ∗ > p˜∗, we focus
on the inequality p˜∗ > p∗. Furthermore, we claim that pˆ∗ > p∗. According to
Zhou (2009) proposition 3, the price of non-prominent firms, because of the search
order effect, is always higher than the equilibrium price when firms are searched
randomly. The price of a merger increases due to the order effect, because a merger
is visited only all non-merged shops are searched, and due to price internalization
effect. Therefore, pˆ∗ > p∗.
(a) Consider the case in which the search cost is sufficiently low, that is, x¯ → 1.
We prove p˜∗ > p∗ by contradiction. Therefore, assume that, on the contrary, p˜∗ <
p∗ when x¯ → 1. The aggregate quantity sold in the market by all firms together
is Q = 1− pˆ∗ k p˜∗ n−k. Using the FOCs and denoting the quantity sold by a non-
merged firm by firm by q˜∗, and that sold by all the merging firms together by qˆ∗ we
can state that
Y ( p˜∗, pˆ∗) ≡ Q− (n− k)q˜∗ − qˆ∗ = 0
where




qˆ∗ = kpˆ∗xk−1 (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k − k (k− 1) pˆ∗
ˆ x− pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k dε.
We now argue that Y ( p˜∗, pˆ∗) is decreasing in p˜∗. This is because ∂Q/∂ p˜∗ < 0,




∂ p˜∗ = x




(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 dε
> xk−1 (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k−1




= (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k−1 pˆ∗ k−1 > 0
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Next, since Y is decreasing in p˜∗ and by assumption p˜∗ < p∗ we must have
Y (p∗, pˆ∗) < 0. When x → 1, Y (p∗, pˆ∗) goes to:
1− pˆ∗ k p∗n−k − (n− k) p∗ − kpˆ∗ (1− pˆ∗ + p∗)n−k
+ k (k− 1) pˆ∗
ˆ 1− pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p∗)n−k dε (2.A.16)
Now we invoke the FOC of the merged entity, denoted above by G ( pˆ∗, p˜∗).
The function G ( pˆ∗, p˜∗) was shown to be increasing in p˜∗ so when p˜∗ < p∗ we must
have G ( pˆ∗, p∗) > G ( pˆ∗, p˜∗) = 0. Therefore:
lim
x¯→1
G ( pˆ∗, p∗) ≡ − pˆ∗ + 1
(1− pˆ∗ + p∗)n−k
ˆ 1− pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p∗)n−k (ε+ kpˆ) dε
= − pˆ∗ + k− 1




(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p∗)n−k dε
+
1
(1− pˆ∗ + p∗)n−k
ˆ 1− pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 (ε+ p∗)n−k dε
must be positive, which implies that it must be the case that
− kpˆ∗ (1− pˆ∗ + p∗)n−k + k (k− 1) pˆ∗
ˆ 1− pˆ∗
0




(ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 (ε+ p∗)n−k dε
Using this inequality in (2.A.16), we get that
lim
x→1




(ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 (ε+ p∗)n−k dε (2.A.17)
This last expression is increasing in pˆ. This is because its derivative with respect to
pˆ∗ is the same as the sign of the following expression
− pˆ∗ k−1 p∗n−k − (k− 1)
ˆ 1− pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p∗)n−k dε+ (1− pˆ∗ + p∗)n−k
> − pˆ∗ k−1 p∗ n−k − (k− 1) (1− pˆ∗ + p∗)n−k
ˆ 1− pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 dε+ (1− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k
= (1− pˆ∗ + p∗)n−k pˆ∗k−1 − pˆ∗k−1 p∗n−k > 0
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Therefore, (2.A.17) is greater than after setting pˆ∗ = p∗, that is
lim
x→1








> np∗ − (n− k) p∗ − kp∗ = 0
where for the last equality we have used the FOC of a firm in the pre-merger mar-
ket. (If x¯ → 1 then the first order condition of a firm in a pre-merger market be-
comes 1−np∗− (p∗)n = 0.) Consequently, if p˜ > p∗ then we have limx→1 Y (p∗, pˆ) >
0, which establishes a contradiction.
(b) Consider the case in which the search cost is sufficiently high, that is, x¯ →
pmk . From proposition 2.1 we know that the solution to the FOCs is unique. There-
fore, if we find two prices for which (2.12) and (2.13) hold when x¯ → pmk then
these prices are indeed the equilibrium prices. Let us take the limit of the LHS of
(2.12) and (2.13) when x¯ → pmk . and let us use the notation limx¯→pmk p˜∗ = p˜l and
limx¯→pmk pˆ
∗ = pmk . Then we get the following expressions
( p˜∗)n−k
(












The first equation is indeed zero, given the definition of pmk and the second
equation therefore gives the value of p˜l when x¯ → pmk . We note that the price p˜l is




0. We are interested in comparing p˜l with the pre-merger equilibrium price. Let us
use the notation pl = limx¯→pmk p
∗. We now argue that p˜l > pl . To show this, we
take the limit when x¯ → pmk of the FOC that determines pl . This gives:





If we fix the value of pmk then the solution of this equation, pl , decreases with n.
Comparing this equation with (2.A.18), since n− k < n, it is immediately clear that
p˜l > pl .
(c) Finally, we look at the case n = 3. If n = 3 then the FOC of a merging firm
(x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)
(





(ε+ p˜∗) (ε+ 2pˆ∗) dε = 0
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may be rearranged as follows










− x¯ + pˆ∗ (2.A.19)
The FOC of a non-merging firm
1− 2p˜∗ − x¯ + pˆ∗ +
ˆ x¯− pˆ∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)2 dε = 0






− x¯ + pˆ∗ = 2p˜∗ − 1
Using this in (2.A.19) we have
pˆ∗3 − pˆ∗ x¯2 − 3p˜∗ pˆ∗2 − p˜∗ + 1 = 0
or
p˜∗ = 1+ pˆ
∗3 − pˆ∗ x¯2
1+ 3pˆ∗2
From the FOC (2.4) in the pre-merger market we get that
p∗ = 1− p
∗3
1+ x¯ + x¯2
Since, by strategic complementarity, p˜∗ increases in pˆ∗ and since pˆ∗ > p∗, the
difference p˜∗ − p∗ is greater than when we replace pˆ∗ by p∗. Therefore,
p˜∗ − p∗ = 1+ pˆ




1+ x¯ + x¯2
>




1+ x¯ + x¯2
(2.A.20)
The RHS of this expression is concave in x¯ because its second derivative with re-







p∗3 − 1) x¯(1+ x¯)
(1+ x¯ + x¯2)3
< 0
Hence, if the RHS of (2.A.20) is positive with the highest and the lowest possible
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values of x¯ then it is positive for all x¯ values. Setting x¯ = 1 in the RHS of (2.A.20)
gives
2− 3p∗ − 3p∗2 + 4p∗3 + 3p∗5
3 (1+ 3p∗2)
(2.A.21)
which is always positive as shown in Figure 2.A.2.
Figure 2.A.2. Plot of expression 2.A.21
Setting x¯ = p∗ in (2.A.20) gives
p
(
1− 3p∗ + 3p∗2)
1+ 3p∗2
> 0.
Thus, p˜∗ > p∗ .
Proof of Proposition 2.3. We first prove that the function η1 ( p˜) shifts down-
wards if x¯ increases. Form relation G (η1 ( p˜) , p˜, x¯) = 0 we obtain that ∂η1 ( p˜) /∂x¯ =
− (∂G/∂x¯) / (∂G/∂ pˆ). Above the proof of Proposition 2.1, we have already shown






1− xk − kpˆxk−1
)
kxk
− (k− 1) (x− pˆ + p˜) + (n− k) x
xk (x− pˆ + p˜) n−k+1
ˆ x− pˆ
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ p˜)n−k (ε+ kpˆ) dε











(k− 1) (x− pˆ + p˜) + (n− k) x
xk (x− pˆ + p˜) n−k+1
]
·
(x¯− pˆ + p˜)n−k
(
1− x¯k − kx¯k−1 pˆ
)
k








k− 1− (k− 1) (x− pˆ + p˜) + (n− k) x





1− xk − kpˆxk−1
)
(n− k)
kxk−1 (x− pˆ + p˜) < 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that for G ( pˆ, p˜) = 0 it must be the
case that 1− x¯k− kx¯k−1 pˆ < 0. As a result, we conclude that η1 ( p˜) shifts downwards
when x¯ increases.
We now show that η2 ( p˜) shifts upwards when x¯ increases. From the relation
H (η2 ( p˜) , p˜, x¯) = 0, we obtain that ∂η2 ( p˜) /∂x¯ = − (∂H/∂x¯) / (∂H/∂ pˆ). Above in
the proof of proposition 2.1, we have already shown that ∂H/∂ p˜ < 0. Therefore,









1− (n− k) xn−k−1 + (n− k− 1) xn−k
]
(n− k) (1− x)2





where the last inequality uses the fact tat 1− (n− k) x¯n−k−1 + (n− k− 1) x¯n−k is
decreasing in x¯ and equals 0 when x¯ = 1.
Since η1 ( p˜) shifts downwards while η2 ( p˜) shifts upwards when x¯ increases, we
conclude that pˆ∗ and p˜∗ decrease in x¯ (or increase in s). .
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Post-merger, the profit of a merging firm is pˆi∗/k,
while pre-merger it is pi∗. The we need to consider the difference pˆi∗/k− pi∗.
(a) To prove this we set k = 2 in the profits difference pˆi∗/k− pi∗ and study its
sign when x → pmk (= 1/
√










where we use the same notation as a bove in the proof of proposition 2.2: p˜l =
limx→pmk p˜

























2 (1− (pm2 )n)
n(1− pm2 )
where, again as in the proof of proposition 2.2, pl = lim x¯ → pmk p∗. If we demon-
strate that
(pl)



















then the result follows.
To show that (2.A.22) holds, we observe that the FOC
1− p∗n − p∗ (1− x
n)
1− x = 0 (2.A.23)
which determines the value of p∗, is decreasing in p∗. Taking the limit of (2.A.23)
when x → 1/√3 gives




1− 3−1/2 = 0




























which is always positive as shown in Figure 2.A.4.
Since (2.A.23) is decreasing in p∗, then (2.A.22) must hold.
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which shows that for any k, merging is not profitable whenever search costs and
the number of competitors are sufficiently high.
(C) To prove this, we show that in the limit when x¯ → 1 (or search costs go to










because in the limit when x¯ → 1, p˜∗n (1− p˜∗n) > p
∗
n (1− p∗n).
Observe that equilibrium profits of the merging firms are
pˆi∗ = pˆ∗
[







(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 dε
]
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Taking the derivative of pˆi∗ wth respect to pˆ∗ and taking the limit when x¯ → 1 gives
− (1− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k kpˆ∗ + k
ˆ 1− pˆ∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ∗) dε.
This expression is identical to the FOC (2.12) when x¯ → 1. As a result, for any value
of pˆ < pˆ∗ (where pˆ∗ is the equilibrium price of a merging firm when x¯ → 1), this
derivative is negative. Since the equilibrium price of a non-merging firm is lower
























where the last inequality follows from the observations that p˜∗ (1− p˜∗n) in-
creases in p˜∗ and p˜∗ > p∗. The result the follows. .
Proof of Proposition 2.5. We start by deriving the payoffs of the firms in the sit-
uation where consumers start searching at the merging stores. As above, let pˆ∗ and
p˜∗ denote the equilibrium prices of merging and non-merging stores, respectively.
Consider first the payoff of the merging stores when they deviate by charging a
price pˆ 6= pˆ∗. W.l.o.g. assume the merging stores are visited in a particular order,
first the merging store 1, then the merging store 2 etc. all the way till the merging
store k. Consider a consumer who starts searching and visits the first merging store.
If the match value there is less than x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ, the consumer will continue search-
ing and visit a second merging firm. Otherwise, the buyer will buy right away. In
the second shop, and all the way till the (k − 1)th store the tradeoff is exactly the




(x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)i−1 (1− x¯ + pˆ∗ − pˆ) = 1− (x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)k−1
When a consumer arrives at the kth merging firm, the tradeoff is different be-
cause the firm to be visited next is a non-merging firm and charges a different price,
namely p˜∗. As a result, the consumer will search beyond the last merging firm if
the highest observed utility is less than x¯− p˜∗. In addition, we note that the other
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k − 1 shops of the merger were left because the utility levels there were less than
x¯− pˆ∗. Since pˆ∗ < p˜∗ by assumption, this implies that some consumers may decide
to return from the kth merging to one of the other merging firms. This will happen
when zk−1 − pˆ > max {x¯− p˜∗; εk − pˆ}. We will denote the fraction of consumers
who returns to a previously visited merging store without visiting all shops in the
market by rˆm:





(x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)k − (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ)k
)
The sub-index m refers to the fact that these consumers return to a merging store
after visiting only all the merging stores.
A consumer terminates her search in the last merging store if the match value
there is higher than at the other merging stores and it is not worth to continue
searching at the non-merging stores. This happens with probability
Pr [εk − pˆ > max {x¯− p˜∗; zk−1 − pˆ}]
= (x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)k−1 (1− (x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)) + 1
k
(
(x¯− pˆ∗ + pˆ)k − (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ)k
)
Finally, some consumers visit all shops in the market and return to one of the
merging stores to conduct a purchase. This fraction of consumers, which we denote
rˆa to refer to the situation that consumers come back to a merging store after visiting
all firms in the market, is given by:




(ε+ pˆ)k−1 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k dε
Putting the terms together, the joint payoff function of the merging stores equals
pˆi( pˆ) = pˆ
[
1− (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ)k + k
ˆ x¯− p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−1 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k dε
]
Taking the FOC and imposing the equilibrium requirement that consumer expecta-
tions are correct we obtain:





(ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ kpˆ∗) dε = 0 (2.A.25)
Consider now the payoff function of a non-merging firm that deviates by charg-
ing a price p˜ 6= p˜∗. Since consumers expect that all non-merged firms charge the
same price p˜∗, they are supposed to sample these sellers in a random way. Thus, the
probability that a typical non-merging firm is visited first, second and so on till the
position n− k equals 1/ (n− k). Note that conditional on arriving at a non-merging
store, the probability that the buyer terminates her search there is 1− x¯ + p˜∗ − p˜.
Consider a consumer who has visited all the merging stores and h− 1 non-merging
ones. The merging stores were left because the highest match value there was lower
than x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗; likewise, the non-merging stores were left because the match val-
ues there were lower than x¯. Then the demand of a merging store when it is visited
in hth place equals:
1
n− k x¯
h−1 (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k (1− x¯ + p˜∗ − p˜)
Since the non-merging firm may be sampled in any position between 1 and −k,






h−1 (1− x¯ + p˜∗ − p˜)
=
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k
n− k
1− x¯n−k
1− x¯ (1− x¯ + p˜
∗ − p˜)
A non-merging store also obtains demand from consumers who visit all sellers
in the market and return to it to conduct a purchase. Denoting this demand as r˜a to
refer to the fact that these consumers return to a non-merging firm after visiting all
other firms in the market we have




(ε+ pˆ∗)k (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 dε
Putting together the various sources of demand of a non-merging firm, we ob-
tain the payoff function:
p˜i = p˜
[
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k
n− k
1− x¯n−k
1− x¯ (1− x¯ + p˜
∗ − p˜) +
ˆ x¯− p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ∗)k (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 dε
]
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The corresponding FOC is:
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k
n− k
1− x¯n−k





(ε+ pˆ∗)k (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 dε = 0 (2.A.27)
The equilibrium prices pˆ∗ and p˜∗ are determined by the system of equations
(2.A.25) and (2.A.27).
(a) We now prove that when search cost is sufficiently high then pˆ∗ > p˜∗ and
therefore consumer expectations are violated. We start by noting that, because the





the integral in (2.A.25) is positive. As a result, for an equilibrium to exist, the rest
of the LHS of (2.A.25),1− (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k − k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 pˆ∗, must be negative.
Note that this expression decreases in pˆ∗. Then it must be higher than when we set
pˆ∗ = p˜∗ because pˆ∗ < p˜∗ by assumption. That is, it must be the case that
1− (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k − k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k pˆ∗ > 1− x¯k − kx¯k−1 p˜∗ (2.A.28)
We now note that when x¯ → pmk the expression 1− x¯k − kx¯k−1 pmk is equal to
zero. Since p˜∗ ≥ 1/2 ≥ pmk , it is clear that 1− x¯k − kx¯k−1 pmk > 0 when x¯ → pmk . But
this constitutes a contradiction because then the LHS of (2.A.25) cannot be negative.
As a result, there is no such pair of prices pˆ∗ and p˜∗ that satisfy (2.A.25) and (2.A.27)
when x¯ → pmk and pˆ∗ < p˜∗.
(b) We prove now that when search cost goes to zero again we obtain pˆ∗ > p˜∗,
which violates consumer expectations. To show this we use the following equality
Z ≡ 1− pˆ∗k p˜∗n−k − qˆ∗ − (n− k) q˜∗ = 0
where qˆ∗ and q˜∗ denote the equilibrium quantities of the merged entity and the
non-merging firms and, from the FOCs, are given by
qˆ∗ = k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 pˆ∗
− k (k− 1) pˆ∗
ˆ x¯− p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k dε






The partial derivative of Z with respect to pˆ∗ is negative because q˜∗ increases in
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pˆ∗ and the derivative of qˆ∗ with respect to pˆ∗ is positive
∂qˆ∗
∂ pˆ∗ = k (x¯− p˜
∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 + k (k− 1) (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−2 pˆ∗
− k (k− 1)
ˆ x¯− p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k dε
− k (k− 1) (k− 2) pˆ∗
ˆ x¯− p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−3 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k dε
> k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 + k (k− 1) (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−2 pˆ∗













Therefore, if we set pˆ∗ = p˜∗ then Z must be negative when x¯ → 1. That is, it
must be the case that
lim
x¯→1
Z| pˆ∗= p˜∗ = 1− p˜∗n − kp˜∗ + k (k− 1) p˜∗
ˆ 1− p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−2 dε− (n− k) p˜∗







The FOC (2.A.27) may be rearranged as
1− x¯− p˜∗ + (n− k) (1− x¯)
1− x¯n−k
1




(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε = 0 (2.A.30)
The LHS of (2.A.30) increases in pˆ∗ because
k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k ´ x¯− p˜∗0 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 dε
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)2k




∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)2k
=
k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗) ´ x¯− p˜∗0 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 dε
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k+1




∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε





∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗ − ε− pˆ∗) dε





∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 (x¯− p˜∗ − ε) dε
(x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k+1
> 0
Therefore, given that pˆ∗ < p˜∗, if we set pˆ∗ = p˜∗ then the LHS of (2.A.30) must
be positive, that is






(x¯n − p˜∗n) > 0 (2.A.31)
If we take the limit of the LHS of (2.A.31) when x¯ → 1, then we get the following
inequality
− p˜∗ + 1
n
(1− p˜∗n) > 0
This inequality implies that 1 − p˜∗n − np˜∗ > 0 , in the limit when x¯ → 1. This
implies that (2.A.29) is positive. But this constitutes a contradiction and therefore it
cannot be the case that pˆ∗ < p˜∗ when x¯ → 1.
(c) Now we prove that pˆ∗ > p˜∗ if n = 3. We will use the results from the proof
of part (b) of this proposition. If n = 3 then Z ( p˜∗) simplifies to





= 1− 2p˜∗3 − 3x¯ p˜∗ + x¯2 p˜∗
while condition (2.A.31) reduces to












< 1− x¯ + 1
3x¯2
(
x¯3 − (1− x¯)3
)
Then



























3+ 17x¯− 72x¯2 + 72x¯3 − 16x¯4
)
(2.A.32)
which is always positive as shown in Figure 2.A.4
Figure 2.A.4. Plot of expression (2.A.32).
(d) Finally, in the limit when n→ ∞ the FOC of the merged entity becomes
1− (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k − k (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 pˆ∗ = 0 (2.A.33)
while that of a non-merged firm becomes
(x¯− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)k (1− x¯− p˜∗) = 0
This implies that limn→∞ p˜∗ = 1− x¯.
The LHS of (2.A.33) decreases in pˆ∗. Then, if pˆ∗ < p˜∗ then the LHS of (2.A.33)
must be negative if we replace pˆ∗ by p˜∗ = 1− x¯. However,
1− x¯k − kx¯k−1 (1− x¯) = 1+ (k− 1) x¯k − kx¯k−1 ≥ 0
where the inequality follows from setting x¯ = 1. This establishes a contradiction so





Often firms that merge, after a more or less complex process of business reorga-
nization, choose to shut down shops and crowd products together. Even though
this process may a priori be driven by a desire to achieve cost savings, we put for-
ward a different, possibly complementary, rationale: when consumer search costs
are significant, crowding products together generates demand-side economies. This
paper studies, on the one hand, how firms can benefit from the consumer search
economies generated by horizontal mergers and, on the other hand, the aggregate
implications of merging activity.
We study a consumer search market where a few firms sell differentiated prod-
ucts. Firms compete in prices and consumers search for satisfactory deals sequen-
tially. In the pre-merger symmetric market, all firms look alike and when con-
sumers pick a first shop to visit, they do it in a random way. Those consumers who
fail to find a satisfactory deal continue searching and once again they pick the next
shop to visit randomly; and so on. This model was introduced by Wolinsky (1986)
and was further studied by Anderson and Renault (1999).
When firms merge and crowd products together the following trade-off for a
consumer arises: relative to the deal offered by a non-merging firm, at the merged
entity, the consumer encounters more variety though likely offered at a higher
∗This chapter is based on Moraga-González and Petrikaite˙ (2011b)
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price. We show that this trade-off ends up being favorable for the merging firms
when search costs are relatively high. In the unique equilibrium of the post-merger
market consumers find it optimal to search first at the merged entity and then, if un-
satisfied with the deals available there, continue searching among the non-merging
stores.
Search costs, even if small, are known to have important implications for the
functioning of markets. In our model, merging is individually rational and, in con-
trast to most papers on mergers, the outsiders’ profits decrease after a merger takes
place. Moreover, consumers may benefit from consolidation in the market: we
show that the economies from lower search costs may outweigh the price-rising
effects of the merger.
The literature on the incentives to merge and the aggregate implications of
mergers is quite extensive. For a recent survey of the main theoretical and empirical
insights see Whinston (2006). A seminal paper in the literature is Salant et al. (1983),
who demonstrated that merging is not very attractive in environments where firms
compete in quantities and offer similar products. This result is so surprising that
is referred to as the merger paradox. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) showed that
price-setting firms selling horizontally differentiated products, other things equal,
always have an incentive to merge. In contrast to the Cournot case analyzed by
Salant et al. (1983), this result arises because price increases of the merging firms,
which favor the coalition partners, are accompanied by price increases of the non-
merging firms, which also favors them.
In our model firms also compete in prices and sell differentiated products. How-
ever, sufficiently high search costs give a rise to interesting results. When search
costs are significant. In that case, by clustering all products together, mergers serve
to effectively lower the costs of searching the products of the potentially merging
firms. This, everything else equal, gives the merged entity a prominent position in
the market, which implies that the merged entity attracts all consumer first-visits.
In some cases, despite having to internalize the pricing externalities among all its
goods, we show that the prominence effect may be so strong that the merged entity
may charge lower prices than the non-merging firms (as it actually occurs in Arm-
strong et al. (2009) paper on the effects of prominence). In contrast to Deneckere and
Davidson (1985) analysis, in our paper insiders obtain larger gains than outsiders
if a merger occurs. This is because consumers postpone visiting the outsiders until
they have visited the merged entity. When search costs are high, consumer traf-
fic from the merged entity to the non-merging firms is so small that the outsiders
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lose out. On the consumer welfare side, mergers have the potential to generate
sufficiently large search economies so as to benefit consumers too.
Since the seminal paper of Williamson (1968), the role of mergers at generat-
ing supply-side economies, or cost-synergies, that can more than offset the market
power effects of consolidation has been the focus of a considerable amount of re-
search. Perry and Porter (1985), Farrel and Shapiro (1990) and McAfee and Williams
(1992) explicitly modeled the cost efficiencies that arise from economies of sharing
assets in product markets and stated conditions for an efficiency defense of mergers.
Our analysis also brings out an efficiency defence argument of mergers, but based
on demand- rather than on supply-side economies.
Section 5.7 of the 2010 Merger Assessment Guidelines of the U.K. Competi-
tion Commission and the Office of Fair Trading acknowledges the importance of
demand-side efficiencies in merger control. However, the guidelines focus mainly
on cases where complementarities are significant: “Demand-side efficiencies arise if
the attractiveness to customers of the merged firm’s products increases as a result of the
merger. Common examples of demand-side efficiencies include: network effects, pricing ef-
fects and ’one-stop shopping’.1 In this chapter we show that demand-side economies
can also arise even if products are substitutes. The reason is that shops that carry
more variety can, in spite of the potential negative price effects, be more attractive
for consumers.
This chapter is related to a strand of the consumer search literature dealing
with firm’s choice of location, entry and choice of product-lines in the presence
of search costs. This chapter and those papers have in common that consumer
search economies play a central role. In Stahl (1982) and Wolinsky (1983) savings in
search costs can explain the observed geographical concentration of stores selling
differentiated products. Fischer and Harrington Jr (1996) go one step further and
investigate the role of product heterogeneity in explaining interindustry variation
in firm agglomeration. Dudey (1990) studies the case of homogeneous products
and finds conditions under which firms cluster at a single location. Wilson (2010),
by contrast, shows that homogeneous product firms may have an incentive to “ob-
fuscate” the market by locating in less-easy-to-reach locations. Like in Fischer and
Harrington Jr (1996), Non (2010) reconciles these two ideas by showing that clus-
tered and peripheral homogeneous product firms can coexist in the market. Ellison
1 With network effects, users place the higher value for a product the more it is used by other consumers.
A merger may make networks compatible and so enhance the welfare of consumers. Pricing effects arise
when bringing complement products under common ownership, which may results in lower prices for
all products. Gains from one-stop shopping arise when consumers have a strong preference for buying a
range of products at a single supplier.
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and Wolitzky (2009) also study obfuscation strategies in the market. They argue
that consumer search dis-economies can very well explain the obfuscation strate-
gies observed in Ellison and Ellison (2009). Economies of scope in search costs
also play a central role in explaining entry patters and the choice of product-lines.
Schultz and Stahl (1996) show that economies of scope in search costs can lead to
excessive (price-increasing) entry. Economies of scope in shopping costs also arise
when consumers buy many products and prefer to concentrate their purchases with
a single supplier. Klemperer (1992) shows that in these situations firms may prefer
head-to-head competition over product-line differentiation. In a subsequent paper,
Klemperer and Padilla (1997) show that search cost economies can lead to excessive
product-line variety.
This chapter is also related to a recent literature on ordered search. Arbatskaya
(2007) studies a market for homogeneous products where the order in which firms
are visited is exogenously given. In equilibrium prices must fall as the consumer
walks away from the firms visited first. Zhou (2011) considers the case of differenti-
ated products and finds the opposite result. As mentioned above, Armstrong et al.
(2009) study the implications of "prominence" in search markets. In their model,
there is a firm that is always visited first and this firm charges lower prices and
derives greater profits than the rest of the firms, which are visited randomly after
consumers have visited the prominent firm. Zhou (2009) extends the ideas in Arm-
strong et al. (2009) to the case in which a set of firms, rather than just one, is promi-
nent. His analysis shares some features with our model because the merging firms,
by crowding products together, become "prominent". Haan and Moraga-González
(2011) study a model where firms compete in advertising to raise consumer atten-
tion. The firms whose advertising is more salient gain market prominence. Con-
sumers visit them earlier along the search process and charge lower prices. They
show that firms need not benefit from higher search costs.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
consumer search model. Section 3.3 presents the benchmark equilibrium of the
pre-merger market. Section 3.4 discusses our main results. 3.5 briefly concludes the
chapter. To ease the reading of the chapter, long proofs are placed in an appendix.
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3.2 The model
We study the search model for differentiated products first proposed by Wolinsky
(1986) and further studied by Anderson and Renault (1999).2 On the supply side
of the market there are n firms selling horizontally differentiated products. All
firms employ the same constant returns to scale technology of production and we
normalize unit production costs to zero. On the demand side of the market, there is
a unit mass of consumers. A consumer m has tastes described by an indirect utility
function
umi(pi) = εmi − pi,
if she buys product i at price pi. The parameter εmi can be thought of as a match
value between consumer m and product i. We assume that the value εmi is the re-
alization of a random variable uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Match values are
independently distributed across consumers and products. No firm can observe
εmi so personalised pricing is not possible. In what follows we will denote zk ≡
max{ε1, ε2, ..., εk}. For later reference, it is useful to calculate the optimal price of a
multi-product monopolist selling k varieties, which we denote pmk . This price max-
imizes p(Pr[zk ≥ p]), which gives pmk = (1 + k)−
1
k . Setting k = 1, we have the
single-product monopolist, whose price is simply denoted by pm and is equal to
1/2.
Consumers search sequentially with costless recall. Each time a consumer searches,
she must pay a search cost denoted s. To avoid that a market equilibrium fails to
exist (Diamond, 1971), we assume that search cost s is relatively small. In particular:
Assumption SC. We assume that s ∈ [0, 1/8]; moreover, we assume that the number
of firms n ≤ 10.3
This assumption ensures that the first search is always worthwhile for any num-
ber of varieties, k, sold by the first-visited shop, that is:
Pr[zk ≥ pmk ]E[zk − pmk | zk ≥ pmk ]− s
2 More recently, this model has been used to explain incentives to invest in quality (Wolinsky, 2005);
product-designs (Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat, 2011) and the emergence and the effects of market
prominence (Armstrong et al., 2009; Haan and Moraga-González, 2011; Zhou, 2009; Zhou, 2011).
3 The restriction n ≤ 10 is mainly technical and serves to avoid situations in which a post-merger
equilibrium fails to exist. The reason is as follows. Fix the search cost s and suppose n is sufficiently
large. Then an arbitrarily large k-firm merger has an incentive to charge such a high price that the
buyer will find it unprofitable to enter the market. This produces a Diamond-paradox type of result and
the equilibrium collapses. In practice, and for the purpose of this paper, since mergers are relevant in





(zk − pmk )kεk−1dε− s ≥ 0 for all k = 1, 2, ..., n
For k = 1, this inequality holds strictly if s = 1/8. For larger k values, the expected
utility a consumer derives from her first search always covers the search cost.
3.3 Pre-merger market
As a benchmark case, in this section we characterize the pre-merger market sym-
metric equilibrium.
Let p∗ ∈ [0, pm] denote the prices of firms other than firm i. Consider the (ex-
pected) payoff to a firm i that deviates by charging a price pi. Assume pi ≥ p∗
without loss of generality. We start by computing the probability that a consumer
accepts the offer of firm i, conditional on visiting firm i first. For this, we need to
characterize the optimal consumer stopping rule. Suppose that a buyer has arrived
at a certain firm and her current most favorable purchase option gives her utility
εi− pi. If εi− pi < 0, the consumer will search again given our assumption s < 1/8.
Suppose εi − pi ≥ 0. In the Nash equilibrium, a visit to a new firm will yield utility
ε− p∗. Kohn and Shavell (1974) show that the consumer should continue to search
if her best previously discovered match value εi is lower than x, where x is the
solution to the equation ˆ 1
x
(ε− x)dε = s, (3.1)
that is, x = 1−√2s. To see this, notice that searching one more time yields gains
only if the consumer prefers the new option, say j, over option i, i.e., if ε j > εi −
pi + p∗. Denoting x ≡ εi− pi + p∗, the expected benefit from searching once more is´ 1
x (ε− x)dε, which is the LHS of (3.1). Searching one more time is worthwhile if and
only if these incremental benefits exceed the cost of search s. Therefore, the buyer
is exactly indifferent between searching once more and stopping and accepting the
offer at hand if x = x. Since s ∈ [0, 1/8], we have that x ∈ [1/2, 1].
In any symmetric equilibrium, it must be the case that x ≥ p∗ for otherwise no
consumer would participate in the market. Given this, the probability that a buyer
stops searching at firm i given that firm i is visited in first place is equal to
Pr[x > x] = 1− (x + pi − p∗), (3.2)
provided the deviating price is not too high, i.e., pi < 1 − x + p∗, for otherwise
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every single consumer would walk away from firm i.4
Before visiting firm i, the consumer may have visited other firm(s). The proba-
bility that a consumer goes to firm i in her second search and decides to acquire the
offering of firm i right away is x(1− x − pi + p∗).5 Similarly, the probability that
a consumer goes to firm i in her h-th search and decides to acquire the offering of
firm i right away is xh−1(1− x− pi + p∗).
To complete firm i’s payoff calculation, we need to compute the joint probability
that a consumer walks away from every single firm in the market and happens to
return to firm i to conduct a transaction, that is
Pr[max{0, zn−1 − p∗} < εi − pi < x− p∗] (3.3)
This probability is independent of the order in which firms are visited so we will




(εi − pi + p∗)n−1dεi =
ˆ x−p∗
0










1− x (1− x− pi + p
∗) + (xn − p∗n)
]
.
We look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in prices. Hence, the first-order con-
dition is:
1− p∗n − p∗ 1− x
n
1− x = 0 (3.4)
It is easy to check that (3.4) has a unique solution that satisfies x ≥ p∗ ≥ 1− x ≥
0.Since the LHS of (3.4) decreases in x, the equilibrium price increases in the search
cost s. In the limit when s = 1/8, x = p∗ = 1/2.




4 In what follows we derive the payoff of a firm under the assumption that pi < 1− x + p∗. When this
does not hold, the payoff is slightly different. See footnote 4).
5 Letting j denote the firm visited earlier, this probability is given by Pr[εi − pi > x− p∗ > ε j − p∗].
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3.4 Mergers of k firms
In this section we study the price implications of mergers and the incentives to
merge. Consider that k out of the n active firms merge, with 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. We take
a long-term view of mergers and assume that the k merging stores shut down all
their shops but one, where they crowd the k varieties stemming from the k original
merging firms together. In what follows, a typical non-merging store will be labeled
j.
Let p˜∗ ∈ [0, pm] and pˆ∗ ∈ [0, pmk ] denote the equilibrium prices charged by the
non-merging firms and the merged entity, respectively. To characterize the post-
merger equilibrium we need to write out the payoffs of the different types of firms.
These payoffs in turn depend on the optimal consumer search behavior, which, of
course, has to be consistent with equilibrium pricing.
We then proceed by first specifying the order in which consumers will visit
the various types of firms, then calculating equilibrium prices and finally check-
ing back the consistency of the search rule. The trade-off for a consumer is clear:
relative to the deal offered by a non-merging firm, at the merged entity, the con-
sumer encounters more variety but possibly at higher prices,6 offered at a higher
price.
Let x be the solution to
ˆ 1
x
(ε− x)dεk − s = 0 (3.6)
As in (3.1), x represents a threshold value above which a consumer will decide not
to continue searching the products of the merged entity.
Define the x − p˜∗ as the reservation utility for searching a non-merging store.
Note that in any equilibrium where the non-merging stores have positive market
shares, it must be the case that x − p˜∗ ≥ 0. Likewise, the number x − pˆ∗ is the
corresponding reservation utility at the merged entity. Weitzman (1979)’s paper
on optimal search for the best alternative prescribes the consumer should search
as follows: at every step in the search process a consumer should consider visiting
next the (not-yet-visited) shop for which reservation utility is the highest; moreover,
6 Merging firms internalize pricing externalities so it is reasonable to expect lower prices at the non-
merging stores. However, there is a recent literature on oligopolistic competition with search frictions
showing that firms that are visited first charge lower prices than the rivals that are visited later (Arm-
strong et al., 2009; Haan and Moraga-González, 2011; Zhou, 2009). Therefore, if the merged entity were
to be visited first by the consumers in an equilibrium, it may very well be the case that it ends up charg-
ing a lower price than the non-merging stores.
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at every step in the search process a consumer should terminate search whenever
the maximum sampled reward so far is above the reservation utility at the shop to
be visited next.
Momentarily, assume x− pˆ∗ > x− p˜∗ so that consumers visit first the merged
entity. To calculate the post-merger equilibrium prices, we proceed by comput-
ing the payoffs of the firms (merging and non-merging) which they would obtain
when deviating from the equilibrium prices. Then we derive the first order con-
ditions (FOCs), require consumer expectations to be correct, and solve for equilib-
rium prices. After this we look for conditions under which x− pˆ∗ > x− p˜∗ indeed
holds. Later in Section 3.4.2 we prove that the equilibrium we derive here is unique
provided that search costs are sufficiently large.
Payoff to a deviant merging store
Since consumers expect the price set by the merged entity to be pˆ∗, given our as-
sumption SC, they will make the first search. Upon arrival at the merged entity,
they may be surprised by a deviation, denoted pˆ. Without loss of generality, sup-
pose that the deviating price pˆ < pˆ∗.
Let zk − pˆ be the deal observed by the consumer at the merged entity. A con-
sumer stops there and buys right away if the expected gains from further search
are lower than the search cost. Applying the same logic as in equation (3.2), since
consumers believe the non-merging firms to be charging p˜∗, the probability that a
buyer stops searching at the merged entity is equal to
1− (x− p˜∗ + pˆ)k, (3.7)
provided, again, that the deviating price is not too high.
The merged entity also receives demand from consumers who decide to walk
away from it and venture the non-merging firms only to find out that the deal
offered by the merged entity is in the end the best in the market. This happens with
probability:
Pr [zk − pˆ < x− p˜∗ and zn−k < x and zk − pˆ > max{zn−k − p˜∗, 0}] ,
which is equivalent to
Pr [zk − pˆ < x− p˜∗ and zk − pˆ > max{zn−k − p˜∗, 0}]
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=
ˆ x− p˜∗+ pˆ
pˆ
(ε− pˆ + p˜∗)n−k dεk = k
ˆ x− p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ)k−1 dε (3.8)
The demand of the merged entity is therefore the sum of (3.7) and (3.8). There-
fore, the total profit of the merged entity equals:
pˆi( pˆ) = pˆ
[
1− (x− p˜∗ + pˆ)k + k
ˆ x− p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ)k−1 dε
]
(3.9)
Payoff to a deviant non-merging store
We now compute the payoff of a non-merging store that deviates from p˜∗ by charg-
ing p˜. Without loss of generality assume p˜ < p˜∗. Once consumers walk away from
the merged entity, as all non-merging firms are supposed to charge the same price
p˜∗, consumers are assumed to visit them randomly. Therefore the deviant firm may
be visited in the first place after the merged entity, in the second place and so on till
the n− kth place. Like any other non-merging store, the deviant has a probability
1/(n− k) of being visited in each of these places.
Consider that the deviant non-merging firm is visited by a consumer in her h-th
search after walking away from the merged entity, with h = 1, 2, ..., n− k.7 Suppose
the deal the consumer observes upon entering the deviant’s shop is ε j − p˜. There
are two situations in which the deviant sells to this consumer. First, the consumer
may stop searching at this shop and buy there right away. Using the search logic
described above, conditional on the consumer visiting non-merging firm j in her
h-th search, this occurs when ε j ≥ x − p˜∗ + p˜. Therefore, the joint probability a
consumer visits the deviant in h-th place and buys there directly is
1
n− k Pr[zk − pˆ
∗ < x− p˜∗ and zh−1 < x and ε j − p˜ > x− p˜∗]
=
1
n− k (x− p˜
∗ + pˆ∗)kxh−1 (1− x + p˜∗ − p˜)
Second, the consumer may walk away from the deviant firm and come back to it
7 We note that when the consumer visits the deviant immediately after leaving the merged firm, h = 1,
the consumer, even if surprised by a deviation, never wants to return to the merged entity without
searching further. If fact, this event has probability
Pr[zk − p̂∗ < x− p˜∗and ε− p˜ > x− p˜∗ and zk − p̂∗ > ε− p˜] = 0
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after visiting all non-merging stores. This occurs when
Pr
[
zk − pˆ∗ < x− p˜∗ and zn−k−1 < x and ε j − p˜ < x− p˜∗
and ε j − p˜ > max {zk − pˆ∗, zn−k−1 − p˜∗, 0}
]
which after manipulation gives
Pr
[
x− p˜∗ + p˜ > ε j > max{zk − pˆ∗ + p˜, zn−k−1 − p˜∗ + p˜, p˜}
]
=
ˆ x− p˜∗+ p˜
p˜




(ε j + pˆ∗)k(ε j + p˜∗)n−k−1dε j
Note that this probability does not depend on h.
Taking into account that, once the consumer has walked away from the merged
entity, the deviant may be visited by her in positions h = 1, 2, ..., n − k we have a










Using this expression, we obtain the profits of the non-merging firm:





1− x (x− p˜







Taking the FOCs in (3.9) and (3.10) and requiring that consumer expectations
are fulfilled, i.e. pˆ = pˆ∗ and p˜ = p˜∗, gives:




(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ∗) dε = 0 (3.11)
1
n− k (x− p˜
∗ + pˆ∗)k
1− xn−k





(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε = 0 (3.12)
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3.4.1 Main results: high search costs
The main results of this article pertain to the case where search costs are significant.
In this section we focus on such situations.
Proposition 3.1. Assume that k ≤ n− 1 firms merge. Then there exists a Nash equilib-
rium in the post-merger market where:
• Consumers prefer to search first the products of the merged entity and then, if they
wish so, they proceed by searching the products of the non-merging firms.
• The merged entity charges a price pˆ∗ and the non-merging stores charge a price p˜∗;
these prices solve the system of first order conditions (3.11)-(3.12).
This equilibrium exists if the search cost s is sufficiently large, in which case pˆ∗ ≥ p˜∗.
The proof, which is presented in the appendix, has three steps. We first prove
that there exists at least one solution to the system of first order conditions (3.11)-
(3.12). We then show that this solution is unique. Finally, we show that when the
search cost is large, consumer putative search order (first the merged entity then
the non-merging firms) is consistent with equilibrium pricing.
Before turning to a discussion of the aggregate implications of mergers, we
make two remarks in connection with Proposition 3.1. The first observation is that,
even though the proof of the proposition uses the case where the search cost is very
high and converges to its maximum value, the result is true for much lower search
costs. The second observation is that the ranking of merging and non-merging firm
prices can be different than the one in Proposition 3.1. It is indeed possible that
the search-order effect more than offsets the internalization-of-pricing-externalities
effect, in which case the merged entity charges a price lower than the non-merging
stores. This occurs when the search cost is relatively small and the number of merg-
ing firms relative to the total number of firms in the market is also small. These two
remarks can be seen in the graphs of Figure 3.1. In these two graphs, the number
of merging firms is set to 2 and the search cost is very small (s = 0.005). Figure
3.1a plots the post-merger equilibrium prices and shows that the merged entity
charges a price lower than that of the non-merging when n is relatively large. Fig-
ure 3.1b plots consumer reservation utilities for searching the two types of firm,
which shows that consumer search order is consistent with equilibrium pricing for
all n ≥ 4.
We now turn to study the incentives to merge.
Proposition 3.2. For the Nash equilibrium of Proposition 3.1 we have:
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(a) Prices (b) Reservation utilities
Figure 3.1. Post-merger prices and reservation utilities (x = 0.9, k = 2)
• Any k-firm merger is individually rational for the merging firms, that is, pˆi∗/k > pi∗.
• If the search cost is sufficiently large, in any k-firm merger the non-merging firms
obtain lower profits than the merging firms, that is, pˆi∗/k > p˜i∗.
The proof is in the appendix. As shown by Deneckere and Davidson (1985), in
models of price competition with differentiated products merging is individually
rational. Our first observation in Proposition 3.2 generalizes this insight to the case
where there exist search frictions in the market. Our second result in Proposition
3.2 is that non-merging firms may obtain lower profits than the merging ones. This
observation contrasts earlier work and deserves an explanation. Here, by merging,
the potentially merging firms gain prominence in the market so that in the equilib-
rium of Proposition 3.1 the merged entity is visited first. This is to the detriment of
the non-merging firms, which are relegated to the end of the optimal search order
that consumers follow when they search for satisfactory deals. When search costs
are significant, the search-order effect is substantial: the non-merging firms receive
too few visitors and lose out relative to the merging firms.
Our final result pertains to the aggregate implications of mergers. As usual, we
evaluate the effects of a merger on welfare grounds by comparing the pre- and post-
merger un-weighted sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profits. We now compute
the expected surplus consumers derive in the post-merger market. Consider first
those consumers who end up buying from the merged entity. As explained above,
these consumers either buy directly, in which case they incur the search cost only
one time, or they buy at the merged entity after having visited all the non-merging
firms, in which case they incur a total search cost of (n− k + 1) s. Denoting by ĈS
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(ε− pˆ∗ − s) dεk
+
ˆ x− p˜∗+ pˆ∗
pˆ∗
(ε− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k (ε− pˆ∗ − (n− k + 1) s) dεk (3.13)
Consider now those consumers who end up buying from the non-merging firms.
These consumers may buy directly at one of the non-merging firms after walking
away from the merged entity, in which case they incur a total search cost of 2s; or
else they may leave some ` non-merging firms to finally buy at the `+ 1-th one, in
which case the total search cost they incur is equal to (`+ 2)s; or finally, they may
walk away from all merging and non-merging firms only to find out that the best
deal is at one of the non-merging firms, in which case they incur a total search cost
of (n− k + 1) s. Denoting by C˜S the expected consumer surplus of the clientele of
the non-merging firms we obtain











εn−k−1 (ε− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k (ε− p˜∗ − (n− k + 1) s) dε














εn−k−1 (ε− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k (ε− p˜∗ − (n− k + 1) s) dε. (3.14)
Some consumers do not buy at all. The mass of these consumers is pˆ∗k p˜∗n−k. By
construction, they visit all the firms in the market. Hence, their consumer surplus
is negative and equals
CS∅ = − pˆ∗k p˜∗n−k (n− k + 1) s (3.15)
Aggregating the surplus over the different consumers and firms, we obtain a
measure of expected social welfare
SW = ĈS + C˜S + CS∅ + pˆi + (n− k)p˜i.
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Proposition 3.3. For the Nash equilibrium of Proposition 3.1, if the search cost is suffi-
ciently high we have that:
• Any k-firm merger results in an increase in industry profits.
• Consumer surplus increases after a k-firm merger.
As a result, social welfare increases after a merger has taken place.
The proof is in the appendix. The aggregate implications of a merger are illus-
trated in Figure 3.2. The first observation is that the results in Proposition 3.3 not
only hold for very high search costs but more generally. In Figure 3.2a we com-
pare pre- and post-merger (individual and collective) profits. It can be seen that
the merged entity’s profits (green curve) are clearly above pre-merger levels (blue
solid curve). As explained before, this is the outcome of two forces: one the one
hand, the merged entity benefits from the market prominence it gains by cluster-
ing products together; on the other hand, the merged entity profits from increased
market power. The figure also shows that when search costs are not extremely low,
outsiders lose out (red solid curve). In any case, collectively firms obtain greater
profits post-merger (red dashed curve) than pre-merger (blue dashed curve). Fi-
nally, it is also worth mentioning that the asymmetry in the way search costs affect
the profits of the different firms after a merger. As search costs increase, the profits
of the merged entity go up while the profits of the non-merging firms typically fall
down. This is due to the fact that as search costs increase consumer traffic from the
merged entity to the non-merging firms falls.
Figure 3.2b depicts pre- and post-merger consumer surplus and social welfare.
The graph illustrates our result in Proposition 3.3 that when a search cost is high,
consumer search economies more than offset the negative price effects of consol-
idation. When search costs are low, consumers lose but overall welfare anyway
increases. This is driven by the mitigating impact that consolidation has on the
overall search frictions in the market.
3.4.2 Uniqueness of equilibrium
In the previous section we have characterized an equilibrium where the potentially
merging firms gain market prominence if they indeed decide to merge. In the equi-
librium or Proposition 3.1, consumers found it optimal to first search the products
of the merged entity to continue later, if desired, searching the products of the non-
merging firms. For this equilibrium to exist, search costs had to be sufficiently
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(a) Profits (b) Consumer surplus
Figure 3.2. Pre- and post-merger profits and consumer surplus (n = 5, k = 2).
large. In this section we argue that the equilibrium in Proposition 3.1 is unique
when search costs are indeed relatively high. We prove this by contradiction.
Suppose that consumers find it optimal to start searching for a satisfactory good
among the products of the non-merged firms. If this is so, then the reservation util-
ity at the merged entity, x − pˆ∗, must be lower than the reservation utility at a
non-merging firm, x¯ − p˜∗ (where x and x, as before, solve (3.1) and (3.6), respec-
tively). In what follows we derive the payoff functions of merged and non-merged
firms under this assumption. We then compute the pair of equilibrium prices and
show that, for those prices, when search costs are high, the reservation utility at
the merged entity would be above the reservation utility at the non-merged firms,
which constitutes a contradiction.
As before, let p˜∗ and pˆ∗ be the equilibrium prices and assume x¯− p˜∗ > x− pˆ∗.
Invoking Weitzman (1979) again, given this inequality, consumers should start their
search by visiting the non-merged firms. They will visit the merged entity only after
having visited all the non-merged shops.
We first derive the payoff of a (deviant) non-merging firm. Consider a non-
merging firm, say firm i, that deviates by charging a price p˜ 6= p˜∗. As all non-
merging firms are supposed to charge the same price p˜∗, consumers are assumed to
visit them randomly. The deviant firm may be visited by the consumer in the first
place, the second place, etc. all the way till the (n − k)-th place. The probability
that the deviating firm is visited in any of these positions is 1/ (n− k). When the
consumer visits the deviant firm in the 1st, 2nd, ..., (n− k− 1)-th place, the decision
whether to continue searching or not takes into account that the next visited shop
is also a non-merging store. By contrast, when the deviant firm is the last non-
merging store visited by the consumer, i.e. the (n− k)-th one, the decision of the
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consumer is slightly different because the next shop to be visited is a merging store
and such a store charges a price different from the price of a non-merging store.
Since the consumer stopping rule at any of the first n− k− 1 non-merging stores is
different from the one at the last non-merging store, it is convenient to distinguish
among those two cases.
Consider a deviant firm i charging price p˜ and visited in positions 1, 2, ...n− k−
1. This type of firm receives demand from three types of consumers: one, from
consumers who visit firm i and terminate their search there; two, from consumers
who walk away from all non-merging firms including firm i and return to it after
all; and three, from consumers who walk away from all (non-merging and merging)
firms in the market and return to it in the end. We now compute the sizes of these
groups of consumers. First, a consumer terminates her search immediately after
visiting firm i if εi > x¯ − p˜∗ + p˜. Therefore, conditional on reaching firm i, the
probability that a consumer buys in shop i without searching further equals
1− x¯ + p˜∗ − p˜. (3.16)
The consumer may have visited other non-merging firms before arriving at shop i.
Since all other firms charge equilibrium prices, if a consumer has walked away from
other shops this means that the match values there are lower than x¯. Therefore, the
demand received by the deviant firm from consumers who visit it in positions 1 to






x¯j−1 (1− x¯ + p˜∗ − p˜) = 1
n− k
1− x¯n−k−1
1− x¯ (1− x¯ + p˜
∗ − p˜) (3.17)
We now compute the demand received by this type of firm from consumers
who walk away from all non-merging firms including firm i and return to it af-
ter all. Consider a consumer who is at the last non-merging firm and is therefore
contemplating whether to continue searching for a satisfactory good among the
products of the merged entity. The consumer will continue searching if the highest
match value observed so far is lower than x − pˆ∗ + p˜∗. Therefore, the consumer








ˆ x¯− p˜∗+ p˜
x− pˆ∗+ p˜
(ε− p˜ + p˜∗)n−k−1 dε = 1
n− k
(
x¯n−k − (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k) (3.18)
Finally, we calculate the demand received by firm i from consumers who visit




0 < εi − p˜ < x− pˆ∗ and εi − p˜ > max {zn−k−1 − p˜∗, zk − pˆ∗}





(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε (3.19)
Note that the number of these consumers does not depend on the position in which
firm i has been visited.
As a result, we conclude that the total demand of firm i if it is sampled in posi-
tion 1 to n− k− 1 equals to the sum of (3.17), (3.18) and (3.19).
We now move to consider the demand of firm i when it is the last non-merging
firm visited by the consumer. This type of firm receives demand from two types
of consumers: one, consumers who stop searching at firm i right away: and two,
consumers who visit all the shops in the market and return to firm i after all. The









n−k−1 (1− x¯ + p˜∗ − p˜) + 1
n− k
(
x¯n−k − (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k) (3.20)
The returning demand of firm i does not depend on the order of sampling and is
identical to (3.19).
Putting the above demands together, the total payoff of a deviating non-merging
firm equals:





1− x¯ (1− x¯ + p˜
∗ − p˜) + 1
n− k
(




(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε
]
Taking the FOC, imposing the rational expectations requirement that p˜ = p˜∗
and simplifying gives:













(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε = 0 (3.21)
We now derive the payoff of the merged entity when it deviates to pˆ 6= pˆ∗. As
discussed above, consumers will walk away from all non-merging stores and arrive
at the merged entity if the best of the non-merging firms’ deals is lower than x− pˆ∗.
Therefore, the merged entity will only receive demand when its offer is the best of
all the offers in the market. The probability of this event equals
Pr
[




x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k (1− (x− pˆ∗ + pˆ)k)+ k ˆ x− pˆ∗− pˆ
pˆ
(ε− pˆ + p˜∗)n−k εk−1dε
Its payoff then equals:
pˆi( pˆ) = pˆ
[(




(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ)k−1 dε
]
Taking the FOC, imposing the rational expectations condition that pˆ = pˆ∗ and
simplifying gives:
(




(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ∗) dε = 0 (3.22)
Proposition 3.4. Assume that a k-firm merger takes place in the market. Assume also that
the search cost is sufficiently high. Then an equilibrium where consumers prefer to search
first the products of the non-merging firms and then, if they wish so, the products of the
merged entity does not exist. As a result, the equilibrium in Proposition 3.1 is unique.
Proof. Assume that there is a pair of non-negative prices pˆ∗ and p˜∗ that satisfy
the system of equations (3.21) and (3.22). For these prices to be consistent with
equilibrium, first, they must be lower than or equal to the monopoly prices pmk
and pm, respectively; moreover, the reservation utility at the merged entity must be
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lower than the reservation utility at a non-merging firm.
Take the LHS of the FOC of a non-merging firm, equation (3.21). Note that
the integral in this equation is positive. Observe now that the second summand,
1
n−k (x¯
n−k − (x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗)n−k), is also positive because the assumption x¯ − p˜∗ >
x− pˆ∗ implies that x¯ > x− pˆ∗ + p˜∗. As a consequence, if an equilibrium exists, the
first term of the FOC (3.21) must be negative. This implies that in equilibrium, it
must be the case that p˜∗ > 1− x¯.
Take now the limiting case where the search cost is high so that x¯ → 1/2. If this
is so, for an equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that p˜∗ > 1/2. But this is a
contradiction because p˜∗ ≤ pm = 1/2.
3.5 Conclusions
In the long-run firms that merge end up shutting down shops and clustering their
products together. In this paper we have argued that when search costs are signif-
icant, this process generates substantial demand-side economies. What happens is
that in the post-merger market, everything else equal, consumers do not need to
search as intensively as in the pre-merger situation to find satisfactory products.
This paper has emphasized the importance of these demand-side economies. We
have shown that firms that merge may gain a prominent position in the market,
even if they increase their prices more than what the non-merging firms do. In that
case, consumers prefer to start searching for satisfactory products at the merged
entity. In equilibrium, insider firms gain customers and increase their profits, while
outsider firms lose out because they are pushed all the way back in the optimal
search order that consumers follow when they search for products. We have shown
that consolidation may create sufficiently large search economies so as to generate
rents for consumers too.
The difference between the short- and the long-run effects of mergers is impor-
tant. In a previous chapter, we have studied the short-run implications of mergers.
We have shown that firms that merge raise their prices more than what the non-
merging firms do, so absent any other offsetting effect, merging firms are pushed all
the way back in the optimal search order that consumers follow when they search
for satisfactory products. Thus, merging gives the outsiders a free ride that is freer
the greater the search costs. For sufficiently large search costs, it turns out that
merging in a product differentiation environment lowers the short-run profits of
the merging firms. To counter this effect, firms may cluster their products together.
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In this chapter we have shown that by doing so search economies unfold, which
makes mergers profitable for the merging firms and, sometimes, for the consumers
too.
In a recent paper on mergers in the Italian banking sector, Focarelli and Panetta
(2003) forcefully make the point that mergers may generate efficiency gains (head-
quarter consolidation, shutting down of branches, etc.) that take a relatively long
time to materialize. In fact, they show that consolidation leads to adverse price
changes only temporarily, and that when sufficient time elapses efficiency gains
kick-in and prices decrease. Seen against earlier empirical results by Kim and Sin-
gal (1993) and Prager and Hannan (1998), this is an interesting insight. Our theory
points out that after-merger downsizing may lead to important search economies
that in the long-run may result in price decreases. In this sense it yields implica-
tions consistent with Focarelli and Panetta (2003)’s empirical findings. Whether
supply- or demand-side economies cause the results remains an empirical ques-
tion. Developing methods to separate the relative importance of demand- versus
cost-economies seems a fascinating area of research.
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3.A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. The proof of the proposition is organized in three claims.
The first claim shows that there is a pair of prices pˆ∗ and p˜∗ that satisfy the first
order conditions (3.11) and (3.12). The second claim shows that this pair is unique,
and the last claim shows that it is optimal for consumers to start searching from a
merger if the search costs are sufficiently high.
Let G( pˆ∗, p˜∗) and H( pˆ∗, p˜∗) denote the LHS of the FOCs (3.11) and (3.12), re-
spectively. In what follows, we drop the "∗" super-indexes to shorten the expres-
sions.
Claim 3.A.1. There is a pair of prices pˆ and p˜ that satisfy the first-order conditions
G( pˆ, p˜) = 0 and H( pˆ, p˜) = 0.
Proof. The function G is differentiable and takes on real values for all ( pˆ, p˜) ∈[
0, pmk
] × [0, pm]. Therefore, the FOC G ( p˜, pˆ) = 0 defines an implicit relation be-
tween pˆ and p˜. Let us denote such relationship by p˜ = υ1( pˆ). We now argue that












− (k− 1) (x− p˜ + pˆ)k−2 (x− p˜ + (k + 1) pˆ)− (k + 1) (x− p˜ + pˆ)k−1
+ k (k− 1)
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k (ε+ pˆ)k−3 (2ε+ kpˆ) dε
]
= −k (x− p˜ + pˆ)k−2 (2x− 2p˜ + (k + 1) pˆ)
+ k (k− 1)
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k (ε+ pˆ)k−3 (2ε+ kpˆ) dε





= − (k− 2) (x− p˜ + pˆ)k−3 (2x− 2p˜ + (k + 1) pˆ)− 2 (x− p˜ + pˆ)k−2
+ (k− 1) xn−k (x− p˜ + pˆ)k−3 (2x− 2p˜ + kpˆ)





We know that x ≥ p˜. If we evaluate ∂G/∂ pˆ at x = p˜ we obtain ∂G/∂ pˆ = −k (k + 1) pˆk−1 <
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= (k− 1) (x− p˜ + pˆ)k−2 (x− p˜ + (k + 1) pˆ) + (x− p˜ + pˆ)k−1
+ k (n− k)
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ) dε
− kxn−k (x− p˜ + pˆ)k−2 (x− p˜ + kpˆ)




+ k (n− k)
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ) dε > 0
As a consequence, υ1 is increasing in pˆ.
We now observe that the solution of the equation G( pˆ, p˜) = 0 when pˆ = 0 is
negative. We establish this by contradiction. Suppose that the solution to G(0, p˜) =
0 is some non-negative number. If this is so, since we know G increases in p˜, it
should be the case that G(0, 0) < 0. However,




which leads to a contradiction. Summarizing, we have shown that the implicit
function υ1, defined on [0, pmk ], starts taking negative values and is increasing.
Consider now the second FOC H( pˆ, p˜) = 0 and rewrite it as
1− xn−k
(n− k) (1− x) (1− x− p˜) +
1
(x− p˜ + pˆ)k
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 dε = 0
Let us denote the LHS of this expression by L( pˆ, p˜). The equation L( pˆ, p˜) = 0 de-
fines an implicit relationship between pˆ and p˜, which we denote p˜ = υ2( pˆ). We













(x− p˜ + pˆ)k+1
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−1 (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 (x− p˜− ε) dε > 0.
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For the second, we compute
∂L
∂ p˜
= − 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x) +
k
(x− p˜ + pˆ)k+1
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 dε
+
n− k− 1
(x− p˜ + pˆ)k
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k (ε+ p˜)n−k−2 dε− xn−k−1 (3.A.2)
It is difficult to evaluate the sign of this derivative on inspection. To ease the evalu-
ation, consider first the term in the second line of this derivative. We note that
n− k− 1
(x− p˜ + pˆ)k
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k (ε+ p˜)n−k−2 dε− xn−k−1
< (n− k− 1)
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ p˜)n−k−2 dε− xn−k−1 = − p˜n−k−1 < 0 (3.A.3)
Consider next the first term of (3.A.2) and note that
k
(x− p˜ + pˆ)k+1
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 dε− 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x)
<
kxn−k−1
(x− p˜ + pˆ)k+1
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k dε− 1− x
n−k






(k + 1) (x− p˜ + pˆ)k+1
− 1− x
n−k

















We now argue that the term in square brackets in the last line of (3.A.4) is negative
for all x¯. To see this, we first observe that it increases in x¯. In fact, taking the












= k (n− k− 1)− k (n− k) x¯
+ (k + 1)x¯ = −k (k + 1) + (k + 1) x¯ + k2 x¯ + nk (1− x¯)
≥ −k (k + 1) + (k + 1) x¯ + k2 x¯ + (k + 1) k (1− x¯) = x¯ > 0







n− k = 0
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we conclude that (3.A.4) is negative. This in turn implies that L decreases in p˜.
Since L is increasing in pˆ and decreasing in p˜, the function υ2, defined implicitly by
the first order condition H( pˆ, p˜) = 0, is also increasing in pˆ.
We finally observe that the solution to L( pˆ, p˜) = 0 when pˆ = 0 must be a positive
number. By contradiction, suppose that the solution to L(0, p˜) = 0 is some negative
number. If this is so, since we know L decreases in p˜, it should be the case that









which constitutes a contradiction. Summarizing, we have now shown that the im-
plicit function υ2 defined on [0, pmk ] starts taking positive values and is increasing.









(since both are increasing in p˜ and we know that υ1(0) < 0 < υ2(0)).
Setting pˆ = pmk in the FOC for the merged entity gives




(ε+ p˜)n−k (ε+ pmk )
k−2 (ε+ kpmk ) dε = 0




= 1− (k + 1) (pmk )k = 0 by definition of pmk .
Likewise setting pˆ = pmk in the FOC for the non-merging firm gives
L (pmk , p˜) =
1− xn−k
(n− k) (1− x) (1− x− p˜)
+
1(
x− p˜ + pmk





= (1 − xn−k) (1− 2x) / (n− k) (1− x) ≤ 0 and we know that L




= 0 must be some p˜ < x.
To complete the proof of existence, it remains to be shown that at the point(s)










= 0 must be some p˜ < 1/2. In fact, setting p˜ = 1/2, we get
L (pmk , 1/2) =
1− xn−k









x− 12 + pmk



















= −1+ (n− k− 1)x
n−k − (n− k)xn−k−1
2(n− k)(1− x)2
− k(
x− 12 + pmk







and notice that 1+ (n− k− 1)xn−k − (n− k)xn−k−1 > 0 for all x (since it decreases
in x and equals zero when x = 1). Therefore, if L
(
pmk , 1/2
) ≤ 0 for the lowest





= 0. To summarize, we have now shown that υ1 and υ2 cross at least
once on [0, pmk ]× [0, pm] so a candidate equilibrium exists.
The arguments in the proof can be seen in Figure 3.A.1. As explained in the
main text, the equilibrium candidate may entail prices for the non-merging firms
above or below the price of the merged entity. In Figure 3.A.1a, we set n = 3, k = 2
and x = 0.54 so that the internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect dominates
the search-order effect. In Figure 3.A.1b we depict a case with many firms (n = 10,
k = 2 and x = 0.9) where the search-order effect has a dominating influence over
the internalization-of-pricing-externalities effect. QED
(a) Case pˆ∗ > p˜∗ (b) Case pˆ∗ < p˜∗
Figure 3.A.1. Existence of equilibrium
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Claim 3.A.2. The pair of prices { pˆ∗, p˜∗} that satisfies (3.11) and (3.12) is unique.
Proof. We start by noting that υ1 is increasing in pˆ at a rate greater than 1. Using









= (x− p˜ + pˆ)k−2
(









(ε+ p˜)n−k−1(ε+ pˆ)k−2(ε+ kpˆ)dε. (3.A.7)
Observe now that this expression is increasing in x, as its derivative with respect




≥ 0. Therefore, if (3.A.7) is positive
when x takes on its lowest value, then it is positive everywhere. Setting x = p˜ in
the RHS of (3.A.7) gives pˆk−2
(
pˆ + kp˜n−k pˆ
)
> 0, which proves that υ1 increases
with slope greater than 1.
We continue by noting that the rate at which υ2 increases is lower than 1. Using






= − 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x) +
k
(x− p˜ + pˆ)k
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−1 (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 dε
+
n− k− 1
(x− p˜ + pˆ)k
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k (ε+ p˜)n−k−2 dε− xn−k−1 (3.A.8)
is negative. Now notice that the last line of this expression is negative (from (3.A.3)).
Moreover, regarding the first line of (3.A.8) we have
− 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x) +
k
(x− p˜ + pˆ)k
ˆ x− p˜
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−1 (ε+ p˜)n−k−1 dε
< − 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x) +
kxn−k−1




= − 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x) +
xn−k−1
(x− p˜ + pˆ)k
[
(x− p˜ + pˆ)k − pˆk
]
< − 1− x
n−k
(n− k) (1− x) + x
n−k−1 = −1+ (n− k− 1) x¯
n−k − (n− k) x¯n−k−1
(n− k) (1− x¯) < 0,
where the last inequality follows from the remarks after equation (3.A.6). This im-
plies that υ2 increases at a rate less than 1. This, together with the arguments before
shows that there exists a unique candidate equilibrium. QED
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Claim 3.A.3. The candidate equilibrium where consumers start searching by the merged
entity, which charges a price pˆ∗, and then continue by the non-merging stores, which charge
a price p˜∗ exists if the search cost s is sufficiently large, in which case pˆ∗ ≥ p˜∗.
Proof. Basically, we need to prove that the putative search order which pre-
scribes consumers to go first to the merged entity and then continue searching the
non-merging stores is indeed optimal. For this, as described in the main text of the
paper, we need to show that x− p̂∗ > x− p˜∗.
(i) Consider the case in which s is sufficiently large, so s→ 1/8 and x¯ → 1/2. It





− p˜∗ + pˆ∗
)k−1 (1
2



























(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε = 0
is
p˜∗ = pm = 1/2 = x¯
pˆ∗ = pkm = 1/(1+ k)
1
k (3.A.9)
Inspection of (3.A.9) reveals that when s → 1/8, pˆ∗ > p˜∗. Moreover, to prove the
claim it suffices to show that when s→ 1/8
x− pˆ∗ > 0.
From equation (3.6) we know x satisfies
´ 1
x (ε− x)dεk − s = 0, or
k(1− x)− x(1− xk)
k + 1
− s = 0. (3.A.10)
We note now x increases in k. This is because the derivative of the LHS of (3.A.10)
is
1+ xk+1((k + 1) ln[x]− 1)
(k + 1)2
> 0
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(the positive sign follows from noting that this derivative decreases in x and that at





Deducting pˆ∗ on both sides of this equality gives
x− pˆ∗ = k + x
k+1
k + 1
− pˆ∗ − s. (3.A.11)
From the solution in (3.A.9) we know that when s → 1/8, then pˆ∗ → 1/(1 + k) 1k .











Note now that the RHS of (3.A.12) increases in x. Setting the lowest admissible
value for x, we have
x− pkm =










for all k ≤ n− 1. QED
The proof of the Proposition is now complete.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. (i) We first show that the merging stores increase
their profits after the merger. The difference between the profit per product of the
merged entity, pˆii/k, and the typical pre-merger profit of a firm, pi∗, equals:
pˆii
k













Since pˆ∗ is an equilibrium price, then, given the non-merging firm’s price, pˆii ( pˆ∗)
is greater than pˆii ( pˆ) for any pˆ 6= pˆ∗. Therefore, replacing pˆ∗ by p˜∗ gives
pˆii
k














We now note that 1−xkk =
´ 1
x ε




































where the inequality follows from setting k = n− 1. Observe next that this expres-
sion is decreasing in x since its derivative with respect to x is equal to−xn−2 (n(n− 1)(1− x)) <
























where the inequality follows from setting x = 1.
Finally, note that the expression p˜
∗
n (1− p˜∗n) is increasing in p˜∗ because its deriva-
tive with respect to p˜∗ is equal to 1n (1− (n + 1) p˜∗n) > 0. Therefore, if it is the case












(1− p∗n) = 0
where the inequality follows from replacing p˜∗ with p∗. We then conclude that
pˆii
k − pi∗ > 0 if p˜∗ > p∗.
To complete the argument, we now show p˜∗ > p∗ is indeed true. For this,
we build on a result of Zhou (2009). Consider the following modification of our
model. Suppose that (i) the merging stores did not internalize the price-effects they
impose on one another (ii) the merged entity continued to keep all its stores and
(iii) consumers visited the merging stores first. If this were so, this modified model
would be exactly identical to the market situation studied in Zhou (2009) article
on the effects of market prominence. "Prominent" firms are searched first by the
consumers, who, in case they do not find a satisfactory product, continue searching
among the non-prominent firms.
In such a modified model, the payoff of a deviant (potentially) merging firm (or
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(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 dε
]
(3.A.13)
where pˆj is indexed by j to indicate that it is the deviation price of a single
potentially merging firm j. In the modified model, however, the payoff to a non-
merging firm (or non-prominent firm) is exactly the same as the payoff in our model
given in (3.10). This signifies that the reaction function of a non-merging firm is
identical to ν2 ( pˆ), which was derived in the proof of claim 3.A.1.














(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−1 dε = 0 (3.A.14)
This equation defines implicitly a relation p˜ = ν0 ( pˆ). The crossing point be-
tween ν0 ( pˆ) and ν2 ( pˆ) gives the equilibrium prices pˆ∗ and p˜∗ in the modified
model. As in our original model, note that the functions ν0 ( pˆ) and ν2 ( pˆ) can be in-
terpreted as the joint reaction functions of the potentially merging and non-merging
firms, respectively.
Zhou (2009) Proposition 3 shows that non-prominent firms charge a price above
the price the firms would charge if no firm were prominent. In the jargon of this
chapter, this implies that the non-merging firms in this modified model will charge
a price above the pre-merger price, which is the result we want to prove.
To complete the proof, we now argue that moving from the modified model
to the original model can only enhance the difference between the price of a non-
merging firm and the pre-merger price. Consider first the effect of price coordi-
nation among the potentially merging firms, as it occurs after a merger has taken
place. Under joint profit maximization, we need to add to the FOC in (3.A.14) the
effect of a change in pˆj on the profits of the other potentially merging firms. This
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(ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k dε
]
> 0 (3.A.15)
We note now that the LHS of (3.A.14) decreases in pˆ∗. This is because its derivative
is equal to
− (x¯− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 + (k− 1)
ˆ x¯− p˜∗
0
(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 dε








− x¯n−k pˆ∗k−1 < 0
Since (3.A.15) is positive, this implies that the internalization-of-pricing-externalities
effect shift upwards the joint reaction function ν0 ( pˆ) of the potentially merging
stores. Consequently, since the reaction function of the non-merging stores is up-
ward sloping (due to strategic complementarity of the price-strategies) the internalization-
of-pricing-externalities effect can only increase further the price of the non-merging
stores, as expected.
To conclude, we show that in this modified model once the merging firms coor-
dinate their prices their payoff is independent of whether the keep the k stores or
shut down all but one.9 To see this, multiply the sum of (3.A.14) and (3.A.15) by k
to obtain:
1− x¯k
1− x¯ (1− x¯− pˆ
∗) +
(









1− x¯ − k (x¯− p˜
∗ + pˆ∗)k−1 + k (k− 1)
ˆ x¯− p˜∗
0
(ε+ pˆ)k−2 (ε+ p˜∗)n−k dε
]




(ε+ p˜∗)n−k (ε+ pˆ∗)k−2 (ε+ kpˆ∗) dε
8 Details on how to obtain this formula, which are available from the authors upon request, are omitted
to save space.
9 Of course, in our model, consumer search behavior is only consistent with equilibrium pricing if the
merged entity sell all products at a single point-of-sale.
Horizontal Mergers and Economies of Search 95
This last equation is exactly identical to the LHS of our FOC (3.11). These arguments
together imply that p˜∗ > p∗; hence, pˆiik − pi∗ > 0.
(ii) We now prove the second statement. For this we need to show that pˆi∗/k−
p˜i∗ > 0. It has been shown in the proof of Proposition 3.1 that when search cost is
large pˆ∗ → pmk and p˜∗ → 12 . Therefore, for the difference between the post-merger
























































































































4 (k + 1)
=
1
4 (k + 1)
[4pmk − 1] > 0
where the first inequality follows form replacing n by k + 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. (i) We first note that the equilibrium of Proposition 3.1
has pˆ∗ > p˜∗ when the search cost is sufficiently high. The difference between post-
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and pre-merger total industry profits, denoted as ∆Π, is:
∆Π = pˆi + (n− k)p˜i − npi∗
Using the expressions for profits above, we have
∆Π = pˆ∗
(
1− (x− p˜∗ + pˆ∗)k + k
ˆ x− p˜∗
0











(ε+ p˜∗)n−k−1 (ε+ pˆ∗)k dε
)
− p∗ (1− p∗n)
Note now that this expression is clearly increasing in pˆ∗ (the derivative of the first
line, by the FOC, is zero and that of the second line is positive). Hence,
∆Π > ∆Π| pˆ∗= p˜∗ = p˜∗ (1− p˜∗n)− p∗ (1− p∗n) (3.A.16)
Observe next that (3.A.16) increases in p˜∗ because its derivative with respect to p˜∗
equals 1− (n + 1) p˜∗n. Therefore,
p˜∗ (1− p˜∗n)− p∗ (1− p∗n) > p∗ (1− p∗n)− p∗ (1− p∗n) = 0
where the inequality follows from using the result in the proof of Proposition 3.2
that p˜∗ > p∗ and replacing p˜∗ by p∗.
(ii) In the pre-merger market, consumer surplus is given by











εn−1 (ε− p∗ − ns) dε− nsp∗n
In the post-merger market, consumer surplus is given by CSpost−merger = ĈS +
C˜S+ CS∅, where the expressions for ĈS, C˜S and CS∅ are given in (3.13), (3.14) and
(3.15).




CSpost−merger − CSpre−merger] = ˆ 1
pmk
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A firm is not a price-taker in an oligopolistic market. Its unilateral decisions to
increase its output and(or) decrease its price negatively affect the prices and profits
of its competitors. These negative pricing (quantity setting) externalities imply that
sellers can be better off if they coordinate their decisions.
Unfortunately a collusive equilibrium cannot be sustained if market interaction
lasts for only one period. This happens because a single firm always increases its
profit by deviating from the collusive price and output, given that its competitors
adhere to the joint profit maximization strategy. However, things are quite differ-
ent if sellers interact for more than one period. Friedman (1971) has shown that
a collusive equilibrium may be sustained if firms agree to revert endlessly to the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium after at least one deviation is observed, and the
discount factor is sufficiently high. If the sellers agree on such a strategy then, be-
fore it departs from the collusive set up, a potential deviant needs to compare the
short term deviation gain with the deviation loss. The deviation gain is the differ-
ence between the deviation and collusive profits of a firm. The deviation loss is
the accumulated sum of the discounted decrease in future profits of a firm due to
the implemented punishment. Consequently, a cartel is sustainable if the deviation
gain is less than the deviation loss. On the contrary, if the deviation gain is above
the deviation loss then a cartel cannot survive.
The degree of market transparency is acknowledged to have an impact on cartel
stability. It has been discussed by Stigler (1964) and later analyzed in more detail by
Green and Porter (1984), Abreu et al. (1985) and Ivaldi et al. (2003a) that collusion
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is harder to sustain if firms cannot observe the choices of their competitors easily. If
there is a positive probability that the choice of a single firm is not observed by its
rivals then there is a chance that the deviant does not get caught immediately after
the first deviation. In such a case the firm would deviate the next period again.
Thus, the deviation gain increases if the probability that the deviation is not ob-
served increases. Furthermore, the deviation loss decreases if firms do not observe
each other perfectly. This happens because the punishment phase is postponed,
which implies that the punishment is less severe if market transparency decreases.
The collocation ’market transparency’ can be perceived in two ways. As men-
tioned in the previous paragraph, a market can be transparent from the firms’ point
of view. In that case the sellers observe each others actions without any hindrance.
However, market transparency can also be seen from the consumers’ point of view.
A consumer needs to observe all the offers of firms if she wants to choose the op-
tion with the highest utility. However, sometimes the information about products is
lacking or has to be found at some positive costs. Then a market is non-transparent
from the perspective of consumers.
The effects of costly consumer search on market equilibrium have been broadly
discussed in the economics literature. It has been proved in the models of Burdett
and Judd (1983), Janssen and Moraga-González (2004), Stahl (1989) and Janssen
et al. (2005) that firms charge high and low prices with a positive probability if con-
sumer search is costly and firms sell homogeneous products. Additionally, Wolin-
sky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) have demonstrated that if firms sell
horizontally differentiated products and consumer search is costly then the com-
petitive equilibrium price is higher than if consumer search costs are zero. How-
ever there have not been many attempts to analyse how the search costs affect the
incentives to collude.
Nilson (1999) has introduced a fraction of zero search cost consumers in the
model of Burdett and Judd (1983) and analysed the stability of a cartel in a duopoly
market. He has found that the cartel is easier to sustain if the search cost decreases.
This happens because the expected price decreases relatively fast if the search costs
decrease. Therefore, the punishment becomes harder, which makes a cartel more
stable. Meanwhile Schultz (2005, 2009) has analysed collusion in the Hotelling
model. In his set-up firms observe each other easily. However, for some exogenous
reason a fraction of consumers are not informed about the prices of both firms;
the rest of the buyers are perfectly informed. The uninformed consumers form
their expectations about the prices and can visit only one firm. Schultz (2005) finds
Collusion and Search 101
that the gain from the deviation increases if the market becomes more transparent.
However, the demand of a firm is more elastic in a competitive market if more con-
sumers are informed. Thus, the punishment becomes stronger if the market is more
transparent. The effect of market transparency on the deviation gain is weaker than
on the punishment if products are sufficiently differentiated. Therefore, the inter-
val of the discount factor values, where collusion is sustainable, gets narrower if
the fraction of uniformed consumers decreases (the market becomes more trans-
parent). He also shows that if products become almost homogeneous then “there is
almost no impact of market transparency on the scope for collusion.”
In this chapter we analyze how cartel stability is affected by costly consumer
search. We follow the sequential consumer search set-up that was derived by
Wolinsky (1986) and analyzed in a more general form by Anderson and Renault
(1999). According to the model assumptions, sellers can perfectly observe each
other. However, their customers need to search for the highest utilities at positive
costs. The analysis reveals that both the deviation gain and the deviation loss are af-
fected by the search cost. Some buyers do not check all the alternatives before they
make their purchase decisions because of costly search. Then less potential cus-
tomers observe the deviation price of a cheating seller. As a result, deviating from
the collusive equilibrium becomes less attractive. The non-cooperative equilibrium
price increases with the search cost. Therefore, the punishment is less severe in a
costly search market than in a fully transparent market. The deviation gain is suf-
ficiently more sensitive to the search cost than the deviation loss for the most of
parameter values in our model. Therefore, collusion is more stable if the search
cost is higher.
Our result is in line with the findings of Schultz (2005). However, both models
differ in two aspects. First of all, the uninformed consumers check only one firm in
the model of Schultz (2005), whereas the searching consumers may check any num-
ber of alternatives (including all) in our model. Secondly, we introduce a search cost
that affects a consumer’s consideration set and search behaviour, whereas the frac-
tion of uninformed consumers is determined exogenously in the model of Schultz
(2005). Thirdly, we note that distance related transportation costs cannot be in-
terpreted as the search costs in a Hotelling model with horizontally differentiated
products. Hence, there are no search costs in the model of Schultz (2005). Finally,
consumers do not know both the actual match values and the prices before they
visit firms in our model. On the contrary, the uninformed consumers know their
locations on the line in the model of Schultz (2005). Hence, only actual prices are
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unknown to them.
Cartel stability depends on the degree of product differentiation. However, this
effect depends on the model assumptions a lot. The market power of firms in-
creases if product heterogeneity goes up. Hence, the deviation loss decreases with
the degree of product differentiation. If products are differentiated then a deviant
must set its price lower than in a homogeneous product market because consumers
see significant differences between the alternatives. Therefore, the deviation gain
often decreases with the degree of product differentiation. Hence, whether a cartel
is more or less stable when the degree of product heterogeneity increases depends
on the parameters of the model. It has been shown by Deneckere (1983), Albæk
and Lambertini (1998) and Rothschild (1997) that collusion becomes more stable
if products are sufficiently differentiated and become more differentiated and the
market demand is linear in prices. However, if products are relatively close substi-
tutes then an increase in the degree of product differentiation works the other way
around: a cartel is less stable if products are more differentiated.
In Hotelling-type models cartel stability is monotonic in the degree of product
differentiation. It has been shown by Chang (1991) and Ross (1992) that the de-
viation gain decreases with the degree of product differentiation. However, the
deviation loss also decreases if products become more differentiated. Nevertheless,
collusion is less stable if products become more differentiated. Additionally, Je-
hiel (1992) shows that collusion encourages firms to decrease the degree of product
differentiation if the joint profit is shared not equally and there are no monetary
transfers among the cartel members. Furthermore, Häckner (1995) has shown that
colluding firms prefer to change the distance between each other on a Hotelling line
if the discount factor varies. In his analysis two sellers maximize their joint profit
with respect to the degree of product differentiation so that collusion is sustained
for a fixed discount factor value. The firms move towards the ends of the line if the
discount factor increases. This result holds if the sellers are relatively close to each
other and the discount factor is relatively small. However, if the discount factor is
relatively high already and its value goes up further then the sellers prefer to limit
the degree of product differentiation.
We look at the effect of product differentiation in our model as well. We find
that the relationship between cartel stability and the degree of product differentia-
tion depends on model parameters. If the match value is distributed uniformly and
the search costs approach zero then the degree of product differentiation does no
have any effect on cartel stability. If search costs are positive and the match value is
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distributed uniformly then a cartel is less stable if products are more differentiated.
However, if the match value is distributed according to an exponential family dis-
tribution, there are two firms in the market and products are almost homogeneous
then a cartel is more stable if the degree of product heterogeneity increases.
We apply the method of Perloff and Salop (1985) to account for the degree of
product heterogeneity, i.e. we multiply the match value with the preference inten-
sity parameter in the utility function. Hence, one could expect that the effect of
product heterogeneity on cartel stability must be somehow similar to the effect in a
Hotelling-type model. However, it is not so. The difference arises because the mar-
ket is not fully covered in our set-up and the market is typically fully covered in
Hotelling models. Then, an increase in the preference intensity parameter has two
effects in our model. Firstly, it increases the mean valuation of a product, which
encourages the firms to increase their prices. Secondly, the variance of the match
values increases, which implies more product differentiation. If products are more
differentiated then consumers search more intensively and firms have incentives
to lower their prices. Which effect is stronger depends on the parameters of the
model. Hence, whether an increase in product heterogeneity leads to a more or less
stable cartel also depends on the model parameters.
We describe the consumer search behaviour and the search rule in the subse-
quent section. We derive the competitive and joint profit maximizing prices and
profits in section 4.3. The sustainability of a cartel with different search cost values
is analysed in sections 4.4 and 4.5. We show how the degree of product differen-
tiation affects collusion in section 4.6. Finally, some concluding remarks are laid
down in section 4.7. More complicated proofs and derivations are presented in the
appendix of the chapter.
4.2 Consumer behaviour
There is a mass of consumers on the demand side of the economy, and we normalize
this mass to one. Consumers have different preferences for the product character-
istics and each consumer buys one item at most. Heterogeneity in consumer tastes
implies that the same variety is rated differently by distinct buyers.1 In other words,
if we denote the valuation of consumer i for item j by εij then εij 6= εmj, ∀m 6= i.
We assume that the valuation (or match value) is distributed in the interval between
1 The terms a consumer, a shopper, a customer and a buyer are used interchangeably as synonyms further
on.
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zero and ε¯ > 0 according to a continuous, twice differentiable function F(ε) with a
positive density f (ε) and an increasing hazard rate. Additionally, we require that
f (y) + p f
′
(y) > 0, ∀p ≤ y. There is no correlation between the match values
across consumers, products and time. The choices that a consumer made in the
past have no effect on the present purchase decisions.2
A seller cannot identify how much one or another consumer likes its variety.
Thus, price discrimination is not possible and all consumers pay the same price pj
if they buy a product from firm j. We assume that the total utility of consumer i,
who buys product j, equals the difference between the match value εij and price pj
uij = εij − pj (4.1)
A consumer prefers to buy the alternative that gives her the highest utility.
However, she does not know what variety and at what price is sold in each shop
exactly. The shopper knows the distribution of ε and has some expectations about
prices. Though, she needs to go to every shop and check what is on the counter ex-
actly before she decides to buy anything if she buys at all. The consumer can visit
and check one shop at a time. She visits sellers one after another using an optimal
sequential search strategy. Search is without replacement and with costless recall.
Every visit to a shop costs s for the consumer. The search cost has a negative
impact on the buyer’s utility. Thus, the consumer needs to find a balance between
her wish to find the highest utility in the market and the search cost. According to
Weitzman (1979), a rational consumer should search as long as the gain from one
more search is greater than the search cost. If the search cost exceeds the expected
additional utility from an extra search then the shopper should stop looking for
other alternatives and choose the best among observed ones.
Let us assume that utility uij is the highest observed utility by consumer i. If the







2 The assumption that the purchase decisions are independent from the choices in the past is realistic
in the markets where the assortment in the shops changes between the purchases of a consumer. For
instance, clothing collections change every half year. New fashion trends imply changes in furniture,
cosmetics, and construction materials. The producers of home appliances, computers, phones and cars
update their models due to rapid technological progress. Thus, a buyer always finds different offers
whenever she comes to buy a washing machine, a fridge or a digital camera.
The past purchase decisions and experience may imply that a consumer has higher (or lower) pref-
erences over some brands. However, if there are new models every shopping season then the brand
loyalty affects only the search order of a consumer but not the valuation of a particular product.
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The visit to shop l costs s. Consumer i is indifferent between taking alternative






εij − pj + pl
))
dF (εil) = s (4.3)
Let us define a variable x¯ such that x¯ = εij − pj + pl if (4.3) is satisfied. Then
(4.3) may be rewritten as ˆ ε¯
x¯
(εil − x¯) dF (εil) = s (4.4)
The variable x¯ takes on a unique value in the interval between zero and ε¯ for
any fixed value of s and decreases with the search cost.
Very high search costs prohibit consumers from entering the market. Therefore,
we restrict the maximum search cost in such a way that a consumer searches at least
once even if firms set the price that maximizes the profit of the monopolist that sells
n varieties. We denote this price by pc.3
The maximum search cost s¯ cannot be higher than the expected utility that a





Thus, the minimum value of x¯ cannot be less than pc.
As said above, consumer i follows an optimal sequential search strategy. Thus,
she terminates her search in firm j if x¯ < εij − pj + pl because the gain from an
additional search is below the cost of the visit to firm l. However, if x¯ > εij− pj + pl
then the shopper continues searching in firm l.
4.3 One period interaction
4.3.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium
There are n ≥ 2 firms selling horizontally differentiated products in the market.
Each firm supplies one variety at a common unit cost, which we normalize to zero.
3 Later we show that the joint profit maximizing price of a cartel is the same as the price that maximizes
the profit of the monopolist that sells n varieties. We use the superscript c to refer to the price and
the profit of a cartel in the subsequent sections. Hence, we use the same notation for the price of the
monopolist.








= arg maxp p (1− F(p)n)
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Sellers are informed about the distribution of match values, consumers’ expecta-
tions and the search rule. Thus, every seller needs to choose its profit maximizing
price, which coincides with consumers’ expectations in equilibrium.
Consider a firm j that contemplates charging price pj. There is no vertical prod-
uct differentiation. In addition, consumers know that each seller offers one variety
and firms have the same production cost structure. As a result, buyers expect that
all shops charge the same price p∗.4
Weitzman (1979) proved that rationally searching consumers should rank all
the sellers according to their reservation utilities in a decreasing order and start
searching from the top of the list. The reservation utility at firm l is the utility level
that a buyer should observe in firm j 6= l and to make her indifferent between
searching in firm l and terminating her search in firm j. According to the search
rule written in (4.4), a consumer stops searching in firm j and does not go to firm
l if ε j ≤ x¯ − pl + pj. Then the lowest utility level in firm j (or the reservation
utility at firm l) that prevents a buyer from searching in firm l is x¯− pl . Consumers
expect that all sellers have the same price p∗ in the competitive market. Thus, the
reservation utilities at all firms are x¯ − p∗ and consumers visit shops in a random
order.
Firm j may be visited in the first, second and any other position up to the nth
with the probability 1/n. The consumer, who has reached firm j, observes price
pj 6= p∗. The buyer interprets price pj as the deviation price of firm j only. There-
fore, she expects to see price p∗ in other shops. As a result, the reservation utilities
at not-yet-visited firms are unaffected by the deviation price of firm j, and the con-
sumer terminates her search in firm j if ε j is greater than or equal to x¯ − p∗ + pj .
Otherwise, the shopper goes to the next firm. Since match values are distributed in
the interval between zero and ε¯, the probability that the consumer, who has arrived
at firm j, terminates her search here equals 1− F (x¯− p∗ + pj).
All shops, except shop j, choose equilibrium price p∗. Therefore, the probability
that a consumer has arrived at firm j equals the probability that the match values
have been less than or equal to x¯ in the firms that have been visited before firm j.
The number of consumers is normalized to one. Therefore, the probability that a
single consumer has arrived at firm j and terminated her search there equals "the









1− F (x¯− p∗ + pj)) = 1n 1− F (x¯)n1− F (x¯) (1− F (x¯− p∗ + pj))
4 The terms a firm, a shop, and a seller are used interchangeably, unless it is stated differently.
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The utility in firm j is less than x¯− p∗ for some consumers. These buyers do not
stop in the firm and continue searching further. However, several consumers visit
all sellers in the market and decide to return to firm j and buy there. This happens if
the utility in firm j is the highest in the market and is greater than zero. If the highest
observed utility is negative then a consumer decides not to buy anything. The
number of consumers, who return to firm j and buy there, are called "the returning
demand" of firm j and it is labeled by rj. The returning demand of firm j equals the
probability that a consumer has not terminated her search in it and in any other
shop but has returned and has made a purchase in firm j.
rj = Pr
[










The profit function of firm j equals the total income of firm j because its constant
unit production cost is normalized to zero. We denote this function by pij.
pij = pj
(
f j + rj
)
(4.5)
Firm j chooses such pj that makes its first order condition equal to 0. This choice
guarantees the maximum profit of firm j because pij is concave in pj5. The seller
finds it optimal to set p∗ in equilibrium and the first order condition of firm j sim-
plifies to equation (4.6).
1− 1− F (x¯)
n
1− F (x¯) p





(ε) dε = 0 (4.6)
There is a unique value of p∗ that satisfies (4.6). This can be shown by taking the
5 See the appendix for expression of the second order derivative.
We have assumed that firm j has deviated to a relatively smaller or higher price than p∗ so far. However,
it is not profitable for the seller to deviate to a much higher or to a much lower price than p∗. It is not
profitable for the firm to deviate to any much smaller price than p∗ because its profit function increases
with any deviation price which is smaller than p∗. Furthermore, it is not profitable for the seller to
deviate to a very high price such that no consumer stops in its shop. If the firm deviates to such a high
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dε− p∗ f (ε¯) < 0 if x¯ < ε¯
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derivative of the LHS of (4.6) with respect to p∗ and checking the sign of the LHS
of (4.6) for the highest and lowest possible values of p∗. It is shown in the appendix
that the LHS of (4.6) decreases with p∗. It is not difficult to observe that the LHS
of (4.6) equals one if p∗ = 0 and equals 1−F(x¯)
n
1−F(x¯) (1− F (x¯)− x¯ f (x¯)) < 0 if p∗ → x¯.
Furthermore the competitive equilibrium price increases with the search cost.6
A high search cost corresponds with a low threshold value for ε. Consumers
are less picky if the search cost is high. This implies that consumers search less
intensively and compare less alternatives if the value of x¯ goes down. As a result,
firms can charge higher prices if s increases. On the contrary, if the search cost
decreases then consumers compare more offers and, consequently, firms compete
for their customers more fiercely. Then the equilibrium price is pushed down.
After some arithmetic manipulations we get that the equilibrium profit of a firm,





1− F (p∗)n) (4.7)
The partial derivative of pi∗ with respect to p∗ is positive because p∗ < pc.7 This
implies that the equilibrium profit of a firm increases with the search cost.
4.3.2 Joint price setting
The profit of a firm increases if the equilibrium price goes up. Horizontally differ-
entiated products selling firms exert pricing externalities on each other. Hence, the
equilibrium price and profits increase if firms maximize their joint profit instead of
competing with each other. The sellers are symmetric in our model. Thus, the joint
profit maximization problem is identical to the profit maximization problem of the
monopolist that owns n single-variety shops. Consumers expect to see pc in every
shop in collusive equilibrium, where the superscript c refers to collusion.8 Further-
6 We show in the appendix that the partial derivatives of the LHS of (4.6) with respect to p∗ and with








1− F (p∗)n − nF (p∗)n−1 p∗ f (p∗)
)
> 0
The inequality follows from the fact that the competitive price is less than the joint profit maximizing
price.
8 The new expected price differs from p∗. Colluding firms maximize their joint profit and the expecta-
tions of consumers must match with the profit maximizing choice of a cartel in equilibrium. We do not
analyse how the expectations of consumers move from p∗ towards pc. On the one hand, it could be a
common knowledge that firms collude; however, the competition authorities cannot prove the existence
of a cartel. On the other hand, consumers may update their expectations because of their experience
in transitional periods. Furthermore, the joint payoff function does not depend on the expected price.
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more, the buyers expect that all firms charge the same price. So they visit the sellers
a random order because the reservation utilities at all shops are the same.
The sellers consider the joint profit maximizing price p, by taking pc into ac-
count. As well as in a pre-merger market, the demand of every shop consists of its
fresh and returning demands. The reservation utility at every shop equals x¯ − pc.




1− F (x¯− pc + p)n
1− F (x¯− pc + p) (1− F (x¯− p
c + p)) + n
ˆ x¯−pc+p
p





The expectations of consumers coincide with the choice of the monopolist. In
other words, p = pc in one period collusive equilibrium. As a result, we set p = pc





= 1− F (pc)n − pcnF (pc)n−1 f (pc) = 0 (4.8)
The joint profit maximizing price pc is unique because the LHS of (4.8) decreases
with pc, it equals zero if pc = 0 and is negative if pc = ε¯. This price does not depend
on the search cost and increases with n.9 Every firm gets the same share of the joint
profit. Thus, the profit of one coalition partner equals the ratio between the joint








1− F (pc)n) (4.9)
4.4 Collusion

















The profit of firm j is maximized when the first term on the LHS of (4.10) equals
However, the expected price has an impact on the reservation utility, which implies that the search in-
tensity depends on the expected price. Consumers search more if the expected price is smaller than pc
and search less if the expected price is more than pc. Nevertheless, it does not have any effect on the
joint profit maximizing price pc.
9 See the appendix for a proof.
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zero. Firms sell substitutes in a horizontally differentiated product market. Thus,
the second term on the LHS of (4.10) is not zero. Hence, pc is not the own profit
maximizing choice of firm j if other firms charge the joint profit maximizing price.
Then a single seller prefers to deviate from the cartel, and the collusive equilibrium
cannot be sustained if the game lasts only one period. However, deviating is not
necessarily profitable from a long term perspective. If all sellers interact in the same
market for several periods then fooled firms may punish the deviant in the period
following the deviation. If the punishment is sufficiently hard then firm j may give
up its plans about deviating with the purpose to avoid the punishment later.
We assume that firms interact for an infinite number of periods. Every period
consumers search the sellers sequentially as it has been described in section 4.2 and
make their choices independently from the choices in the past. The firms maximize
the sum of their discounted profits. The discount factor δ is constant over time and
is less than one. The sum of discounted profits is the highest if the firms maximize
their joint profit every period. Therefore, there is a motivation for the sellers to start
colluding.
Unilateral deviations from the cartel set-up must be prevented in order to make
collusion sustainable. We consider that the sellers apply a grim trigger strategy
in our model. To put differently, the firms set the joint profit maximizing price pc
every period if all the coalition members do this. If at least one shop deviates from
the collusive price then all the sellers revert to the one period Nash equilibrium
price for the rest of the time. Both the consumers and the firms observe the choice
of every seller in the end of each period. Therefore, the punishment mechanism
starts working the next period after the deviation is observed.
Consumers search because they do not know actual prices and match values in
our model. Hence, the assumption that both the firms and all the consumers get
informed about the deviation after the first deviation period may appear unreason-
able at first sight. The expressions of profits and the condition of cartel stability
simplifies a lot if this assumption is used. Hence, the comparative statics becomes
easier. Moreover, we check what happens if not all consumers observe the devia-
tion immediately in section 4.5. More particularly, there we assume that only the
consumers, who visit the deviant, get informed about the deviation. We show that
the qualitative results of the cartel stability analysis are the same in both cases.
A potential deviant compares the gain and the loss from the deviation. If the
gain is higher than the loss then the seller deviates. On the contrary, if the loss ex-
ceeds the gain then the firm sticks to the cartel agreement. We denote the deviation
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profit by pid. Then the deviation gain equals pid − pic. After a deviation has taken
place, firms set p∗ in the subsequent periods. The reversion to the one period Nash
equilibrium price decreases one period profit of a firm by pic − pi∗. Thus, the profit
of the deviant decreases by pic − pi∗ every period after the deviation. Hence, if we
sum the discounted difference pic−pi∗ over all punishment periods then we get the
total decrease in the profits of the firm - the deviation loss.
We start the comparison of the deviation gain and the deviation loss with the
derivation of the deviation price. Afterwards we derive the expression of the devia-
tion profit and the expressions of the deviation gain and the deviation loss. Finally,
we look for the discount factor values that preserve cartel stability for different s
values.
Deviation price. A single unilateral deviation does not affect the expectations of
consumers about the prices of other firms. Thus, the buyers expect that other sellers
charge pc if they see pd in one shop. As a consequence, the derivation of the payoff
function of the deviant is similar to the derivation of the pay-off function of firm
j in section 4.3.1. If we replace p∗ with pc and pj with pd in the pay-off function
of firm j then we get the pay-off function of a deviating firm. Thus, the first order

























dε = 0 (4.11)
Claim 4.1. There is a deviation price pd that satisfies (4.11), and p∗ ≤ pd < pc.
The deviation price varies with s. The higher the search cost is, the less con-
sumers observe the deviation price. Therefore, a deviant does not attract many
customers by lowering its price if the search cost is relatively high. Hence, there
are less incentives to deviate from the cartel agreement if s is high. If the search
cost decreases then the deviant can attract more customers by lowering pd because
more buyers observe the deviation price. However, the firm has incentives to raise
its price if the number of its customers increases. The total effect of the search cost
on the deviation price depends on whether the positive of the negative effect is
stronger.
Claim 4.2. The deviation price pd increases with the search cost.
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There is an indirect negative effect of s on the quantity of the deviant that comes
via the deviation price. A firm sells less if its price increases and the deviation price
increases with s. However, there is a direct effect of s on the quantity of the deviant
too. Consumers search less if the search cost goes up. Hence, the direct effect of
the search cost on the quantity of the deviant is also negative. Then the quantity of
the deviant decreases with the search costs. The negative search cost effect on the
quantity is stronger than the effect on the deviation price. Therefore, the deviation
profit decreases with s.
Claim 4.3. The deviation profit pid decreases with s.
Cartel stability. The deviation is observed by all the firms in the end of the devi-
ation period. Hence, it is followed by the punishment from the subsequent period
for the rest of the time. A firm can earn the deviation profit only in one period
and it deviates the first collusive period if it deviates at all.10 A potential deviant
compares the deviation gain with the deviation loss before it sets pd in its shop. If
the gain is higher than the loss then every firm deviates in the first collusive period
and a cartel is not sustainable. However, if the deviation loss is higher than the
deviation gain then the collusive agreement survives, as no firm wants to deviate
from it. This cartel stability condition is written in (4.12).
pid − pic ≤ δ (pic − pi∗) + δ2 (pic − pi∗) + ... = δ
1− δ (pi
c − pi∗) (4.12)
The factor δ/ (1− δ) increases with δ. Therefore, there is some δ̂ such that (4.12)
becomes an equation if δ = δ̂. If δ > δ̂ then cartel members follow a collusive
agreement; if the discount factor is smaller than the critical value then the deviation
loss is less than the deviation gain and a cartel collapses in the first period.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that ε ∼ U (0, 1). Then the critical discount factor δ̂ decreases
with the search cost.
This result implies that collusion is less sustainable if market transparency in-
creases. The proof of the proposition is written in the appendix and here we provide
only an intuitive explanation. The collusive profit does not depend on the search
cost. Thus, only pid and pi∗ change when s varies. It has been shown that the devi-
ation profit decreases with the search cost. Hence, the gain from the deviation gets
smaller if s goes up. The competitive profit rises if consumer search becomes more
10 The discount factor δ is less than one, and the discounted deviation profit of a firm if it deviates in
period t is δt−1pid < pid. Therefore, the seller deviates in period one if it deviates at all.
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costly. Thus, the deviation loss gets less severe if the search cost increases. Both
sides of (4.12) decrease with s. However, the critical discount factor declines with
the search cost because the negative effect of s on the deviation gain is stronger than
the effect on the deviation loss (see Figure 4.1a).
(a) ε ∼ U (0, 1) (b) F (ε) = eε−1e−1
Figure 4.1. The changes of δ̂ with the search cost for different n values
We check whether the result of the proposition holds for other match value dis-
tributions. We assume that ε is distributed according to an exponential-type trun-
cated distribution in the interval between zero and one. More particularly, we as-
sume that F (ε) = exp{ε}−1e−1 . This distribution function has an increasing hazard
rate and satisfies f (y) + p f
′
(y) > 0, ∀p ≤ y. The analytical expressions of the
payoff functions and the critical discount factor are complicated if the exponential-
type distribution is taken. Therefore, we present the simulation results only. For all
n ≥ 3 the critical discount factor decreases with s, given the new distribution of ε
(see Figure 4.1b). However, if n = 2 then the value of δ̂ varies differently with s.
If there are two firm in the market then the critical discount factor decreases with
s for the low search cost values and increases with s if the search cost is high. The
deviant is searched by relatively many customers if there are a few firms in the
market. Therefore, the quantity of the deviant decreases with s slower if there are
less sellers. Furthermore, the exponential-type distribution function is convex and
the probability that a customer has a very high valuation of a product is relatively
high. Hence, consumers search less willingly with the exponential-type distribu-
tion of ε than with the uniform distribution. As a result, the positive effect of the
search cost on the deviation price is weaker if ε is distributed exponentially. Thus,
it happens that the deviation gain decreases with s slower than the deviation loss
and δ̂ increases with the search cost.
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4.5 Transitional punishment period
It has been assumed that all the consumers were informed about the market price(s)
at the end of each period in section 4.4. Therefore, firms set p∗ in the first punish-
ment period. However, it is not optimal for the sellers to set p∗ in the first pun-
ishment period if some consumers do not observe the deviation in the deviation
period and expect that firms collude in the next period. In this section we assume
that only the fraction of consumers ν < 1 observe the deviation price in the de-
viation period. Then ν consumers expect to see the punishment price in period
t + 1 if the deviation occurred in period t, whereas 1− ν consumers have no idea
about the deviation and expect to see pc in the shops. The fraction of consumers,
who observed the deviation price pd in the deviation period, is endogenous. In
fact, it equals the share of the buyers, who arrived at the deviating firm during the
deviation period. Thus, ν = 1n
1−F(x¯)n
1−F(x¯) .
On the contrary, all firms detect the deviation immediately and start the pun-
ishment in the following period. The competitive price p∗ is not an optimal choice
for the sellers in the first punishment period because there are two groups of con-
sumers who expect two different prices in the market. Therefore, the firms charge
a price p˜ 6= p∗ in the first punishment period. After all consumers observe p˜, they
recognize that the cartel broke down and the firms will compete for the rest of the
time. Therefore, all the buyers expect to see p∗ in period t + 2 if the price p˜ is set in
period t + 1. Hence, the firms charge p˜ in the first punishment period and later set
p∗ for the rest of the time.
The first period punishment price is less than the collusive price because firms
compete with each other. However, it is higher than the competitive price p∗. To
show this we derive the payoff function of firm j which considers some deviation
price p˜j 6= p˜. The seller knows that there are two expected prices in the market.
The fraction ν of consumers expect to see the punishment price p˜, whereas, 1− ν
consumers wait for pc. As a result, we can split the demand derivation of firm j in
two parts. The first part of the demand is the demand from the informed consumers
and the second part of the demand is from 1− ν uninformed consumers.
All shops look alike for the informed consumers. The buyers sample firms ran-
domly, because the reservation utilities at all sellers are the same x¯− p˜. Therefore,
the demand from ν consumers is identical to the demand of firm j that has been
derived in section 4.3.1. We only need to replace p∗ with p˜ and pj with p˜j.
The fraction 1− ν of consumers expect that all firms set pc in their shops and get
surprised by p˜j in the shop of firm j. The buyers interpret the deviation as a mistake
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and do not change their expectations about not-yet-visited shops. Therefore, an
uninformed consumer searches beyond firm j if ε j < x¯ − pc + p˜j. Other sellers,
which the consumer has visited before firm j, have been left because their match
values have been less than x¯ − pc + p˜. Thus, the fresh demand of firm j from the
uninformed consumers equals the probability that an uninformed consumer has
arrived at firm j and terminated her search here regardless of the position that firm




1− F (x¯− pc + p˜)n
1− F (x¯− pc + p˜)
(
1− F (x¯− pc + p˜j))
Some of the uninformed consumers do not terminate their search in any shop.
However, they may return to firm j and buy here if the utility from firm j is positive
and it is the highest in the market. Thus, we obtain the returning demand of firm j
from the uninformed consumers which equals
r1j = Pr
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Then the total payoff of firm j equals the sum of both demands times its price
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The choice of firm j coincides with the expectation of informed consumers in
equilibrium. Therefore, the first order condition of the firm becomes
1− F ( p˜)n − ν
[
1− F (x¯)n
1− F (x¯) p˜ f (x¯)− np˜
ˆ x¯− p˜
0
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The LHS of (4.13) decreases with p˜.11 However, the derivative of the LHS with
respect to pc is positive.12 Therefore, the derivative of p˜ with respect to pc is positive
by the Implicit function theorem. It is not difficult to see that p˜ = p∗ if pc = p∗.
However, the collusive price is above p∗. Thus, p˜ > p∗. In addition, p˜ is less than
the monopoly price pm that is set by a single variety monopolist.13 To show this
we set p˜ = pm and pc = x¯. Then we get that the LHS of (4.13) is negative,14 which
implies that p˜ ≤ pm.





1− F ( p˜)n) .
The profit is higher than pi∗ but less than pic and we show that it increases with
s. The first punishment period profit is affected by the size of the search cost via
two sources. First of all, consumers search less in the first punishment period if the
search cost increases. Therefore, an increase in s in the first punishment period has
a positive effect on p˜. This can be shown more formally by fixing the value of ν and
taking the derivative of the LHS of (4.13) with respect to x¯. The derivative is the
sum of two derivatives that are similar to the derivative of (4.6) with respect to x¯
and to the derivative of (4.11) with respect to x¯. Therefore, the derivative of the LHS
of (4.13) with respect to x¯ for any fixed ν is negative and the effect of the search cost
on p˜ in the first punishment period is positive. Furthermore, there is the effect of s
on p˜ from the deviation period. The consumers, who did not observe the deviation
price pd in the deviation period, are less choosy than the consumers that visited the
deviant because x¯ − pc + p˜ < x¯. Therefore, the firms may raise their prices if the
fraction of 1− ν consumers increases. The value of ν depends on the search cost
and ν increases with x¯. Therefore, the effect of s on p˜ from the deviation period is
positive. This fact may be shown by taking the derivative of the LHS of (4.13) with
11 See the appendix for details.
12
(1− ν) 1+ (n− 1) F (z)
n − nF (z)n−1
(1− F (z))2 p˜
(
f (z)2 + (1− F (z)) f ′ (z)
)
> 0
where z = x¯− pc − p˜.
13 pm = arg maxp {p Pr [ε > p]}
14
1− F (pm)n − ν 1− F (x¯)
n




F (ε+ pm)n−1 f
′
(ε+ pm) dε
− (1− ν) 1− F (p
m)n
1− F (pm) f (p
m) pm < 1− F (pm)n − 1− F (p
m)n
1− F (pm) f (p
m) pm = 0
where the inequality has been obtained by setting x¯ = pm because the derivative decreases with x¯.
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respect to ν. This derivative is negative.15 The derivative of pi with respect to p˜ is
positive because p˜ < pc. Consequently, the first period punishment profit increases
with the search cost.
A cartel is sustainable if the discounted deviation loss is higher than the de-
viation gain. Firms set different prices in the first punishment period and the
subsequent periods. Therefore, the cartel stability condition in (4.12) needs to be
modified. The first period deviation loss equals pic − pi and later the difference be-
tween the collusive profit and the competitive profit is the same as in section 4.4,
i.e. pic − pi∗. Then the cartel stability condition is as follows:
pid − pic ≤ δ (pic − pi) + δ
2
1− δ (pi
c − pi∗) (4.15)
The first period punishment profit is different from the competitive profit pi∗.
Hence, the total deviation loss on the RHS of (4.15) is different from the total de-
viation loss on the RHS of (4.12). Thus, the new critical discount factor value that
makes (4.15) an equation is not the same as δ̂. We label the new critical discount
factor value δ˜.









If the fraction of consumers does not get informed about the deviation at the
end of the deviation period then the critical discount factor is greater than δ̂. The
punishment price in the first period is higher than p∗. Hence, pi > pi∗, which im-
plies that the total punishment is softer. As a result, a higher value of the discount
factor than δ̂ is needed to make (4.15) an equality.
For a formal proof that δ˜ > δ̂ we take the derivatives of the LHS of (4.16) with
respect to pi and with respect to δ˜. The derivative with respect to δ˜ is positive
and the derivative with respect to pi is negative.16. Thus, according to the Implicit
function theorem, δ˜ increases with pi. If we set pi = pi∗ in (4.16) then we get the
15 The derivative of the LHS of (4.13) with respect to ν is as follows
− p˜ 1− F (x¯)
n
1− F (x¯) f (x¯) + p˜
1− F (x¯− pc + p˜)n
1− F (x¯− pc + p˜) f (x¯− p
c + p˜) + np˜
ˆ x¯− p˜
x¯−pc
F (ε+ p˜)n−1 f
′
(ε+ p˜) dε (4.14)
This derivative decreases with pc because its derivative with respect to pc is negative:
− p˜ 1+ (n− 1) F (z)
n − nF (z)n−1
(1− F (z))2
(
f 2 (z) + (1− F (z)) f ′ (z)
)
< 0
were z = x¯ − pc + p˜. Then (4.14) is less than if we set pc = p˜ which makes (4.14) equal to zero. As a
result the LHS of (4.13) decreases with ν.
16 The derivative with respect to δ˜ is 2δ˜ (pi − pi∗) + pid − pi > 0, and The derivative with respect to pi is
δ˜2 − δ˜ < 0
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condition (4.12) which defines δ̂. Consequently, δ˜ > δ̂.
The LHS of (4.16) is a second degree convex polynomial in δ˜ with two roots. It
is difficult to show how the critical discount factor varies with the search cost an-
alytically. Thus, we use numerical simulation for further analysis. The simulation
results suggest that both roots of (4.16) are positive. However, one root is higher
than one. Hence, we use the smaller root for the analysis of cartel stability.
The profits of firms increase with the search cost in all punishment periods.
Therefore, the deviation loss decreases with the search cost even if not all con-
sumers observe the deviation price pd immediately. The deviation gain decreases
with the search cost too. If ε is distributed uniformly then the deviation gain is more
sensitive to the changes of s than the deviation loss. Therefore, the critical discount
factor δ˜ decreases with the search cost (see Figure 4.2a). However, if ε is distributed
according to the exponential-type distribution and n = 2 then the critical discount
factor decreases with s for small s values and increases with s if s is sufficiently
high. (see Figure 4.2b).
(a) ε ∼ U (0, 1) (b) F (ε) = eε−1e−1
Figure 4.2. The values of δ˜ for different values of s
4.6 Product differentiation
It has been noticed by Perloff and Salop (1985) that “an increase in preference inten-
sity ... raises the equilibrium price.”17 High market power leads to high firms’ profits.
Thus, collusion becomes less attractive if the substitutability between products de-
creases. In addition, it has been shown in the collusion literature that high product
differentiation decreases the deviation gain. However, the low substitutability be-
tween products “limits the severity of price wars and, thus the firms’ ability to punish
17 See Proposition 1 in Perloff and Salop (1985)
Collusion and Search 119
a potential deviation”.18 Consequently, the effect of product differentiation on the
cartel stability is ambiguous and is closely related to the model assumptions.
We analyze the effect of product differentiation on the cartel stability with costly
consumer search in this section. For this reason, we introduce a new variable µ > 0
and assume that the utility of consumer i, who buys product j equals
uij = µεij − pj
If products are highly differentiated then µ is high and the utilities from two dif-
ferent products differ a lot. On the contrary, if the value of µ is small then the
difference µ
∣∣ε ji − ε li∣∣ is small for all j 6= l. With the purpose of algebraic simplicity
of the proofs the assumption that both the firms and the consumers get informed
about the prices in the end of every period is maintained in the analysis.
The introduction of a new variable slightly affects the expressions of the search
rule and the pay-off functions that have been derived in sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
We start with the changes of the search rule that has been defined in (4.3), and later
proceed with the analysis of profits and prices.





(ε l − x˜) dF (ε l) = s
where x˜ = ε j − pj−plµ . If we denote the price of n-variety monopolist by pc then
x˜ ≥ pc/µ.
Let us consider a firm j, which looks for a profit maximizing price pj 6= p∗ in a




/µ. A consumer searches beyond firm j
if ε j < x˜−∆µ. If the inequality is reversed then the consumer terminates her search
in firm j. If the consumer searches all firms, then she returns to shop j and buys
here if the utility here is the highest in the market and is non-negative. As a result,
a returning consumer buys from firm j if ε > pj/µ and ε j = max {ε l , 0}l=1,...n. To
sum up, if µ 6= 1 then the threshold values x¯ − ∆1 must be replaced with x˜ − ∆µ
and all prices must be divided by µ in the demand expression in section 4.3.1.
In equilibrium firm j does not want to deviate from consumers’ expectations
and charges price p∗. Thus, the first order condition of a firm looks similar to equa-
tion (4.6):
18 Ivaldi et al. (2003a).
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(ε) dε = 0 (4.17)
The new variable µ enters the first order condition (4.17). Therefore, it has an
impact on p∗. The equation (4.17) looks very similar to equation (4.6). The only
difference is that x¯ is replaced with x˜ and p∗ is replaced with p∗/µ. As a result, the
LHS of (4.17) decreases with p∗/µ and decreases with x˜. Therefore, for any fixed
value of µ the equilibrium price p∗ increases with the search cost.
The calculation of the effect of µ on the competitive price is not that trivial.
The degree of product differentiation has a twofold effect on p∗. Firstly, if µ in-
creases then consumers are more loyal to the firms and the sellers have incentives
to raise their prices. Secondly, a high degree of product differentiation encourages
consumers to search more because x˜ increases with µ. More searching customers
imply higher competitive pressure on firms and push the equilibrium price down.
Furthermore, there is the third effect of µ in our model. An increase in µ leads to an
increase in the mean of µε in our model because we require that ε ≥ 0. The higher
mean implies that consumers value all the varieties more in general. As a result, the
firms have incentives to increase their prices. The total effect depends on the sum
of three effects and it is sensitive to the assumptions about the distribution function
and the range of values of ε.19
Claim 4.4. Assume that either (1) s → 0 or (2) ε ∼ U [0, 1]. Then the competitive price
p∗ increases with the degree of product differentiation.










This profit increases with the degree of product differentiation if the equilibrium
price increases with µ because it increases with p∗ and the direct effect of µ is also
positive.
19 See Anderson and Renault (1999) for more details.
Perloff and Salop (1985) suggest that product differentiation can be modeled differently. They propose
to assume that the match value is distributed according to a symmetric mean preserving distribution
with a positive variance. An increase in the variance makes the tails of the distribution thicker, which
implies that products a more differentiated. If the variance decreases then the majority of ε values
are concentrated around the mean, which implies that products are more homogeneous. If product
differentiation is modeled in this way then an equilibrium price may decrease if products become more
heterogeneous.
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The cartel serves the consumers whose valuation for at least one variety is more





























The collusive price increases with the degree of product differentiation because
the LHS of the first order condition of a monopolist increases with µ. This increase
is mainly driven by the increase in the mean of µε. The positive effect of µ on the
collusive price has a positive effect on the collusive profit too. Every cartel member
gets higher profit for any fixed search cost and the number of firms if the degree of
product differentiation increases.
The increased product differentiation does not remove the incentives to deviate
from the collusive set-up unilaterally. A deviating firm sets pd < pc if it maximizes
its own profit, given that other sellers set pc in their shops. If µ 6= 1 then the payoff
function and the first order condition of the deviant are very similar to the ones that
have been derived in section 4.4. The only difference is that both prices pc and pd
must be divided by µ and x¯ must be replaced with x˜.
Claim 4.5. If (1) s → 0 or (2) ε ∼ U (0, 1) then the deviation price pd increases with the
degree of product differentiation
A deviant prefers to set a high price to its customers because they have high
valuations for the deviant’s product if µ is high. However, the difference in prices
becomes less important when products get more differentiated. Therefore, the firm
must reduce its price a lot if it wants to steal some demand from its rivals. The
positive effect of µ is stronger than the negative. Therefore, the deviation price
increases with µ.

















The effect of µ that comes via pd cancels out because ∂pid/∂pd = 0. If products
become more differentiated then a consumer searches more. This has a negative
effect on the demand of the deviant because consumers are more picky. However,
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more intensive search implies that more consumers observe the deviation price. In
addition, the collusive price increases with µ. Then the total effect of the degree
of product differentiation depends on whether the positive or negative effect is
stronger.
Claim 4.6. If (1) s→ 0 or (2) ε ∼ U (0, 1) then the deviation profit pid increases with the
degree of product differentiation.
The incentives to deviate vary with the degree of product heterogeneity. All
profits increase with µ if ε is distributed uniformly or the search cost is very close
to zero. Therefore, it is not explicitly clear whether the critical discount factor in-
creases or decreases with µ. The expressions of the derivative of the deviation gain
and the deviation loss with respect to µ are complicated. Therefore, we proceed
with the case ε ∼ U (0, 1) in the analysis of ∂δ̂/∂µ.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that ε ∼ U (0, 1). Then
(A) if s→ 0 then the critical discount factor does not depend on µ;
(B) if s→ s¯n then the critical discount factor increases with µ.
We simulated the values of δ̂ for several values of µ, n and s, given that ε ∼
U (0, 1) and F (ε) = e
ε−1
e−1 . The simulation results show that the critical discount
factor increases with µ for any size or search costs if the match value is distributed
uniformly (Figure 4.3a). This happens because the deviation profit increases with
the product heterogeneity parameter faster than the competitive profit. Therefore,
it is harder to sustain a cartel if product get more differentiated. The same result
holds for the exponential distribution of ε if n > 2. (Figure 4.3b). If there are two
firms in the market and the match value is distributed exponentially, then for small
values of µ the deviation loss increases faster with µ than the deviation gain. Then
a cartel becomes more stable if the product differentiation increases and consumer
search is costly. However, if µ is sufficiently high then collusion is more stable if µ
increases for any number of firms.
Proposition 4.3. The preference intensity parameter does not have an effect on the sign of
∂δ̂/∂s if s ≤ s¯n.
The preference intensity parameter µ does not affect the result of proposition
4.1 because the parameter of product heterogeneity works as a scaling factor in the
expressions of the first order conditions and profits. As a result, the derivatives
of prices and profits with respect to x˜ are similar to the derivatives that have been
derived for the case µ = 1.20 Hence, the critical discount factor δ̂ increases (or
20 See the formal proof of the proposition in the appendix.
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(a) ε ∼ U (0, 1) (b) F (ε) = eε−1e−1
Figure 4.3. The values of δ̂ for different values of n, µ, and s (blue lines n = 2, red
lines n = 5, solid lines s = 0.05, dashed lines s = 0.001)
decreases) with the search cost no matter the value of µ. However, the value of the
the derivative ∂δ̂/∂x˜ depends on the product heterogeneity parameter as well as
the value of δ̂.
4.7 Conclusions
Both the EC and the FTC acknowledge that collusion is easier to sustain if firms
can monitor each other easily.21. The findings of the economics literature show that
market transparency from the point of view of firms decreases the deviation gain
and makes the punishment harder, because the probability to gain from deviating
more than one period decreases if sellers can observe the deviation better.
However, market transparency on the consumer side works in the opposite
way. This paper has studied the effect of the search costs on collusion stability.
An increase in consumer search costs makes a market less transparent because con-
sumers search less and observe less offers. We have shown that a cartel often is
more stable if the search costs increase. This happens because the deviation is less
attractive if less consumers observe it. The punishment becomes less severe if the
search cost increases because the competitive profit increases with the search cost.
However, the effect of costly search is stronger on the deviation gain than the devi-
ation loss. Thus, collusion is more stable if the search costs increase.
Our findings are in line with the findings of Schultz (2005). He analyzed the
21 "The market typically is more vulnerable to coordinated conduct if each competitively important firm’s sig-
nificant competitive initiatives can be promptly and confidently observed by that firm’s rivals", Federal Trade
Commission (2010)
"...the coordinating firms must be able to monitor to a sufficient degree whether the terms of coordination are being
adhered to..." European Commission (2010a)
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effect of market transparency on cartel stability by introducing the fraction of uni-
formed consumers in a Hotelling model. He shows that that the minimum dis-
count factor value, above which a cartel is stable, decreases with the fraction of
uninformed consumers. In other words, a cartel gets less stable if market becomes
more transparent. However, our model differs from the model of Schultz because
we introduce the search costs in our model instead of fixing the consideration set
of a consumer exogenously.
Collusion is easier to sustain if a market is more transparent on the side of
firms and is less transparent from the point of view of consumers. Unfortunately
Stigler (1964) has observed that "no one has yet invented a way to advertise price re-
ductions which brings them to the attention of numerous customers but not to that of any
rival." Therefore, it is a difficult task for competition authorities to identify the right
amount of market transparency.
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4.A Appendix
The second derivative of pij with respect to pj. The first order derivative of pij with
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x¯− p∗ + pj
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+ nF (x¯)n−1 f
(
x¯− p∗ + pj
)− nF (p∗)n−1 f (pj)
− n (n− 1)
ˆ x¯−p∗
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x¯− p∗ + pj
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− n (n− 1) pj
ˆ x¯−p∗
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dε = nF (x¯)n−1 f
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x¯− p∗ + pj
)− nF (p∗)n−1 f (pj)
− n (n− 1)
ˆ x¯−p∗
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= −1+ (n− 1) F (x¯)






















− 2n (n− 1)
ˆ x¯−p∗
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− n (n− 1) pj
ˆ x¯−p∗
0







1−F(x¯) is positive because
1+ (n− 1) F (x¯)n − nF (x¯)n−1 ≥ 1+ (n− 1) 1n − n1n−1 = 0 and
2 f (p) + p f
′
(p) > 0.
The derivative of the LHS of (4.6) with respect to p∗.
− 1− F (x¯)
n
1− F (x¯) f (x¯)− nF (p






− nF (p∗)n−1 f ′ (p∗) p∗ = −1+ (n− 1) F (x¯)
n − nF (x¯)n−1
1− F (x¯) f (x¯)
− nF (p∗)n−1
(




− n (n− 1)
ˆ x¯
p∗
F (ε)n−2 f (ε)2 dε < 0
where the second equality has been obtained because´ x¯
p∗ F (ε)
n−1 f ′ (ε) dε = F (x¯)n−1 f (x¯) − F (p∗)n−1 f (p∗) − ´ x¯p∗ f (ε) dF (ε)n−1; and
1+ (n− 1) F (x¯)n − nF (x¯)n−1 > 1+ (n + 1) 1n − n1n−1 = 0.
The derivative of the LHS of (4.6) with respect to x¯.
− 1+ (n− 1) F (x¯)
n − nF (x¯)n−1
(1− F (x¯))2 p
∗ f (x¯)2 − 1− F (x¯)
n
1− F (x¯) p
∗ f
′
(x¯) + nF (x¯)n−1 p∗ f
′
(x¯)
= −1+ (n− 1) F (x¯)
n − nF (x¯)n−1
(1− F (x¯))2 p
∗
(
f (x¯)2 + (1− F (x¯)) f ′ (x¯)
)
< 0






The proof that pc increases with n.We rewrite the first order condition (4.10) as
K (pc, n):







f (ε) dε− f (pc) pc = 0
The derivative of K (pc, n) with respect to n is non-negative because ε ≥ pc.
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(n− 1) F (ε)
n−1
F (pc)n
f (ε) f (pc)
]





1− F (pc)n] f (pc)
F (pc)n
− 2 f (pc)− pc f ′ (pc) < 0
Thus, by the Implicit function theorem we get that ∂pc/∂n > 0.
Proof of claim 4.1. Firstly we need to prove that the LHS of 4.11 decreases with
pd. Afterwards we show that pd < pc. And finally we show that p∗ ≤ pd.








/∂pd < 0. The deriva-
tive is similar to the second derivative of pij with respect to pj. Therefore, omit it
here.
Let us check the sign of V (pc).
V (pc) = 1− 1− F (x¯)
n
1− F (x¯) p
c f (x¯)− F (pc)n + n
ˆ x¯−pc
0
F (ε+ pc)n−1 pc f
′
(ε+ pc) dε
The form of V (pc) is similar to the first order condition (4.6). It has been shown
that the LHS of (4.6) decreases with p∗. Moreover, pc > pm > p∗. Thus, V (pc) < 0
and pd < pc.
If f (y) + p f
′
(y) > 0, ∀p < y is satisfied then the derivative of the LHS of (4.11)
with respect to pc is positive:









x¯− pc + pd
))
+ n (n− 1)
ˆ x¯−pc
0











Thus, if pc > p∗ then pd > p∗.
Proof of claim 4.2. We apply the Implicit function theorem to prove this lemma.
It has been shown that the LHS of (4.11) decreases with pd. Thus, we need to show
that the LHS of (4.11) decreases with x¯. The derivative of the LHS of (4.11) with
respect to x¯ is as follows:
1+ (n− 1) F (x¯)n − nF (x¯)n−1








x¯− pc + pd
))
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− 1+ (n− 1) F (x¯)









x¯− pc + pd
))
(4.A.1)
If f (y) + p f
′
(y) > 0, ∀p < y then from the first order condition (4.11) we
get that 1− F
(




x¯− pc + pd
)
is negative, which completes the
proof.
Proof of claim 4.3. The deviating firm sets pd such that the derivative of pid






1+ (n− 1) F (x¯)n − nF (x¯)n−1




x¯− pc + pd
))
− 1− F (x¯)
n
1− F (x¯) f
(
x¯− pc + pd
)
+ nF (x¯)n−1 f
(
x¯− pc + pd
)
=











x¯− pc + pd
)
1− F (x¯− pc + pd)
 > 0
Thus, the profit of a deviating firm increases with x¯ or decreases with the search
cost.
Proof of proposition 4.1. If (4.12) holds with the equality then the critical dis-
count factor value δ̂ can be written in the following way
δ̂ =
pid − pic
pid − pi∗ (4.A.2)
The profit of a coalition member does not depend on the search cost. Thus, the
derivative of the critical discount factor with respect to x¯ depends only on the
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1+ (n− 1) x¯n − nx¯n−1
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1−x¯ + n (p∗)
n−1
)
Note that both the derivative of pid with respect to x¯ and the derivative pi∗ with
respect to x¯ have the same positive element 1n
1+(n−1)x¯n−nx¯n−1
(1−x¯)2 . The sign of the RHS
of (4.A.4) does not change if we divide it by this expression. Therefore, we explore
the sign of the expression φ (x¯, p∗, n) further on.
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The collusive price is higher than the deviation price. Therefore, if we divide
φ (x¯, p∗, n) by pc− pd then the new expression will have the same sign as φ (x¯, p∗, n).
We denote this new expression by φ1 (x¯, p∗, n)
φ1 (x¯, p∗, n) = pd
(
n (pc)n+1
























Then we can rewrite φ1 (x¯, p∗, n) as
φ1 (x¯, p∗, n) ≡ pd
(




n− p∗α (n + 1)






∂ (φ1 (x¯, p∗, n))
∂α
= −pd (p∗)2 − (p∗)2 2np
∗







n− p∗α (n + 1)





The inequality has been obtained because ∂pi
∗
∂x¯ < 0 implies that
n−p∗α(n+1)
n−α(n−1)p∗ < 0.
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Additionally,




n− p∗α (n + 1)









(n− α (n− 1) p∗)2 < 0
and
∂ (φ1 (x¯, p∗, n))
∂pd
= n (pic − pi∗)− (p∗)2 α
(
n− p∗α (n + 1)































n− n2 (n + 1)










4 (n− 3) (n + 1)
The last result implies that if n ≥ 3 then (4.A.5) increases with pc ∀1/2 < pc < 1,
because 5− 4n− n2 < 0.
If we set pc = 1/2 then (4.A.5) simplifies to n(n−1)
2(n−3)(n+1)2 > 0.
Now we tackle the case n = 2. If n = 2, then pc = 1/
√
3 and α = 1 + x¯ =(
1− (p∗)2
)
/p∗. After we plug the values of n, pc and α, nφ1 (x¯, p∗, n) becomes the
function of p∗ only. More particularly,





) (−3+ 7√3p∗ − 9 (p∗)2
−8
√









) is negative. The polynomial in the parenthesis is also
negative because it does not have any real roots the interval [0, 1/2]. Thus, the
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polynomial is of the same sign for all p∗ ∈ [0, 1/2]. If we set p∗ = 0, then the
expression equals −3 < 0. Therefore, φ1 (x¯, p∗, 2) > 0.
The derivative of the LHS of (4.13) with respect to p˜. If we denote the LHS of
(4.13) by G ( p˜) then
∂G ( p˜)
∂ p˜
= −ν∂G2 ( p˜)
∂ p˜
− (1− ν) ∂G2 ( p˜)
∂ p˜
where
G1 ( p˜) = F ( p˜)
n +
1− F (x¯)n
1− F (x¯) p˜ f (x¯)− np˜
ˆ x¯− p˜
0
F (ε+ p˜)n−1 f
′
(ε+ p˜) dε
G2 ( p˜) = F ( p˜)
n +
1− F (x¯− pc + p˜)n





F (ε+ p˜)n−1 f
′
(ε+ p˜) dε
The derivative of G1 ( p˜) with respect to p˜ is identical to the derivative of the
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′
(ε+ p˜) dε− np˜F (z)n−1 f ′ (z) + np˜F ( p˜)n−1 f ′ ( p˜)
+ nF ( p˜)n−1 f ( p˜)
where z = x¯− pc + p˜.’




F (ε+ p˜)n−1 f
′
(ε+ p˜) dε
= nF (z)n−1 f (z)− nF ( p˜)n−1 f ( p˜)− n (n− 1)
ˆ x¯−pc
0
F (ε+ p˜)n−2 f (ε+ p˜)2 dε




1− nF (z)n−1 + (n− 1) F (z)n
(1− F (z))2 p˜
(
f (z)2 + (1− F (z)) f ′ (z)
)
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+
1− nF (z)n−1 + (n− 1) F (z)n
1− F (z) f (z) + nF ( p˜)
n−1 (2 f ( p˜) + f ′ ( p˜) p˜)
+ n (n− 1)
ˆ x¯−pc
0
F (ε+ p˜)n−2 f (ε+ p˜)2 dε > 0
Proof of claim 4.4. We denote the LHS of (4.17) by H (p∗). This function de-
creases with p∗. Therefore, if we need to show that ∂p∗/∂µ > 0 then we need to
































− 1+ (n− 1) F (x˜)
n − nF (x˜)n−1
(1− F (x˜))2
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f (x˜)2 + f
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+ n (n− 1)
ˆ ε¯
p∗/µ




















+ n (n− 1)
ˆ ε¯
p∗/µ
F (ε)n−2 f (ε)2 dε > 0

























1+ nx˜n−1 − (n + 1) x˜n
2 (1− x˜) > 0
The inequality has been obtained because 1− x˜ > 0. Furthermore, if x˜ = 1 then
1 + nx˜n−1 − (n + 1) x˜n = 0; if x˜ = 0 then 1 + nx˜n−1 − (n + 1) x˜n = 1 > 0. At the

















Hence, 1+ nx˜n−1 − (n + 1) x˜n ≥ 0, ∀x˜ ∈ [0; 1]. .
Proof of claim 4.5. We start with the case s → 0. The first order condition of a








































If we want to show that ∂pd/∂µ > 0 then we need to show that the LHS of the
first order condition increases with µ. The LHS of the first order condition decreases
with pd. The proof is similar to the case µ = 1. Therefore, we omit it here.









with respect to µ when s → 0 encompass just the direct effect of µ and the








x˜ (ε− x˜) dF (ε)
limx˜→ε¯ µ (1− F (x˜)) /µ = 0









with respect to µ. We denote this part by L1. The second part is the








with respect to pc
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We start with the case when s → 0. We split the derivative of limx˜→ε¯ pid in two
parts. The first part will be the direct effect of µ on pid. This part we denote by P1.
The second effect of µ is indirect and comes via pc. This part of the derivative we




P1 = − 1− F (x˜)
n






































































































































































+ (n− 1) pd















f (ε) dε > 0














































pic − pi∗ =
δ̂
1− δ̂


































































































































































































(B) Now let us turn to the high search cost, i.e. x˜ → pcµ . Before we write down
the expression of the derivative of γ we introduce a new notation. Let us define
η ≡ pcµ and θ = p
∗
µ . These two new variables do not depend on µ because η =
(n + 1)−1/n and θ is defined by equation
1− 1− η
n
1− η θ − θ
n = 0
.
As a result, both η and θ are the functions of n only.
We again start with each element of (4.A.6) separately. The derivative of pic
with respect to µ remains the same as before, i.e. ∂pic/∂µ = ηn+1 and pic = pcηn =
µηn+1 The deviation price approaches to µ/2 if x˜ → η. Then the expression of the
























1+ (n− 1) ηn − nηn−1





















1+ (n− 1) ηn − nηn−1
8n (1− η) −
1





2 (1− η) (n + 1) =
−4η2 − 1+ 2η
8 (n + 1) (η − 1) η
The expression of competitive profits and its derivative with respect to µ is the



































2θn−1 (1− η) + ηn−1)












2θn−1 (1− η) + ηn−1)









4ηθn − 4η2θn + (1+ n)η1+nθn + ηn (θ − (1+ n)θn))
2(−1+ η)η (−θ + (1+ n)(−1+ η)θn)
=
θ2 (θn (1− η) (4η − 1) + ηnθ)
2(1− η)η (θ + (1+ n)(1− η)θn)
The product heterogeneity parameter µ enters the RHS of (4.A.6) linearly be-
cause it enters the differences in profits only. Moreover, µ ≥ 0. Therefore, the
sign of the derivative of γ depends only on n when x˜ → η. We divide the RHS of
(4.A.6) by µ and plot the expression for different values of n (see Figure 4.A.1). The
expression is positive. Therefore lims→s¯n ∂δ̂/∂µ > 0.
Figure 4.A.1. The value of (4.A.6) when x˜ → η
Proof of proposition 4.3. We use the notation from the proof of proposition
4.2 here, i.e. pc/µ = η, p∗/µ = θ and we denote pd/µ by ξ. Then the first order
condition of a firm in a competitive market can be rewritten as
1− 1− F (x˜)
n






(ε) dε = 0
Then the derivative of θ with respect to x˜ looks like the same as the derivative of p∗
with respect to x¯, given that µ = 1. Furthermore, the restrictions on θ in terms of x˜
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and n are the same as the restriction on p∗ in terms of n and x¯.
If we replace pc/µ by η in (4.19) then we get similar equation to (4.10) with η
instead of pc and all restrictions that are imposed on pc by (4.10) are the same for η
from equation (4.19).
If we replace pd/µ with ξ in the first order condition of a deviant, then we get
the following expression
1− F (x˜)n










dε = 0 (4.A.7)
Thus, the derivative of ξ with respect to x˜ looks almost the same as the deriva-
tive of pd with respect to x¯, given that µ = 1. Moreover, the restrictions on the value
of ξ in terms of x˜ and n from equation (4.A.7) are the same as the restrictions on the
value of pd in terms of x¯ and n from equation (4.11).
We rewrite the competitive profit as pi∗ = µn θ
(
1− F (θ)n). The profit of a cartel
member, given that µ 6= 1, can be written as pic = µnη
(







1− F (x˜) (1− F (x˜− η + ξ)) + n
ˆ x˜−η
0
F (ε+ η)n−1 f (ε+ ξ) dε
)
If we replaced the new parameters with x¯, pc, p∗ and pd in the expression of the
profits we would get exactly the same expressions of the profits that we have de-
rived for the case µ = 1, except factor µ in the front.
The same holds for the derivatives of the profits. For instance, the derivative of


















1+ (n− 1) F (x˜)n − nF (x˜)n−1




1− F (x˜) −
f (x˜− η + ξ)
1− F (x˜− η + ξ)
))
If we write down the derivative of δ̂ with respect ro x˜ and divide it by µ2, then
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the sign of the new expression would be the same as the sign of ∂δ̂/∂x˜. Then, if
we replace x˜, η, ξ, θ with x¯, pc, p∗ and pd in the new expression then we get the
derivative of the critical discount factor δ̂ with respect to x¯. Consequently, the sign




under costly consumer search
5.1 Introduction
Concentration in the market for banking services varies across the European Union
(the EU) a lot. For instance, in the period 2005-2009 the Herfindahl-Hirshman In-
dex (HHI) for the banking market was relatively low in Germany (∼ 200), and it
fluctuated in the interval between 400 and 500 in the United Kingdom. Meanwhile,
the index was over 2500 in Finland, around 2000 in the Netherlands and exceeded
3000 in Estonia in the same period.1 Competition authorities pay attention to high
HHI values, and any potential merger or acquisition goes under scrutiny if the con-
centration index is already relatively high in the pre-merger market.
Banks are engaged in many different economic activities. They are the pay-
ment intermediaries between firms and their customers; banks accept deposits and
issue loans, mortgages, exchange currencies, perform some investment activities,
etc. The clientele of a bank is very heterogeneous in terms of demanded services.
For instance, an individual may prefer to get a package with a current account, an
internet banking option, a credit card and a mortgage. However, a firm probably
prefers to relate an overdraft option to its current account and looks for transac-
tion services with the lowest transaction price. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the
market power of banks precisely just from general banking market concentration
measures.
1 For more details see European Central Bank (2010)
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In this chapter we provide a method to estimate saving deposit demand of
households under the assumption that depositors incur positive search costs in
order to find the best saving deposit contracts. The estimated parameters of the
demand functions have a strong impact on the assessment of market power. There-
fore, the demand function specification and its estimation results are important in
counterfactual merger simulations. Our model is not estimated with actual data
because the necessary data are not available at this moment. Though, we provide
simulation results where we show that the estimated model parameters are biased
if the search costs are ignored or if the search costs are modeled as a contract’s
characteristic instead of as a cost that limits a consumer’s consideration set.
The average consumer consideration set is smaller when she searches sequen-
tially at positive costs than when there are no search costs. The assumption that
the search costs are zero or the inclusion of the search costs directly in the utility
function implies that a consumer compares all the existing contracts, which is dif-
ferent from the true data generating process. Therefore, the estimated parameters
are biased.
The concept deposit demand may sound slightly misleading because of the fol-
lowing reason. A bank invests money that is deposited by its customers, pays the
money out when required and makes loans at interest. The institution makes its
profit by charging higher interest rates on loans than it pays out to the depositors.
Thus, if we treat a bank as an ordinary firm then a deposit is a production input and
the interests on the deposits are variable production costs. Hence, the relationship
between an offered interest rate and the sum of accepted deposits should be called
deposit supply from the point of view of a bank. However, it is usually assumed
that a bank supplies its customers with services and a saving deposit is a service of
a bank. Therefore, we use the term deposit demand instead of deposit supply in this
chapter.
We use the multinomial logit (MNL) model to derive and estimate the saving
deposit demand. The application of this discrete choice modeling technique is not
a novelty in the analysis of the retail banking sector. Dick (2008) and Ho and Ishii
(2011) used a random coefficient MNL for the estimation of saving deposit demand
in the US. Zhou (2008), Nakane et al. (2006) and Molnár et al. (2007) used a mixed
MNL to estimate structural banking market models in the US, Brasil and Hungary
respectively. Knittel and Stango (2008) and Ishii (2005) used this approach to an-
alyze how the degree of interbank ATM network compatibility affects consumer
choices for saving deposits and banks’ incentives to invest. Our model differs from
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the mentioned ones by assuming costly consumer search in the saving deposit mar-
ket. It is assumed in all the above mentioned papers that bank customers are per-
fectly informed about the saving deposit contracts available in the market. On the
contrary, we assume that a typical bank customer does not know the precise utilities
of all the saving contracts. In our model bank customers get the information about
interest rates and some characteristics of banks for free. However, a customer needs
to spend some time to learn the rest of contract and bank characteristics, e.g. friend-
liness of the staff, the duration of a financial month, etc. at some positive costs. The
modeling assumptions are based on the surveys and reviews of the banking market
in European countries.
Knowledge about consumers’ consideration sets is very important for the iden-
tification of search costs. Sometimes the data suggest what alternatives were ob-
served and compared by a single consumer before the purchase decision was made.
For instance, Honka (2010) had information about the observed and chosen offers
of every consumer when she estimated an auto insurance demand model with non-
sequential consumer search. Kim et al. (2010) inferred the sequential search order
by using Amazon.com view rank data in the estimation of the online demand for
camcorders. Furthermore, Koulayev (2010) and Brynjolfsson et al. (2010) had in-
formation about hotels and books respectively that were observed by consumers.
De los Santos et al. (2011) had data on the browsing history of every consumer
when they analysed whether sequential or non-sequential search models were in
line with the behaviour of consumers buying books online.
If the data does not suggest the size and the composition of consumers’ con-
sideration sets then the insights from economic theory can be used to judge which
alternatives should have higher probabilities to be considered. The characteristics
of products (quality, prices, etc.) affect the list of alternatives compared by con-
sumers. If products are homogeneous, the price is all that matters for consumers.
Then the data on prices is sufficient to determine the order in which alternatives get
into a consumer’s consideration set. Furthermore, the size of the search cost deter-
mines the size of the consideration set. If the search costs are high then a consumer
samples very little offers. Hence, the most expensive offers are accepted by the con-
sumers with the highest search costs and the low search cost consumers pay lower
prices because they sample more items. Hong and Shum (2006) used this fact when
they discussed the identification of the search cost distribution with sequential and
non-sequential consumer search in a homogeneous product market.
Product heterogeneity makes the ranking of alternatives complicated because
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there are factors other than the price that affect consumer choice. Hortaçsu and
Syverson (2004) used the fact that alternatives are of vertically differentiated when
they estimated a search cost distribution in the market for S&P 500 funds. They
needed information both on prices and market shares of the funds for the iden-
tification of the search cost distribution. Wildenbeest (2011) estimated a search
cost distribution with vertically differentiated products without the information on
market shares. However, he focused on mixed strategy equilibrium in utility lev-
els, whereas the market equilibrium was in pure strategies in the model of Hortaçsu
and Syverson (2004).
If products are horizontally differentiated then it is not clear how the products
should be ranked. Then the number of possible consideration sets increases very
rapidly with the number of alternatives and complicates the estimation process.
Moraga-González et al. (2011) address this problem when they estimate a market
model for cars. In their model consumers search the car dealers non-sequentially
and there is no clear ranking of alternatives due to horizontal product differenti-
ation. They have overcome the computationally intensive many-consideration set
problem by using importance sampling.
Our set-up is similar to the one of Moraga-González et al. (2011) because nei-
ther the search behaviour of bank customers nor their consideration sets are ob-
served. Furthermore, the saving contracts are treated as horizontally differentiated
products in the demand specification. Therefore, no criterion can be used for the
ranking of credit institutions and contracts. We build our model on the theoretical
sequential costly consumer search framework first proposed by Wolinsky (1986)
and further analyzed by Anderson and Renault (1999), Armstrong et al. (2009) and
Zhou (2011). Hence, bank customers search the banks sequentially with perfect re-
call. A customer observes all saving contracts of a bank after she pays the search
cost. Any search order may happen with positive probability, and the number of
search orders increases very fast with the number of existing banks. Therefore, the
estimation of the demand may be computationally difficult if there are many banks
in the market and a customer is free to visit any number of credit institutions. In or-
der to lower the computational burden, we impose some restrictions on the search
behaviour of bank customers in model simulation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We describe the mod-
elling assumptions in section 5.2. The search and choice behaviour of bank cus-
tomers is described in section 5.3.1. The derivation of market shares in the saving
contract market is given in section 5.3.2. The simulation results are in section 5.4.
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Finally, possible future model development is discussed in section 5.5.
5.2 Modeling assumptions
We use the following list of assumptions to derive the sequential search model for
the saving deposits.
A1 Bank customers observe a few saving deposit contracts’ characteristics for free
and have to search for the rest of the characteristics at positive costs.
A2 Bank customers search banks sequentially with perfect recall and the offers of
the first bank are learnt for free.
A3 The search cost per bank equals the sum of a constant c and a customer and
bank specific term ν that is distributed according to a continuous differentiable
distribution function H (ν).
A4 Bank customers perceive fixed term saving deposit contracts as differentiated
products.
A5 A customer puts only a part of its assets (an emergency fund) under a saving
deposit contract and does not sign more than one saving contract.
A6 A bank customer does not consider switching costs before signing a saving
deposit contract. Furthermore, banks do not affect the choice of a customer by
bundling and tying their offered services.
A bank customer wants to put her savings in the bank that offers the highest
utility. She observes the offered interest rates, and some characteristics of a bank at
no costs. However, some factors can be observed only after paying a search cost.
For instance, Paswan, Spears, Hasty, and Ganesh (2004) show that bank customers
pay attention to the knowledge and experience of employees, empathy, friendli-
ness, a feeling of confidence in a bank, etc. These characteristics of banks are cus-
tomer specific most of the time. Therefore, we assume that a consumer must spend
some efforts or have some monetary expenditures in order to learn this kind of
information.
A bank customer starts searching from the bank where she has her current ac-
count or handles all her daily transactions because it does not cost anything to
search there. This assumption is made because bank customers have much ex-
perience about the services in the banks where they have their current accounts.
Moreover, a customer gets some additional information about the bank’s saving of-
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fers while she handles her credit card, internet banking, etc. issues. If a customer is
not satisfied with the best offer in the bank where she has her current account then
she searches other credit institutions. She searches banks sequentially with perfect
recall.
The search cost per bank may be determined in many ways. For instance, it has
been shown by Devlin (2002) that the location and the reputation of a bank are very
important choice criteria for a bank customer in the United Kingdom. Relatively
many surveyees stressed the importance of the bank location in the survey of Lee
and Marlowe (2003). Additionally, Bexley (2005) find that recommendations from
existing bank customers are very important choice criteria for choosing a financial
institution. Therefore, the search costs per bank could be defined as a function of
bank characteristics: distance, market share in previous periods, etc. In order to
make the derivation of market shares easier we assume that the search costs per
bank equal the sum of constant c plus bank and customer specific error term ν. The
random term allows us to deal with the search cost heterogeneity among customers,
which happens because bank customers vary in their disutility that they experience
when they try to reach a credit institution (Boyd, Myron, and White, 1994; Lee and
Marlowe, 2003; Paswan et al., 2004).
Devlin and Gerrard (2005, 2004) have analysed bank customer survey data that
was collected in Great Britain in 2000. They find that bank customers consider the
location and the image of a bank, home banking options, opening hours, interest
rates on savings and credit and other charges before they choose where to open
their current accounts. Furthermore, the duration of a financial year (month), the
conditions to break a non-expired fixed term saving deposit contract, etc. varies
among banks. Hence, bank customers consider saving deposit contracts as differ-
entiated products.
An individual may earn interest on her savings in several ways. For instance,
she may sign a saving contract, buy some shares and (or) bonds, engage in the
trade of financial derivatives, etc. We assume that a bank customer makes ratio-
nal investment decisions. Saving deposits have a small return compared to other
types of investment. However, a saving deposit is a lower risk and more liquid
investment than the investment in shares, capital funds, financial derivatives, etc.
Therefore, it is advised for households to keep their emergency funds as saving
deposits, and the rest of their money to invested elsewhere.2
2 The purpose of an emergency fund is to cover the necessary expenses of an individual (household) if
there is a sudden decrease in income or an unexpected increase in expenditures. Usually it is stated that
the size of an emergency fund must be between three to six months of current monthly expenditures.
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It is obligatory for commercial banks to follow national deposit insurance schemes
in most European countries. The insured deposit size exceeds the recommended
size of an emergency fund on average in the EU.3 Furthermore, banks are very vul-
nerable to the behaviour of their customers. The collapse of one bank makes the
customers of other banks more suspicious and may cause the bankruptcy of other
credit institutions. Hence, spreading of an emergency fund across several banks
does not necessarily help to avoid the case that the whole emergency fund needs
to be recovered from the saving deposit insurance. Moreover, it takes more efforts
from a bank customer to monitor her investment in several banks compared to the
case when only one saving deposit contract is signed.
Tying, bundling and consumer switching costs are considered to be important
aspects of the retail banking market in Europe (see the EC, 2007; the EC, 2009).
However, the switching costs and bundling do not have a strong effect on con-
sumer choice where to sign a saving deposit contract. Bank customers had to name
the reasons why they signed their saving contracts with particular banks in the
EC survey in 2009. According to the survey results, only 5.83% bank customers
signed their saving contracts with particular banks just because they had their cur-
rent accounts there. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that in some countries, e.g.
the Netherlands, consumers pay relatively low costs for their current accounts and
have multiple accounts.4 If a customer has current accounts in several banks then
she can transfer her money from one credit institution to another at no additional
costs. Additionally, it has been stated in the OECD and the EC reports that in sev-
eral European countries banks do not take advantage via tying arrangements, or
the tying practice that is related to current accounts is mostly exercised by issuing
loans and selling insurance products. Therefore, we abstract from switching costs
in our model.
Estimation of a demand model raises the issue of endogeneity because the con-
tract interest rate may be correlated with the unobserved characteristics of a con-
tract. Therefore, instruments are necessary to estimate the model. The set of instru-
ments that are used in the empirical banking market models with the unobserved
product characteristics varies a lot. For instance, Nakane et al. (2006) include per-
However, the exact size of an emergency fund depends on the social security system of a particular
country and the individual’s abilities to tackle the unexpected gap between her income and expendi-
tures.
3 It is stated in the directive of the EU No. 2009/14/EC Art. 1.3 that “by 31 December 2010, Member
States shall ensure that the coverage for the aggregate deposits of each depositor shall be set at EUR 100 000 in the
event of deposits being unavailable”. Meanwhile, the average yearly disposable income per person did not
exceeded EUR 23 000 in the EU in 2007 (EUROSTAT).
4 Boot (2007), OECD (2007)
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sonnel and operational costs, credit risk, liquidity coefficients, the ratio of net worth
to operational assets, the ratio of loans to operational assets next to BLP instruments
(characteristics of the rivals in each market) in their model. A similar approach was
applied by Ho and Ishii (2011), Nakane et al. (2006) and Dick (2008), who used BLP
instruments in addition to a list of cost shifters such as the expenses on premises
and equipment, credit risk cost variable, depreciation, etc. Zhou (2008) and Knittel
and Stango (2008) used only BLP instruments in their models.
We provide two suggestions for the instruments here. First of all, if the inter-
bank lending market is very liquid and a single bank does not have a significant
effect on the equilibrium in this market then the pricing decisions of some banking
products may be almost not related. In other words, banks maximize their profits
in deposit and loan markets separately by considering the interest rate in the in-
terbank lending market,5 instead of solving the total profit maximization problem.
If it is so then the unobservable characteristics of saving contracts have no effect
on the interest rates of loans, mortgages, etc. However, the interest rates in lending
and saving deposit markets are related to the interbank market equilibrium interest
rate. Hence, the interest rates on mortgages and consumer loans of the same bank
may be used as instruments in the model.
Secondly, the approach of Nevo (2001) may be followed, i.e. the saving deposit
interest rates from other markets (countries) can be used as instruments too. A bank
customer usually signs a saving deposit contract with the banks that perform their
activities in her country of residence. Therefore, it is very unlikely that banks com-
pete for the saving deposits internationally. However, if there is a joint interbank
lending market between several countries, e.g. Eurozone, then the saving deposit
interest rates in the analysed country may be instrumented by the aggregated in-
terest rates on saving deposits, mortgages, etc. from other countries.
5.3 Model specification
5.3.1 Customer behaviour
In this section we assume that all bank customers search for the contracts that suit
them the best, and a bank customer may search any number of credit institutions.
We put some restrictions on the number of searches in section 5.4. This will be
done in order to make the simulation and estimation process less time consuming.
5 EURIBOR, LIBOR, etc.
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However, in this section we derive the general market share expressions that later
are specialized for the restricted search case.
Consider a bank customer i, who considers signing a saving deposit contract.
The customer can sign a saving contract with one of J banks. Every bank offers
several different saving contracts. We denote the set of the saving contracts that are
offered by bank j in period t as Zjt. If customer i signs contract k ∈ Zjt with bank j
in period t then she gets the following utility:
uki = xkβ+ ξk + εki = δk + εki (5.1)
where xk is the vector of observable characteristics of alternative k at time t, β
is a parameter vector, ξk shows the contract characteristics that are not observable
for the econometrician but known by the customer, and εki is a customer and con-
tract specific error term, which is distributed according to the extreme value type I
distribution.
Customer i may choose an outside option, which consists of not signing any
saving contract and keeping her money in her current account or in terms of cash
at home. In this case her utility equals
u0i = δ0i + ε0i
where δ0 is normalized to 0.
If a customer knows all the utilities that are available in the market then she
chooses the one with the highest utility. A typical bank customer knows the deter-
ministic part δ of utility of every saving contract before she visits a credit institution.
However, the customer needs to learn customer and contract specific terms ε. In-
formation about ε is costly. Thus, the customer has to decide what alternatives she
wants to learn fully about.
A typical bank customer compares the gains from an additional search and the
search costs when she makes a decision whether to terminate her search or con-
tinue searching further. Let us assume that the customer is in bank j where she
has observed an alternative that gives her utility u˜ji, which is the highest observed
utility so far. The customer considers searching in bank h 6= j, and u˜hi refers to the
maximum utility from bank h as , i.e. u˜hi = max {uli}l∈Zht . Then the customer is
indifferent between searching in bank h or terminating her search in bank j if the
following equality is satisfied.6
6 See Weitzman (1979) for the derivation of the optimal stopping rule.
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Since ε is distributed according to the type I extreme value distribution, we have
















where γh = ∑l∈Zht e
δl .
We introduce a scalar u¯hi such that if u˜ji = u¯hi then (5.2) is satisfied.7 The value
of u¯h is independent from the characteristics of bank j and depends on the charac-
teristics of bank h only. Therefore, this value is called the reservation utility at bank
h. If u˜j > u¯h then the gain from searching in bank h is less than the search cost8 and
a customer prefers to terminate her search in bank j . On the contrary, if u˜j < u¯h
then a customer wants to pay c + νh to learn about the offers of bank h.
The reservation utility for every bank in the market can be computed from equa-
tion (5.2). According to Weitzman (1979), a rational sequentially searching bank
customer should rank all banks according to their reservation utilities from the
highest to the lowest and start searching from the top of the list. Thus, if a bank
customer is in bank j and later searches in bank h then u¯h > max {u¯l}l=1,..J\{h,j}.
7 Consumer specific index i at chi and u¯hi will be omitted from here on.
8 The RHS of (5.2) is less than the LHS.
Deposit demand estimation with costly consumer search 155
5.3.2 Market share derivation
Bank j signs contract k ∈ Zjt with two types of customers. Firstly, the credit institu-
tion signs contract k with the customers who have their current accounts in bank j.
These customers are referred as “the own customers” of the bank from here on. The
second type of the customers who sign contract k with bank j have their accounts in
the banks other than bank j. We refer to these customers as “the alien customers” of
bank j. We introduce variable λj to label the share of the customers who have their
current accounts in bank j, and split the derivation of the market share of contract
k in two parts according to the customer type. Later these parts are aggregated for
the final expression of the market share.
An own customer signs contract k with bank j in several cases. Firstly, she may
choose contract k after she observes the offers of bank j and learns the utility of an
outside option without searching other credit institutions. Secondly, the customer
may continue searching beyond bank j, terminate her search after observing the
offers of several (not all) banks and decide to sign contract k with bank j. Lastly,
the customer may search all the banks in the market and decide that contract k with
bank j is the best option for her.
Let us assume that the search order is predetermined, i.e. all customers follow
the same search order. The customers start from the banks where they have their
current accounts. Then they continue searching the banks in a numerically ascend-
ing order. More particularly, if a bank customer starts searching from bank j then
she may visit bank 1 after bank j. If the customer does not find a satisfactory offer
in both bank j and bank 1 then she searches bank 2, and so on till bank j− 1. If the
customer searches beyond bank j− 1 then she goes to bank j+ 1 and may continue
with bank j + 2, bank j + 3, etc. up to bank J.
An own customer accepts contract k in bank j without searching bank 1 if the
utility of contract k is the highest among all observed utilities and is above u¯1. We
label this probability as Po1k where the superscript o indicates an own customer.
Po1k = Pr
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) (1− F (u¯1 − ln (γj + 1)))
The customer who is not satisfied with the offer of bank j continues searching
bank 1. Her decision whether to search bank 2 or to choose the best observed offer
right away depends on the value of the best observed offer and the reservation
utility u¯2. The reservation utility at bank 2 is less than the reservation utility at
bank 1, i.e. u¯1 > u¯2. The customer has searched bank 1 because u˜j ≤ u¯1. Thus,
the customer may terminate her search after seeing the offers of bank 1 and choose
contract k ∈ Zjt. This happens if the utility of alternative k is less than u¯1 but it
is above u¯2 and it is the highest utility among the observed utilities. We label this
probability as Po2k .
Po2k = Pr
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 exp {−e−ε} e−εdε
=
eδk(
γj + γ1 + 1
) (F (u¯1 − ln (γj + γ1 + 1))− F (u¯2 − ln (γj + γ1 + 1)))
The customer may search bank 2 and then return to bank j for contract k without
searching further. This happens if uk is the highest utility among the observed utili-
ties, it is less than u¯2 but it is higher than the reservation utility of the next searched
bank (u¯3). The expression of this probability is very similar to the expression of
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Po2k . The only difference is that the values of u¯1 and u¯2 must be replaced with the
values of other reservation utilities (u¯2 and u¯3), and γ2 has to be added in the ex-
pressions under the logarithms and in the denominator of the fraction in the front.
The customer may return to bank j and sign contract k after every searched bank.
Thus, we have a sequence of probabilities that are similar to Po2k .
The own customer may search all the banks in the market and still return to
bank j and sign contract k. The last visited bank is bank J. Then the customer
signs contract k if uk is less than u¯J and is the highest available utility in the market.
We name the set of alternatives Zjt ∪ Z1t ∪ Z2t ∪ ... ∪ ZJt ∪ {0} as Z jt. Then the
probability that an own customer takes contract k after searching all the banks can
be written as follows
PoJk = Pr
[














Thus, conditional on that the order according to which a bank customer visits
the other J− 1 banks is known, the probability that an own customer signs contract






The second part of contract k demand consists of the alien customers who ar-
rive at bank j from other banks and sign contract k. Let us assume that an alien
customer starts searching from bank 1. Then bank j is visited in the jth position,
and the next bank that the customer would visit after bank j is bank j + 1. The
customers have left banks up to bank j − 1 without signing any contract because
the maximum utilities in these banks have been less than the reservation utility at
bank j, i.e. max {ul}l=Z1t∪...∪Z(j−1)t∪{0} < u¯j. These customers may sign contract k
if they terminate their search in bank j or continue searching further and return to
bank j for contract k.
If the alien customers terminate their search in bank then j they sign contract k
in two cases. First of all, these customers sign the contract if uk is the highest utility
in bank j and is higher than u¯j. Secondly, the alien customers terminate their search
in bank j and sign contract k if u¯j+1 < uk < u¯j and uk is the highest observed utility.
We label the probability that an alien customer from bank 1 has arrived at bank j,
terminated her search here and signed contract k as Pajk(1). The index next to k shows
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An alien customer from bank 1 continues searching beyond bank j if all ob-
served utilities are less than u¯j+1. The customer may search bank j + 1 and return
back to bank j for contract k without seeing the offers of bank j + 2. This happens






























The reservation utilities of the banks are ranked in a decreasing order. Thus,
an alien customer from bank 1 may return back to bank j and sign contract k from
any credit institution that is searched beyond bank j. The probability of this event
equals the probability that uk is less than the reservation utility at the last searched
bank, it is higher than the reservation utility at the subsequent bank, and it is the
highest utility among all observed utilities. Consequently, the expression of the
probability that an alien customer from bank 1 returns to bank j for contract k from
any bank that is searched beyond bank j is similar to the expression Paj+1k(1) . How-
ever, the values of the reservation utilities and the sum of γs have to be adjusted
accordingly. Finally, an alien customer may sign contract k after she observes all the
contracts in the market. The probability of this event is identical to the probability
PoJk . We refer to the probability that an alien customer from bank 1 returns to bank
j for contract k after visiting all the banks in the market as PaJk(1). The total proba-
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bility that an alien customer from bank 1 signs contract k with bank j is the sum of






Bank j may sign contract k with the alien customers who start searching from
any of J − 1 banks. Therefore, the probability that bank j signs contract k with an
alien customer, given the search order, equals the sum of J − 1 probabilities similar








The order of visited banks affects the expressions of the probability that own
and alien customers sign saving contract k. This happens because the combinations
of γs and the values of the reservation utilities in the probabilities Polk and P
a
k(l),
l ∈ [1; J] depend on the search order. It has been stated that the search cost varies
across the banks and their customers. The random parameter in the search cost
expression implies that there is a positive probability of every search order in the
market, i.e. there is a chance that a customer follows any of (J − 1)! different search
orders.
Let us consider the own customers of bank j who signs contract k with bank j.




u¯1 > u¯2 > ... > u¯j−1 > u¯j+1 > ... > u¯J
]
(5.4)
Then the probability that the own customers of bank j sign contract k and follow










Pok dFu¯(u¯J)...dFu¯ (u¯3) dFu¯(u¯2)dFu¯(u¯1)
The own customers may follow any possible order. The set of indexes {1, 2, ..., J − 1}
may be arranged in (J − 1)! orders. We denote the set of orders by Γ. Then, Γ (q, i)
shows the ith element of the qth order. Then the probability, that an own customer
















Bank j may be visited in any position from 2 to J by the alien customers from
bank 1 with some positive probability. This, implies that the probability that the
alien customers from bank 1 sign contract k with bank j is the sum of (J− 2)!(J− 1)
multidimensional integrals. In order to illustrate this statement let us assume that
there are four banks in the market and j = 2. Then the alien customers who start
searching from bank 3 and sign contract k with bank 2 may follow this list of search
orders
3→ 2→ 1→ 4
3→ 2→ 4→ 1
3→ 1→ 2→ 4
3→ 4→ 2→ 1
3→ 4→ 1→ 2
3→ 1→ 4→ 2
Then the probability that an alien customer who starts searching from bank 3

























Pak(3)dFu¯ (u¯2) dFu¯ (u¯4) dFu¯ (u¯1)
We introduce an additional index z in the notation of the elements of Γ for the
general expression of pak(1). The triple (q, z, i) denotes the i
th element of the qth
arrangement of J− 1 indexes, given that bank j is sampled on the zth position. Then
the probability that bank j signs contract k with the alien customers from bank 1 is
























The multidimensional integrals make the estimation of the model quite com-
plicated. The analytical solutions of the integrals are not possible because it is not
possible to get the analytical expression of u¯h from (5.2). However, the model is
still tractable if there are a few banks in the market. Unfortunately some restric-
tions on the search order or the number of searches are necessary if the number J is
relatively large.
Not the quantity of contracts but the sum of money matters in a banking sector.
We follow the similar methodology to the one of Ishii (2005) and Zhou (2008) in
defining the market shares of the saving deposit contracts. Therefore, we define the
market share of contract k as the ratio between the expected deposits of contract
k and the total expected sum of deposits in the market. Then the share of saving


















where y denotes the deposit size.
5.4 Model simulation
We simulate the saving deposit demand model and estimate its parameters in this
section. It is very computationally intensive to perform numerical integration of
the market shares over the distribution of the search costs because it involves solv-
ing many non-linear search rule equations. Therefore, we put some restrictions on
the search behaviour of consumers, which simplify the multidimensional integra-
tion problem and let to speed up the estimation process. We assume that there are
three types of bank customers in the simulated market. The first group of bank
customers have zero search costs and compare all saving deposit contracts before
they sign any of them. The second group of the customers do not search beyond
the banks where they have their current accounts and the third group of bank cus-
tomers observe the offers of two banks at most.
The three types of banks customers are distinguished because of the particu-
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larities of the Dutch retail banking market. According to OECD (2007) report, all
Dutch households kept their current accounts in one of four biggest banks in 2007.9
In addition, these banks had 90% of all saving accounts. It is very likely that a typ-
ical bank customer searches for a saving contract only among four biggest banks.
However, the fact that about one tenth of all saving accounts are distributed among
other smaller banks suggests that there is a fraction of actively searching bank cus-
tomers in the market. Moreover, the survey data showed that about 21% of Dutch
bank customers would have switched from one bank to another to get all banking
services from only one credit institution in 2006.10 Consequently, we assume that
there are bank customers who have zero search costs, the customers who do not
search beyond the bank where they have their current accounts and the customers
who perform a limited number of searches.11
The first group comprises of 10% of all the customers. These customers compare
all the saving contracts in the market and choose the ones with the highest utilities.
Hence, the probability that they sign contract k is as follows
P0k =
eδk
∑Jl=1 γl + 1
20% of all the bank customers do not search beyond the bank where they have
their current accounts. These customers choose between the contracts of the banks
where they have their current accounts and an outside option. Therefore, the prob-




This customer must have a current account in bank j
Finally, the remaining customers may search beyond the banks where they have
their current accounts. However, they do not search more than one more bank. In
other words, these customers observe the offers of two banks at most. The introduc-
tion of zero search cost and not-searching bank customers brings in some confusion
to the classification of the bank customers that has been used in section 5.3.2. This is
because the customers who have their current accounts in bank j can belong to any
9 They are ABN AMRO/Fortis, Rabobank, ING, SNS Bank.
10 Lelieveldt (2006)
11 Moraga-González and Wildenbeest (2008) estimated the shares of consumers who searched for one,
two, etc. up to all prices of memory chips in their non-sequential search model. They found that the es-
timated shares of the consumers who observed only one, two, three and all the prices were significantly
above zero.
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of three customer groups that have been introduces in this section. In order to draw
the parallel between the derived probabilities in section 5.3.2 and the correspond-
ing probabilities in this section, we make the distinction between "own customers"
and "alien customers" just for the customers who have positive search costs and
may search beyond the first bank. In other words, zero search cost customers and
not-searching customers are not divided into any subgroups.
The probability that the own customers of bank j sign contract k, given that bank




) (1− F (u¯q − ln (γj + 1)))
+
eδk





γj + γq + 1
))
The own customer of bank j may search any of J − 1 banks. Therefore, the












) Pok (u¯q,γq,γj, δk) dFu¯q (u¯q)
If bank j does not have its own customers then pok = 0.
Now let us consider the alien customers who arrive at bank j from bank q 6= j.











1− F (u¯j − ln (γj)))
+
eδk





γq + γj + 1
))
Alien customers can arrive from J− 1 banks. They search bank j if u¯j > max {u¯l}l 6={j,q}.













) λqPak(q) (u¯j,γq,γj, δk) dFu¯j (u¯j)
The market share of contract k is the sum of the probabilities that the customers
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During the model simulation we assumed that there are 10 banks in the market.
Five banks had their own customers, and five banks signed saving contracts with
alien customers only. The vector of current account market shares (λ) for five banks
was generated as follows. Five random draws were taken from U (0, 1) and λi =
drawi/∑j drawj.
Matrix X had five columns in the simulated model. We included the yearly in-
terest rates, a saving account dummy, the share of banks’ assets, and two dummies
that showed whether a bank had own customers or not. There were twelve periods
in our model and every bank offered three types of deposits (a saving account, a
half-year fixed term contract and an one-year fixed contract). Hence, there were
10× 12× 3 = 360 observations.
The share of assets per period was generated similarly as λ, i.e. by drawing from
U (0, 1) and normalizing by the sum of the drawn numbers. The asset variable
varied every three periods. In other words, one generated share of assets for bank
j was the same in the periods from 1 to 3, there was the same share of assets in the
periods from 4 to 6, etc. The repetitive values of the asset shares were used because
banks report the newly accepted deposits and their interest rates monthly, however,
the financial accounting data frequency is one quarter. The asset share variable was
generated once and remained fixed for all simulations.
The interest rates of the contracts were affected by the interbank market lending
interest rate (r¯) and ξ. The interbank market interest rate vector was generated as
a random draw from U (0, 1) for each period (twelve draws in total). The vector r¯
was generated once and was fixed for all model simulations. The unobserved con-
tract characteristics were drawn independently fromN (0, 1) for each observation.
A new set of ξ was drawn for every simulation. Hence, the interest rates on saving
contracts varied with the simulations too.
The interest rates on saving contracts were simulated as follows. We label the
vector of the interest rates for saving accounts rs, the vector of the interest rates
for half-year fixed term deposits r0.5 and the vector of the interest rate for one-year
fixed term deposits r1. Then the generation of the interest rate vectors for period t
was performed by using these expressions












exp {ξ1t}+ 4r¯t ⊗ i1×10
where i1×10 is a 1× 10 vector of ones.
We follow the approach of Nevo (2001) for the model instruments. In other
words we assume that it is possible to use the interest rates on the deposits (loans)
from other markets (countries). These interest rates are not affected by the char-
acteristics of the contracts and banks in the analyzed market, however, they are
affected by the interbank lending market equilibrium interest rate r¯. Hence, we
generated one instrument z for the model which was simulated as the function of
r¯ and some random variables. We denote the vector of instruments for period t as
zt. Then
zt = (2r¯t ⊗ i1×30) ◦ A+ 0.01B
where A is a 1× 30 vector which element ai = 1/li and li ∼ U (1, 2), B is 1× 30
vector which element bi ∼ N (0, 1).
The model estimation was run according to BLP procedure for random coef-
ficient logit models, i.e. we minimized the GMM criterion function Q (c, β) with











where Z is an instrument matrix, Ω stands for the variance-covariance matrix and
ω (c, β) is
ω (c, β) = δ− Xβ






and δ (cˆ) was obtained by solving the system of equations s− s (δ, cˆ) = 0 Hence,
the search for the minimum of the GMM objective function was performed with
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respect to c.12
The estimation consisted of three optimization loops. The inner loop consisted
of solving the search rule equations (5.2) for u¯, given the values of γ and c+ ν. The
middle loop involved solving the system of equations s− s (δ, cˆ) = 0 to get δ (c).
The final loop was the minimization of the objective function.
We could not solve (5.2) for the value of u¯h explicitly. Hence, we could not
write the expressions for the distribution functions Fu¯ (u¯). Therefore, the calcula-
tion of the market shares went as follows. We drew 3000 values of ν independently
from the uniform distribution U (−1, 1). These values were grouped in 300 ten-
dimensional vectors. Element j, j ∈ [1, 10] of vector νi was used to calculate u¯ji.
Thus, for each νi, i ∈ [1, 300] we had a vector u¯i.
When the values of u¯i were known, then the ranking of the reservation utilities
was known and we could write down the expressions of the market shares. This
procedure was repeated for 300 times. Therefore, we got 300 expressions of the
market share of each contract. All 300 market shares of one contract were added
up and divided by 300 to obtain the final expression of the contract’s market share.
In other words, the expressions of pok and p
a
















































1, u¯ji = max {u¯li}l 6=q0, u¯ji 6= max {u¯li}l 6=q
We estimated the model by using R environment and explored several opti-
mization routines for the minimization of the GMM objective function and the in-
version of the market shares. More particularly, we used these R packages: BB
12 See Nevo (2000) for more details.
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Table 5.1. Simulation results
Variable name True value
Case Ia Case IIb Case IIIb
Mean StD Mean StD Mean StD
Dummy 1c -1.2 -1.094 1.154 -2.395 0.797 -1.521 1.179
Dummy 2d -0.7 -0.270 1.026 -3.707 0.778 -1.866 1.1693
Interest rates 2.8 3.022 2.542 1.729 1.089 -0.640 1.633
Assets 1.7 1.982 1.851 1.097 0.609 -0.332 0.907
SA dummy 1.8 0.971 2.141 2.921 2.015 2.676 1.292
Search costs (c) 1.3 1.257 0.976 - - 0.073 1.213
a 20 simulations were performed
b 100 simulations were performed
c Has own customers
d No own customers
(BBsolve), nleqslv (nleqslv), SQUAREM ( fpiter) and neldermead (fminsearch) for solv-
ing the system of non-linear equations. Nleqslv solver uses the Newton method
and the numerical gradients of the objective function; BBsolve is a derivative-free
spectral approach for solving the systems of non-linear equations;13 fpiter employs
monotone, contraction mappings (including EM and MM algorithms); and finmin-
search is a function that minimizes the objective function by using the Nelder-Mead
algorithm. The inversion of the market shares with finminsearch achieved the toler-
ance criteria most often. Unfortunately this algorithm was very slow.14 Therefore,
we performed full model simulation and estimation procedures by using BBsolve.
For the minimization of the GMM objective function we used R environment func-
tion fminsearch.15 The estimation results are reported in Table 5.1 under the caption
Case I.
Assumptions about how many alternatives bank customers may compare have
a strong effect on the parameter estimates of the model. Thus, the estimated values
of δ and β depend on the assumptions about c and customer search behaviour. If
13 Reynaerts et al. (2010) performed the inversion of the market shares of BLP model by using BBsolve,
nleqslv and a BLP contraction mapping algorithm. They found that BBsolve was very successful in con-
vergence, this algorithm was faster than the Contraction mapping procedure and faster than nleqslv if
the analytical gradients were not provided.
14 It took about 2-4 days for one inversion.
15 We also tried standard R optimization routines nlm and optim, BBoptim. However, fminsearch con-
verged more accurately.
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the data is generated with costly consumer search but the model is estimated as if
the search costs are zero then the values of δ are not equal to their true values and
βˆ is biased. We simulated the market with costly consumer search and estimated
β by setting c = 0. The summary of 100 simulations is written in Table 5.1 and is
labeled Case II. The results show that the estimated values of β depart from their
true values a lot if the search cost is ignored.
Bank customers become less picky if they have positive search costs. In other
words, they accept worse bank reputation, lower interest rates than they would ac-
cept if the search costs were zero. As a result, the parameters in the utility function
of a bank customer are underestimated if the search cost is set equal to zero in the
estimation, while it is positive in reality. This result is clearly seen in our simulation
results, where the interest rate coefficient is biased downwards.
Finally, we checked how the parameters of the demand function changed if the
search costs were modeled as a characteristic of a contract instead of as a cost lim-
iting consumers’ consideration sets. In order to do this we generated the distance
variable by drawing 10 values from U (0, 7) for 10 banks. Then we assumed that
all bank customers searched two banks at most (there were no customers with zero
search costs and non-searching customers) and generated the market shares ac-
cording to above described procedure. In addition, the search costs were specified
as (c + ν)Dj on the LHS of (5.2) instead of c + ν. The variable Dj indicated the
distance to bank j. Afterwards we specified a different utility function for a bank
customer who signed contract k function, i.e.
uk = xkβ− (c + ν)Dj + ξk + εk = δk − νDj + εk (5.5)
where ν is bank and consumer specific term and ν ∼ U (−1, 1). The model was
estimated by assuming that bank customers had the utility specification (5.5) and
observed all the existing utilities of all the banks. The estimation results are written
in table 5.1 under the caption Case III. The estimated parameters are biased in this
case too. Furthermore, the parameter next to the interest rates is negative, which
points towards a misspecified model.
5.5 Discussion
“The purpose of demand estimation is often to retrieve price elasticities and to calculate
their effect on optimal pricing.”16 Thus, the specification of a demand function and its
16 Davis and Garcés (2010), Chapter 9 “Demand Estimation in Merger Analysis”.
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estimated parameters have a strong impact on the assessment of a potential merger,
the evaluation of new business regulations and investment. If the demand function
is erroneously specified then its application for further calculations leads to incor-
rect results. Hence, it is important to explore the behaviour of consumers and their
preferences for the correct specification of the demand function.
In this chapter we have presented a modification of the multinomial logit (MNL)
demand function by assuming costly consumer search. Contrarily to the standard
MNL assumption, in our model the choice set of a bank customer does not neces-
sarily contain all the saving contracts that exist in the market. Limited choice sets
arise due to positive search costs. If it is very costly for a customer to search a bank
then the customer may not include the offers of this bank into her consideration set.
Wrong assumptions about a consumer’s consideration set lead to biased parameter
estimates. Our simulation results show that the estimated parameters of the utility
function are biased downwards if search costs are positive and ignored or modeled
improperly in estimation.
The model estimation was run on simulated data. Furthermore, quite stringent
restrictions were imposed on customer search behaviour. If the model is estimated
with real data then the exact information about bank customer choices has to be
incorporated and other model specifications (e.g. non-sequential search, sequential
search with more than one search) should be explored. In addition, there are usu-
ally only a few banks in the retail banking market in a particular country. Therefore,
the time dimension of the data set is longer than the cross-sectional dimension. In-
terest rates tend to follow ARMA processes, the expenditures of households are
very likely to have some seasonal patterns. Thus, seasonal dummies and other
explanatory variables may have to be incorporated in the model with the real data.
If consumers search sequentially and the search order is not known then the
many-search-orders problem arises. With only a few banks one obtains rather many
multidimensional integrals that do not have analytical expressions. This makes the
estimation process very computationally intensive and slow. We had ten banks in
one period in the simulated model. Hence, ten non-linear equations (5.2) had to be
solved numerically for every draw of ν. As a result, the inversion of the market
shares was very time consuming. Hence, some other estimation routines have to
be explored.
Bayesian estimation procedures could be one of the options to make the esti-
mation process faster and less sensitive to starting parameter values. It has been
shown by Train (2009) that Bayesian procedures do not require to simulate the
170 Chapter 5
choice probabilities as many times as it is required for the maximization of the
likelihood function. This option reduces the estimation time. Moreover, “desirable
estimation properties, such as consistency and efficiency, can be attained under more relaxed
conditions”17. However, in our model the market share expressions encompass the
vector of unobservable product characteristics ξ, which has to be tackled in the esti-
mation process. Jiang et al. (2009) have proposed a method to estimate a mixed logit
model with aggregated data and with vector ξ in the utility function. Their simu-
lation results show that Bayes estimator has lower mean squared error than the
standard GMM estimator. Additionally, the Bayesian estimation procedure does
not require to use any instruments. However, this method still requires for an in-
version of the market shares, which implies that solutions for δ have to be obtained
for every iteration. Consequently, the problem of time consuming computational
routines remains.
17 Train (2009), Chapter 12 “Bayesian procedures”.
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Conclusion
6.1 Summary of findings and policy implications
Assumptions about how consumers form their consideration sets and obtain the
necessary information to ultimately conduct purchases have a strong impact on the
strategic decisions of firms, including their decisions on price-setting, incentives to
merge or collude, make long term investment, spend on advertising and promo-
tion, etc. The decisions of competition authorities about the likelihood of miscon-
duct of firms depend on the market modeling assumptions too. In this thesis, we
have investigated the role played by positive consumer search costs on a number of
strategic decisions by firms, including decisions on mergers, business reorganiza-
tion and collusion. The main insight obtained is that ignoring that search costs can
be significant in some markets may lead competition authorities to take the wrong
decisions, thereby dampening economic activity and growth.
In a seminal contribution, Salant et al. (1983) showed that a seller that mergers
with another firm earns less than in the pre-merger market when firms sell homo-
geneous products and compete by setting quantities. According to our analysis in
Chapter 2, this so-called merger paradox also arises in a horizontally differentiated
product market when firms compete by setting prices and consumer search costs
are sufficiently high. Consequently, when consumers find it quite costly to search
the market for satisfactory products there are no incentives to merge. If there are
no incentives to merge then it is very unlikely that a fraction of all the firms choose
to collude in the marketplace. Hence, if it is known that search costs are significant
in a particular market, then competition authorities may spend less resources on
market monitoring activities.
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A merger is often approved if it results in merger specific cost efficiencies. The
literature has focused on cost synergies or other forms of savings related to the
production process. However, merger-specific efficiencies can also emerge at the
demand side. It is shown in Chapter 3 of this thesis that firms that merge in a costly
search market have incentives to dismantle their existing single-product firms and
establish a multi-product store. In that case, if the search costs are sufficiently high,
then consumers save on their total search costs and their post-merger surplus is
higher than that in the pre-merger situation. Consequently, a merger is shown to
be welfare improving even if it does not yield any production costs’ efficiencies.
The economics literature has provided a good number of models in which con-
sumers end up paying higher equilibrium prices as search costs increase. In Chap-
ter 4 we show that there is one more threat for consumer surplus when the search
costs are positive, namely, that a cartel is more stable if consumer search is more
costly. This happens because high search costs make deviating from the cartel set-
up less attractive, as less customers observe the deviation. Therefore, if authorities
introduce and support initiatives to decrease consumer search costs, not only the
competitive equilibrium prices decrease but also collusion becomes more compli-
cated to sustain.1
As search costs increase, the average consideration set of a consumer shrinks.
Hence, with positive search costs consumers are less choosy and accept products
giving them lower utility than if search costs were negligible. As a result, estima-
tion of demand models produces biased estimates if, as it is current practice to date,
wrong assumption are made about search costs and search behavior. We show this
in chapter 5, where we model the demand for saving deposits. Bank customers ac-
cept lower interest rates if the search costs for saving contracts are positive. Hence,
provided that search costs are positive in reality, the interest rate coefficient is un-
derestimated if instead it is assumed that search costs are equal to zero.
6.2 Directions for future research
Armstrong et al. (2009) and Zhou (2009) have shown that symmetric firms can
charge different prices in equilibrium if consumers expect them to do so and re-
spond by searching them in an optimal order. They have shown that firms earn
1 For instance, the Central bank of Lithuania announces banking service fees of credit institutions on
its web-site; Dutch consumers can find much information on financial products (or get directed to some
comparison sites) on the web-site of AFM, can compare energy, telephone, internet contract offers on
more than 10 comparison web-sites; Irish national consumer agency provides information about the
contracts for banking, insurance services, etc.
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more if they are prominent. Thus, sellers have incentives to pay for prominence,
e.g. invest in advertising. However, symmetric firms have the same incentives
to advertise. Hence, there is no equilibrium in pure advertising strategies and no
seller would become prominent in the pre-merger market (see Haan and Moraga-
González (2011)).
A merger introduces asymmetries between firms because of the internalization
of pricing externalities. Hence, the incentives for firms to invest in prominence may
differ across merged and non-merged firms. As a result, it would be interesting to
explore the process of the formation of consumer expectations and how this process
can be affected by e.g. advertising . In Chapter 2 of this thesis we have shown that
there may be equilibria where the price of a merger is less than the price of the non-
merged firms and, consequently, it is optimal for consumers to start their search
for a satisfactory match at the merger. This equilibrium is driven by consumer
expectations that are later confirmed. This equilibrium was valid just for some sets
of parameter values. It would be worth to examine whether this equilibrium in the
only equilibrium once we allow the firms to buy prominence in the marketplace.
A merger that yields search cost savings for consumers may be welfare improv-
ing, as shown in Chapter 3. In our modeling, however, we assumed that searching
within the merged store is costless. This assumption may be unrealistic in situa-
tions where there are very many varieties being sold in the merged entity. When
consumers must incur some smaller search cost to find the best variety within the
merged entity, then the search costs and the expected benefit per variety in the
merged entity depends on the search-history of a consumer. Hence, the myopic
search rule (see Kohn and Shavell (1974) and Weitzman (1979)) is probably not
valid any longer. Similarly, a consumer may get some information about not-yet-
searched sellers when visiting other shops. Also in this case the expected benefits
of an additional search would be search-history dependent. In future work, it may
be interesting to look at history-dependent search processes and analyze them in
more detail.
In Chapter 4 we have proposed a rather general saving deposit demand model
but we have only analyzed in detail a simplified version of it. It may be the case
that bank customers search more than one bank, or that the coefficients of the utility
function are consumer specific. Therefore, it is worth to explore more sophisticated
versions of the model, e.g. the random coefficients MNL. Another issue is that we
did not estimate the model with real-world data, because of lack of them. Hence,
applying the model to a particular market is a natural step we plan to take in the
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years to come. Finally, since the three stage optimization procedure we used in our
chapter proves to be very time consuming, it would be interesting to explore other
estimation methods for our model.
Samenvatting (Dutch
Summary)
Een fusie tussen twee of meer bedrijven is doorgaans bevorderlijk voor de fusiepart-
ners, maar schadelijk voor consumenten omdat hun surplus afneemt. Het klassieke
model in Salant, Switzer, en Reynolds (1983) toont aan dat bedrijven nooit meer
winst kunnen genereren als een fusie te klein is en de bedrijven met elkaar concur-
reren op hoeveelheden (à la Cournot). De situatie verandert echter als concurrentie
op prijzen de norm is, a la Bertrand. In dat geval verdienen zowel de fusiepartners
als hun concurrenten na de fusie meer dan voor het samengaan. Het consumenten-
surplus neemt altijd na de concentratie af, omdat de prijzen na de fusie toenemen.
Dit negatieve effect voor consumenten kan minder worden als de productiekosten
van fusiepartners na de concentratie afnemen, en de kwaliteit of de breedte van het
assortiment van producten toenemen. Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de economis-
che literatuur door te analyseren wat de invloed is van zoekkosten (’search costs’)
op prikkels voor fusies, en hoe de fusie van invloed is op de welvaart van con-
sumenten en producenten.
In een markt met productdifferentiatie en Bertrand competitie wordt de mark-
tmacht van bedrijven sterker als de zoekkosten toenemen. Bovendien heeft de
zoekvolgorde een invloed op prijzen en winsten van bedrijven. De winkels aan
het begin van de zoekvolgorde vragen lagere prijzen dan de winkels aan het eind
van de zoekvolgorde. Daardoor is het optimaal voor consumenten om in deze vol-
gorde naar het product te zoeken waar de consument de meeste waarde aan hecht.
Als er in deze markt een fusie plaatsvindt, zal er een verschil ontstaan tussen de
prijs van fusiepartners en de prijs van hun concurrenten. Daarom verandert ook de
zoekvolgorde in de (post-fusie) markt. In Hoofdstuk 1 nemen wij aan dat de fusie
partners geen aanpassingen maken in hun assortiment of locatie, behalve dat ze pri-
jzen gezamenlijk vaststellen. Er bestaat een marktevenwicht in ons model waar de
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prijs van de fusie partners is hoger dan de prijs van hun concurrenten. Daarom be-
zoeken consumenten eerst de concurrenten van de fusie voordat zij naar de winkels
van de fusiepartners gaan. Consumenten zoeken minder als de zoekkosten stijgen.
Daardoor verkopen de bedrijven aan het eind van de zoekvolgorde minder dan
de anderen, bij een toename van de zoekkosten. Volgens onze analyse in Hoofd-
stuk 1 zullen, als de zoekkosten hoog zijn, de fusiepartners veel minder goederen
verkopen dan ze voor de fusie verkochten. Daardoor kan de fusie paradox, die in
de markt met homogene producten door Salant et al. gevonden is, ook in de markt
met Bertrand competitie plaatsvinden.
Rationele consumenten zullen hun zoektocht beginnen bij de winkels met het
hoogste verwachte consumentensurplus. Een winkel is aantrekkelijker als ze een
lagere prijs kan bieden of de zoekkosten voor de consument verlaagt. Het is meestal
niet optimaal voor de fusiepartners hun prijs lager dan de prijs van hun concur-
renten te stellen. Daarom kan de fusie de zoekkosten proberen te verminderen. In
Hoofdstuk 2 nemen wij aan dat de fusie partners al hun goederen in hun geza-
menlijke winkel tentoonstellen. Zodoende kunnen consumenten voor dezelfde
zoekkosten meerdere productvarianten vinden. Als zoekkosten hoog zijn, zullen
consumenten dan ook bij de fusiewinkel beginnen te zoeken, ondanks dat de fusiepart-
ners een hogere prijs vragen dan de concurrentie. De fusie leidt in dit geval tot een
hogere winst voor de fuserende bedrijven, terwijl hun concurrenten minder verdi-
enen dan voor de fusie. Bovendien wordt het consumentensurplus hoger door de
fusie omdat op zoekkosten wordt bespaard. De totale welvaart na de fusie is hoger
dan voor de fusie.
Zoekkosten hebben een invloed op de stabiliteit van geheime afspraken tussen
bedrijven. Zonder zoekkosten hangt de stabiliteit van het kartel af hoe winstgevend
het is af te wijken van de gemaakte afspraken. Hoofdstuk 3 toont aan dat deze
winstgevendheid kleiner wordt als zoekkosten toenemen. De reden hiervoor is dat
consumenten minder vaak zoeken, en minder consumenten de afwijking van de
kartelafspraken opmerken. Bovendien zijn kartelafspraken tussen bedrijven on-
aantrekkelijker als de zoekkosten toenemen, omdat er minder concurrentie tussen
de bedrijven is. Volgens ons resultaat neemt de kritieke verdisconteringsvoet waar-
boven het kartel niet stabiel is toe als de zoekkosten afnemen. Daarom is een kartel
stabieler als de markt minder transparant is. Kortom, de kans op een kartel is hoger
als de zoekkosten hoog zijn. Ons resultaat spreekt tegen het resultaat van Green
en Porter (1984). Zij vonden dat een kartel minder stabiel is als de markt minder
transparant wordt. Zij hebben de transparantie van een markt vanuit het stand-
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punt van bedrijven onderzocht, terwijl onze analyse gaat om de transparantie van
een markt vanuit het standpunt van consumenten.
Het aantal producten dat een consument vergelijkt voordat een aankoop wordt
gedaan hangt af van de hoogte van zoekkosten. Daarom zijn de parameters van
een berekend marktmodel van vraag en aanbod onjuist als de zoekkosten in de
specificatie van het model genegeerd zijn. We bieden in Hoofdstuk 4 een meth-
ode aan om de zoekkosten in de markt met productdifferentiatie en multi-product
bedrijven te berekenen. Het model is ontwikkeld voor de vraag naar spaardepos-
ito’s bij banken, en is zeer computerintensief. Desondanks kan deze methode ook
in andere markten met een beperkt aantal ondernemingen toegepast worden.

References
Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and S. Ennio (1985). Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect
monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory 39, 251–269.
Albæk, S. and L. Lambertini (1998). Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited.
Economics Letters 59(3), 305–308.
Anderson, S. P. and R. Renault (1999). Pricing, product diversity, and search cost:
a Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond model. RAND Journal of Economics 30(4), 719–
735.
Arbatskaya, M. (2007). Ordered search. RAND Journal of Economics 38(1), 119–126.
Armstrong, M., J. Vickers, and J. Zhou (2009). Prominence and consumer search.
RAND Journal of Economics 40(2), 209–233.
Bar-Isaac, H., G. Caruana, and V. Cuñat (2011). Search, design, and market struc-
ture. Unpublished manuscript.
Bexley, J. B. (2005). Why customers choose community banks: an empirical study.
Journal of Commercial Banking and Finance 4, 81–89.
Boot, A. W. A. (2007). Competitiveness assessment and key issues for the Dutch
retail banking sector. Report for OECD.
Boyd, W. L., L. Myron, and C. White (1994). Customer preferences for financial
services: an analysis. International Journal of Bank Marketing 12, 9–15.
Brynjolfsson, E., A. A. Dick, and M. D. Smith (2010). A nearly perfect market.
Quantitative Marketing and Economics 8, 1–33.
Burdett, K. and K. L. Judd (1983). Equilibrium price dispersion. Econometrica 51(4),
955–969.
180 REFERENCES
Caplin, A. and B. Nalebuff (1991). Aggregation and imperfect competition: on the
existence of equilibrium. Econometrica 59(1), 25–59.
Chang, M.-H. (1991). The effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 9, 453–469.
Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading (2010, September). Merger
assessment guidelines. Joint publication with OFT.
Davis, P. and E. Garcés (2010). Quantitative techniques for competition and antitrust
analysis. Princeton University Press.
De los Santos, B., A. Hortaçsu, and M. R. Wildenbeest (2011). Testing models of
consumer search using data on web browsing and purchasing behavior. American
Economic Review. forthcoming.
Deneckere, R. and C. Davidson (1985). Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand
competition. The RAND Journal of Economics 16(4), 473–486.
Deneckere, R. J. (1983). Duopoly supergames with product differentiation. Eco-
nomics Letters 11(1-2), 37–42.
Devlin, J. and P. Gerrard (2005). A study of customer choice criteria for multiple
bank users. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 12, 297–306.
Devlin, J. F. (2002). Customer knowledge and choice criteria in retail banking. Jour-
nal of Strategic Marketing 10, 273–290.
Devlin, J. F. and P. Gerrard (2004). Choice criteria in retail banking an analysis of
trends. Journal of Strategic Marketing 12, 13–27.
DGCompetition (2010). Best practices for the submission of economic evidence and
data collection in cases concerning the application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU
and in merger cases.
Diamond, P. A. (1971). A model of price adjustment. Journal of Economic Theory 3(2),
156–168.
Dick, A. A. (2008). Demand estimation and consumer welfare in the banking in-
dustry. Journal of Banking & Finance 32, 1661–1676.
Draganska, M. and D. Klapper (2010). Choice set heterogeneity and the role of
advertising: An analysis with micro and macro data. Journal of Marketing Re-
search 48(4), 653–669.
REFERENCES 181
Dubois, P. and H. Perrone (2010, February). Price dispersion and search costs:
the roles of imperfect information and product differentiation. Unpublished
manuscript.
Dudey, M. (1990). Competition by choice: the effect of consumer search on firm
location decisions. American Economic Review 80, 1902–1105.
Ellison, G. and S. F. Ellison (2009). Search, obfuscation, and price elasticities on the
internet. Econometrica 77(2), 427–452.
Ellison, G. and A. Wolitzky (2009, September). A search cost model of obfuscation.
NBER Working Paper 15237.
European Central Bank (2010, September). EU banking structures.
European Commission (2007, June). Expert group on customer mobility in relation
to bank accounts.
European Commission (2009). Tying and other potentially unfair commercial prac-
tices in the retail financial service sector.
European Commission (2010a, April). EU Competition Law. Rules Applicable to
Merger Control. European Union. Competition handbook.
European Commission (2010b). Summary of responses to the public consultation
on the study on tying and other potentially unfair commercial practices in the
retail financial service sector.
Farrel, J. and C. Shapiro (1990). Horizontal mergers: An equilibrium analysis. Amer-
ican Economic Review 80(1), 107–126.
Federal Trade Commission (2010, August). Horizontal merger guidelines.
Fischer, J. H. and J. E. Harrington Jr (1996). Product variety and firm agglomeration.
RAND Journal of Economics 27(2), 281–309.
Focarelli, D. and F. Panetta (2003). Are mergers beneficial to consumers? Evidence
from the market of bank deposits. American Economic Review 93, 1152–1172.
Friedman, J. W. (1971). A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of
Economic Studies 38(1), 1–12.
Green, E. J. and R. H. Porter (1984). Non-cooperative collusion under imperfect
price information. Econometrica 52(1), 87–100.
182 REFERENCES
Haan, M. A. and J. L. Moraga-González (2011). Advertising for attention in a con-
sumer search model. Economic Journal 121, 552–579.
Häckner, J. (1995). Endogenous product design in an infinitely repeated game. In-
ternational Journal of Industrial Organization 13, 277–299.
Ho, K. and J. Ishii (2011). Location and competition in retail banking. International
Journal of Industrial Organization 29, 537–546.
Hong, H. and M. Shum (2006). Using price distributions to estimate search costs.
RAND Journal of Economics 37(2), 257–275.
Honka, E. (2010, September). Quantifying search and switching costs in the U.S.
auto insurance industry. Unpublished manuscript.
Hortaçsu, A. and C. Syverson (2004). Product differentiation, search costs, and
competition in the mutual fund industry: a case study of S&P 500 index funds.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 403–456.
Ishii, J. (2005, November). Compatibility, competition, and investment in network
industries: ATM networks in the banking industry. Unpublished manuscript.
Ivaldi, M., B. Jullien, P. Rey, P. Seabright, and J. Tirole (2003a). The economics of
Tacit collusion. IDEI Working Paper No. 186.
Ivaldi, M., B. Jullien, P. Rey, P. Seabright, and J. Tirole (2003b). The economics of
unilateral effects. IDEI Working Paper No. 222.
Jacquemin, A. and M. E. Slade (1989). Cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger.
Volume 1 of Handbook of Industrial Organization, pp. 415–473. Elsevier.
Janssen, M. C. and J. L. Moraga-González (2007, July). On mergers in consumer
search markets. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-054/1.
Janssen, M. C. W. and J. L. Moraga-González (2004). Strategic pricing, consumer
search and the number of firms. Review of Economic Studies 71, 1089–1118.
Janssen, M. C. W., J. L. Moraga-González, and M. R. Wildenbeest (2005). Truly
costly sequential search and oligopolistic pricing. International Journal of Industrial
Organization 23, 451–466.
Jehiel, P. (1992). Product differentiation and price collusion. International Journal of
Industrial Organization 10, 633–641.
REFERENCES 183
Jiang, R., P. Manchanda, and P. E. Rossi (2009). Bayesian analysis of random coeffi-
cient logit models using aggregate data. Journal of Econometrics 149, 136–148.
Kim, E. H. and V. Singal (1993, June). Mergers and market power: evidence from
the airline industry. American Economic Review 83(3), 549–69.
Kim, J. B., P. Albuquerque, and B. J. Bronnenberg (2010). Online demand under
limited consumer search. Marketing Science 29, 1001–1023.
Klemperer, P. (1992). Equilibrium product lines: competing head-to-head may be
less competitive. American Economic Review 82(4), 740–755.
Klemperer, P. and J. A. Padilla (1997). Do firms’ product lines include too many
varieties? RAND Journal of Economics 28(3), 472–488.
Knauff, M. (2006, February). Market transparency and Bertrand competition. CORE
Discussion Paper No. 2006037.
Knittel, C. R. and V. Stango (2008). Incompatibility, product attributes and con-
sumer welfare: evidence from ATMs. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 8.
Kohn, M. G. and S. Shavell (1974, October). The theory of search. Journal of Economic
Theory 9(2), 93–123.
Koulayev, S. (2010, March). Estimating demand in online search markets with ap-
plication to hotel bookings. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No.
09-16.
Lee, J. and J. Marlowe (2003). How consumers choose a financial institution:
decision-making criteria and heuristics. International Journal of Bank Marketing 21,
53–71.
Lelieveldt, S. (2006). The Dutch interbank switching support service.
Lommerud, K. E. and L. Sørgard (1997). Merger and product range rivalry. Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization 16(1), 21 – 42.
McAfee, R. P. and M. A. Williams (1992). Horizontal mergers and antitrust policy.
Journal of Industrial Economics 40(2), 181–187.
Molnár, J., M. Nagy, and C. Horváth (2007). A structural empirical analysis of retail
banking competition: the case of Hungary. MNB Working Papers No. 2007/1.
184 REFERENCES
Moraga-González, J. L. and V. Petrikaite˙ (2011a). Consumer search costs and the
incentives to merge under Bertrand competition. Tinbergen Institute Discussion
Paper No. 11-099/1.
Moraga-González, J. L. and V. Petrikaite˙ (2011b). Horizontal mergers and
economies of search. Unpublished manuscript.
Moraga-González, J. L., Z. Sándor, and M. R. Wildenbeest (2010). On the identifi-
cation of the costs of simultaneous search. Indiana University, Kelley School of
Business Working Paper No. 2010-10.
Moraga-González, J. L., Z. Sándor, and M. R. Wildenbeest (2011, February). Con-
sumer search and prices in the automobile market. Unpublished manuscript.
Moraga-González, J. L. and M. R. Wildenbeest (2008). Maximum likelihood estima-
tion of search costs. European Economic Review 52, 820–848.
Nakane, M., L. S. Alencar, and F. Kanczuk (2006, June). Demand for bank services
and market power in Brazilian banking. Banco Central Do Brasil Working Paper
No. 107.
Nevo, A. (2000). A practitioner’s guide to estimation of random-coefficients logit
models of demand. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 9, 513–548.
Nevo, A. (2001). Measuring market power in the ready-to-eat cereal industry.
Econometrica 69(2), 307–342.
Nilson, A. (1999, December). Transparency and competition. Stockholm School of
Economics Working Paper No. 298.
Non, M. (2010, January). Joining forces to attract consumers: location choice in a
consumer search model. MPRA Working Paper No. 20044.
OECD (2007, September). Review of competition in the Dutch retail banking sector.
Office of Fair Trading (2010, December). Advertising of prices.
Paswan, A. K., N. Spears, R. Hasty, and G. Ganesh (2004). Search quality in the
financial services industry: a contingency perspective. Journal of Services Market-
ing 18, 324–338.
Perloff, J. M. and S. C. Salop (1985). Equilibrium with product differentiation. Re-
view of Economic Studies 52(1), 107–120.
REFERENCES 185
Perry, M. K. and R. H. Porter (1985). Oligopoly and the incentive for horizontal
merger. American Economic Review 75(1), 219–227.
Porter, R. H. (1991). A review essay on Handbook of industrial organization. Journal
of Economic Literature 29, 553–572.
Prager, R. A. and T. H. Hannan (1998). Do substantial horizontal mergers generate
significant price effects? Evidence from the banking industry. Journal of Industrial
Economics 46(4), 433–452.
Reynaerts, J., R. Varadhan, and J. C. Nash (2010). The convergence properties of the
blp (1995) contraction mapping and alternative algorithms in R. Unpublished
manuscript.
Robert, J. and D. O. Stahl II (1993). Informative price advertising in a sequential
search model. Econometrica 61(3), 657–686.
Röller, L.-H. (2006). Economic analysis and competition policy enforcement in Eu-
rope. In Modelling European Mergers: Theory, Competition Policy and Case Studies.
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Ross, T. W. (1992). Cartel stability and product differentiation. International Journal
of Industrial Organization 10, 1–13.
Rothschild, R. (1997). Product differentiation and cartel stability: Chamberlin ver-
sus Hotelling. Annals of Regional Science 31, 259–271.
Salant, S. W., S. Switzer, and R. J. Reynolds (1983). Losses from horizontal merger:
the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equi-
librium. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(2), 185–199.
Schultz, C. (2005). Transparency on the consumer side and Tacit collusion. European
Economic Review 49(2), 279–297.
Schultz, C. (2009, January). Collusion in markets with imperfect price information
on both sides. CIE Discussion Paper No. 2009-01.
Schultz, N. and K. Stahl (1996). Do consumers search for the highest price?
oligopoly equilibrium and monopoly optimum in differentiated-products mar-
ket. RAND Journal of Economics 27(3), 542–562.
Shapiro, C. (1989). Theories of oligopoly behavior. Volume 1 of Handbook of Indus-
trial Organization, pp. 329–414. Elsevier.
186 REFERENCES
Stahl, D. O. (1989). Oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search. American
Economic Review 79(4), 700–712.
Stahl, K. (1982). Differentiated products, consumer search, and locational oligopoly.
Journal of Industrial Economics 31, 97–113.
Stigler, G. J. (1961). The economics of information. The Journal of Political Econ-
omy 69(3), 213–225.
Stigler, G. J. (1964). A theory of oligopoly. The Journal of Political Economy 72(1),
44–61.
Train, K. E. (2009). Discrete choice methods with simulation. Cambridge University
press.
Varian, H. R. (1980). A model of sales. American Economic Review 70(4), 651–659.
Weitzman, M. L. (1979). Optimal search for the best alternative. Econometrica 47(3),
641–654.
Whinston, M. (2006). Lectures on antitrust economics. Cairoli lecture series. MIT
Press.
Whinston, M. D. (2007). Antitrust policy toward horizontal mergers. Volume 3 of
Handbook of Industrial Organization, pp. 2369–2440. Elsevier.
Wildenbeest, M. R. (2011). An empirical model of search with vertically differenti-
ated products. RAND Journal of Economics. forthcoming.
Williamson, O. E. (1968). Economies as an antitrust defense: The welfare tradeoffs.
American Economic Review 58(1), 18–36.
Wilson, C. M. (2010). Ordered search and equilibrium obfuscation. International
Journal of Industrial Organization 28, 496–506.
Wolinsky, A. (1983). Retail trade concentration due to consumers’imperfect infor-
mation. Bell Journal of Economics 14(1), 275–282.
Wolinsky, A. (1986). True monopolistic competition as a result of imperfect infor-
mation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(3), 493–512.
Wolinsky, A. (2005). Procurement via sequential search. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 113(4), 785–810.
REFERENCES 187
Zhou, J. (2009). Prominence and consumer search: the case with multiple promi-
nent firms. MPRA Working Paper No. 12554.
Zhou, J. (2011). Ordered search in differentiated markets. International Journal of
Industrial Organization 29(2), 253–262.
Zhou, X. (2008, December). Estimation of the impact of mergers in the banking
industry with historical data on mergers. Unpublished manuscript.

